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Chapter 1
Socially Responsible Investments
1
Sousa, Carlota
Abstract
Due to globalization and, consequently, to the awareness of society, new concepts have emerged,
among them Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), which has grown in the last decades. This
article has as main objectives: to understand the concept of SRI, how it came about and its
importance for society; how can I practice it, and I get advantages in doing so; the distribu-
tion in the market and finally the determinants of SRI from the substantial differences in the
size of the national ISR market in 15 developed countries between 2005 and 2013, using the
preliminary model proposed by Scholtens and Sieva¨nen (2013). The SRI market is larger in
Europe. SRI gains advantages such as social justice, ethics, and increased competitiveness;
however, they may be at greater risk because of lower profit margins and the possibility of
lower return on investment. Of the four SRI determinants: institutions, culture, economic
and financial development, it was possible to conclude that economic development positively
impacts the size of SRI market; a female society exhibits more sustainable investments; in-
dividualism positively affects SRI; long-term orientation conditions economic growth, which
positively affects SRI; institutions condition economic and financial development and cultural
differences condition institutions, economic development and finance. The present study also
analyzed mediation effects of the previously mentioned variables and the empirical results did
not support the proposed mediation effects, indicating that institutions are not conditioned
to economic and financial development.
”Every day nature produces enough for our lack. If each one took what was needed, there
was no poverty in the world and no one would starve.” Mahatma Gandhi
”Today’s humanity has the capacity to develop in a sustainable way, but it is necessary to
guarantee the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.” Agenda 21
”If you have goals for a year. Plant rice. If you have goals for 10 years. Plant a tree. If you
have goals for 100 years, then educate a child. If you have goals for 1000 years, then preserve
the environment.” Confu´cio
Keywords: Socially Responsible Investing, institutions, culture, economic development, fi-
nancial development, ethics.
1This paper is based on Jansen, L. (2016), Socially responsible investments: An empirical
study on the heterogeneity across developed countries (Master’s Thesis).
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 1 Introduction 
Due to the accelerated technological growth from the industrial revolution and the progres-
sive increase of population, human activity started to cause more negative influence on the 
environment (Maciel, 2012). Considering the limitation of natural resources, the concern with 
sustainability becomes increasingly evident (Mendonça, 2006). 
Given this panorama, companies are restructured to adapt to this new perception, since 
society is increasingly attentive to the conduct of companies, demanding information about the 
products and services offered, and about the treatment of employees and to the environment 
(Maciel, 2012). The company systematically imposes an ethical and coherent position on the 
part of the companies and their managers (Macedo, 2007). 
According to Correia (2003), the sustainable development and the general improvement of 
the quality of life have been priorities assumed. In this context, the concepts of Social Respon-
sibility and Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) have been spreading (Maciel, 2012). Con-
cerned with this concern, financial markets have created indexes and funds whose prerequisite 
for company participation is to have a differentiated performance in terms of business sustain-
ability (Maciel, 2012). Its investors are interested in this type of asset, because of personal 
commitment, or because they believe that these companies generate shareholder value in the 
long term, since they are more prepared to face economic, social and environmental risks (LUZ, 
2009 apud BOVESPA, 2008). 
The Wall Street Journal (2016) reported in January that “sustainable investing goes main-
stream”, reflecting the awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the investment 
community is increasing (Jansen, 2016). 
In this way, socially responsible investments (SRI) are growing rapidly and challenge con-
ventional investment strategies, taking into account ethical, social and environmental issues 
(Eurosif, 2014). 
Whereas conventional investment strategies focus on financial criteria, SRI look beyond 
these financial criteria and combine the concerns on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues (Jansen, 2016). A key motive of socially responsible investors is to exert influence 
on firms to stimulate them in becoming more sustainable (Cochran, 2007).  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an issue that has been under study in recent years, 
however, only with the globalization and increased business competitiveness is that companies 
have become more for the concept by studying and building it (Pereira, 2016). 
Starting in the 1990s, the good corporate reputation associated with CSR emerges (Pereira, 
2016). Today, companies come to their mission beyond profit-making, increasingly impelled 
to do more and better for society, feeling as true social and environmental sustainability (Pe-
reira, 2016). 
Although the first concern is the obtaining of profit, the companies can, contribute to the 
achievement of social and environmental objectives through the integration of social responsi-
bility as a strategic investment (Pereira, 2016). 
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 In Portugal, a CSR issue is gaining weight and contributes greatly to the 64º /1, b) of the 
CSC, since the undertaking by a company to take account of the of stakeholders, in view of the 
duties of administrators (Pereira, 2016). On the other hand, "Proactive Law" appears as encour-
aging societies to adopt socially responsible (Pereira, 2016). 
Since executives are convinced that increasing sustainability will only increase costs with-
out benefits directly, they make a trade-off between creating social value and the value of the 
company. As a result the investor’ preferences are influenced by the trade-off between risk 
and return (utility), values, tastes and status (expressions), and feelings (emotions) (Statman, 
2014). 
Although concern with ethical doctrine and social responsibility has existed since the origin 
of capitalism, such concern is in the forefront of our times, as ethics in the investment world 
has a great influence on decision-making. 
As I am not aware of this subject, this article will be based on other work already done. 
Thus, this article aims to:  
 Understand the concept of SRI, how important it is today and where it came from; 
 Understand how SRIs are distributed on the market; 
 Understand how I can practice a socially responsible investment and what its determi-
nants; 
What are the pros and cons in adopting SRI (whether or not I get paid back, more useful); 
To verify if the adoption of social responsibility practices by companies contributes to good 
economic and financial performance and if socially responsible companies are also those that 
present better economic and financial performance, assuming that ethical and socially respon-
sible conduct can be a good step towards the development of society; 
Finally, identify the determinants that explain the substantial differences in the size of the 
national ISR market in 15 developed countries between 2005 and 2013.  
This article is divided into 3 sections: 
 Firstly, topics will be discussed for a better understanding of SRI (literature and back-
ground review), namely, its history, its definition, existing hypotheses about SRI return, 
advantages and disadvantages, determinants of SRI, SRI in practive, and also the dif-
ferences between SRI funds vs. conventional funds. 
 Then, all the methods and data used in the work will be mentioned (research and data 
methodology), based on the preliminary model of the SRI determinants, as a starting 
point, by Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) presented in the previous section. Based on 
the results obtained, an interpretation will still be made. 
 Finally, I will mention the positives and negatives of this article (sensitivity analysis 
and conclusion) as well as possible ideas for later studies. 
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 2 Literature and Background Review 
This section provides all necessary definitions of concepts, as well as the description of the 
problem according to several authors and their conclusions, in order to better understand the 
concept of socially responsible investments. 
2.1 History of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and your definition 
Studying SRI forces us to go back to the 1960s and 1970s, because at that time investors 
were convinced that unison action could influence a company's practices and policies through 
the market mechanism (Wu, 2012). By not buying or selling shares of large-scale companies, 
investors can make a difference (Cochran, 2007). 
Emerging interest in SRI has created sustainable indexes, such as the Dow Jones Sustain-
ability Index, Ethibel, FTSE4, Humanix, Jantzi and the Social Domini Index (Wu, 2012). These 
indices list the companies that do best in a specific sector in relation to sustainability issues, 
using negative and positive ratings (Wu, 2012). Negative screening excludes companies that 
operate in unethical sectors or produce unethical products or services, such as tobacco, weapons 
and gambling, while positive screening concentrates on companies or sectors that incorporate 
social, environmental and governmental governance (Renneboog, Horst & Zhang, 2008). By 
using one or both types of screening, RS investors take into account companies corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) practices when making investment decisions (Wu, 2012). 
Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) argue that SRI and CSR are gradually linked since "SRI 
allows investors to invest responsibly by integrating social and governance criteria and CSR 
provides a framework for analyzing how investment goals work in ESG (Environment, Social 
and Governance) areas" (Scholtens & Sievänen, 2013). SRI grew rapidly. 
SRI started with a small group of individual investors who made socially responsible in-
vestments, which became an investment philosophy implemented by institutional investors 
(Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). 
There are several terms to refer to the concept of Socially Responsible Investment, what is 
not new. This concept has long been part of the investment world (Wu, 2012). The definition 
of SRI has evolved over time (Wu, 2012). The initial view was narrower and excluded from 
this field only the companies belonging to highly controversial sectors such as arms, tobacco 
and pornography (Wu, 2012). With the rise of emerging economies - countries with billions of 
human lives - increased environmental concerns and the urgency of sustainable development 
globally (Wu, 2012). SRI has expanded borders and has demanded that companies also have 
good practices in terms of impact on the environment, the fight against corruption and workers' 
rights (Wu, 2012). 
According to the Bunge Foundation (2008): "Socially Responsible Investments are invest-
ment decisions that, in addition to the traditional financial considerations to measure the per-
formance of companies or their investment option, take into account environmental and social 
criteria". 
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 The Ethos Institute (2008) conceptualizes Socially Responsible Investment in the follow-
ing way: "It is what counts, in addition, the financial results for the investor, environmental, 
ethical and/or social". 
As Pimentel (2006) states in the US, the most common terms are Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI), Responsible Investment and Social Investment; Meanwhile, in the UK and 
Australia, the term Ethical Investment is common. Holland and Germany, a company special-
izing in advertising, use the term Green Investment, and in Europe, generally adopts the term 
Sustainable Investment. Already in Asia, the main organization that takes care of the subject - 
ASRIA - coined the concept of Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI), that comes with 
the same acronym of American nomenclature. In Brazil, it is used more frequently with the 
translation of the American term, that is, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is one way to fit portfolios to various ethical goals 
(Wu, 2012). Mercer (2008) defines SRI as the integration of environmental, social and corpo-
rate governance (ESG) considerations into investment management processes and ownership 
practices with the hope that these factors can have an impact on financial performance. Inves-
tors and people all around are starting to be more socially conscious with their investments 
(Wu, 2012). Either if they are in the marketplace or just buying groceries, people are 2 starting 
to care for the environment (Mercer, 2008). SRI investors are at the same time wondering about 
how to get the best return from their investment and how that investment will impact society 
(Wu, 2012). Investors who are socially responsible are putting increasing pressure on corpora-
tions to improve their practices on social and environmental issues (Wu, 2012). This investment 
strategy works to enhance the financial, social, and environmental triple bottom lines of the 
companies in question (Wu, 2012). In doing so, it aims to deliver better long term returns to 
shareholders. Socially responsible investors include individuals and corporations and comprise 
universities, hospitals, foundations, insurance companies, public and private pension funds and 
non-profit organizations (Wu, 2012). Institutional investors represent the largest and fastest 
growing segment of the SRI world. Generally, social investors seek to own profitable compa-
nies that make positive contributions to society (Mercer, 2008).    
Following the chronological reasoning of Pimentel (2006), the origin of the ISR has a 
strong connection with religion, since the churches played the role of institutional investors, 
and their followers, of individual investors, used their moral principles to withdraw from their 
universe of investments of companies that worked in sectors that met these principles (Bezerra, 
Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). This phenomenon happened mainly in the 
United States and the United Kingdom (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 
2009). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, ISR was no longer considered as an investment modality for the 
religious community alone, since the social movements of the time - such as the civil and wom-
en's rights movements, environmental protection and the anti- war - impacted directly on such 
expansion and consolidation of this theme (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 
2009). Another event of great international repercussion for the SRI was the opposition to apart-
heid in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, with capital flight in public bonds and stocks of 
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 companies doing business in that country (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 
2009).  
Still, according to Pimentel (2006), the sophistication of financial markets and the popu-
larization of investment funds also contributed to the strengthening of ISR. 
In 1950 came the first socially responsible investment fund in the United States, named 
Pioneer Fund (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). The fund excluded 
shares in companies in the liquor, tobacco and gambling sectors known as 'addiction industries' 
or 'sin actions' and was intended to adapt to the demands of Christian investors (Bezerra, Lagi-
oia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). The fund still exists today (Bezerra, Lagioia, 
Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). 
Throughout the 1970s, more funds came into being, such as the Pioneer Fund, but in addi-
tion to excluding 'sin actions' they also took environmental and social issues into account, 
thereby excluding nuclear energy, labor relations and human rights (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, 
Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). 
As noted, the initiative taken for individual and collective awareness of the importance of 
sustainable economic development came from non-governmental organizations (Bezerra, La-
gioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). These initiatives have influenced new models of 
corporate and even governmental management (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vascon-
celos, 2009). 
In 2005 came the Corporate Sustainability Index (CSI) in Brazil (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, 
Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). This index, modeled on the American standards, was com-
posed only of corporate actions that stand out in social responsibility and sustainability, aiming 
to gather those that are seen as more prosperous because of this characteristic and also act as 
promoter of good practices in the business environment (Lopes, 2006). 
According to Marques apud Lopes (2008), the creation of the CSI was due to the natural 
demand of the Brazilian market, which would already be mature enough to have an indicator 
capable of evaluating the performance of shares of companies with these characteristics and 
compares with the other Ibovespa participants. 
It must be stressed though, that there are substantial problems associated with the fact, that 
the concept of SRI is so open to interpretation (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011).  
The funds operate with subjective SRI definitions and selection criteria, which mean that 
they can be of very different character and operate with different investment universes (Norup 
& Gottlieb, 2011). As a consequence, the overall performance results of a sample or a portfolio 
of SRI funds might not be reliable (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). 
2.2  The market of SRI 
During the last two decades the unprecedented growth in the SRI market has made it more 
and more important (Wu, 2012). The 2009 size of the worldwide SRI market is approximately 
5 trillion dollars, with 53% market share of the SRI market based in Europe, 39% from the 
United States, and 8% from the rest of the world (Hross, 2010). 
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 The GoodPlanet research news indicates that between 2004 and 2006, Canadian SRI mar-
ket assets increased from $65bn to $504bn by June 30, 2006, growing by almost 700% (Wu, 
2012). The size of the UK SRI sector was about 781 billion pounds at the end of 2005 (Wu, 
2012). The SRI market in the US had a size of $639 billion in 1995 and $2,159 billion in 1999 
suggesting an average annual growth rate of 36% (Wu, 2012). This amount grew only to $2,290 
billion from 1999 3 to 2005, but then it increased again resulting in $2,711 billion in 2007 
(Renneboog, 2008). SRI is a wide range investment choice that makes up an estimated $3.07 
trillion in the U.S. investment marketplace today according to Social Investment Forum (2010). 
The size of the European SRI Market almost doubled since 2008, in spite of the financial crisis, 
according to Eurosif's 2010 European SRI Study (Social Investment Forum, 2010). 
2.3 Responsible investor vs. normal investor 
In fact, a responsible investor can have several meanings, yet in all of them is present the 
way companies invest and interact with each other and how they (and stakeholders) interact 
with the environment and the society in which they operate. Thus, depending on the investor's 
risk attitude, investors make rational investment decisions between risk and return by adding 
risk-free assets to their optimized risk portfolio (Markowitz, 1952). 
Investors consider beyond superior performance in sustainable investment strategies, ne-
cessities that contribute to financial considerations. Therefore, the utility function has several 
components, since the utility does not come solely from the risk and return trade-off (Bollen, 
2017). The trade-off depends on the strength of values: underlining that investors - those who 
are most influenced by CSR are willing to give up more financial benefits (Bauer & Smeets, 
2010; Jansson, Sandberg, Biel, & Gärling, 2014). 
The modern theory of the portfolio, or simply portfolio theory, explains how rational in-
vestors will use the principle of diversification to optimize their investment portfolios, and how 
a risky asset should be priced. The development of portfolio optimization models originates in 
the economic-financial area. Following this theory, investors are not entirely rational, their ac-
tions are influenced by investor desires, cognitive errors and emotions (Jansen, 2016).  
While rational investors only consider utility (risk and return) when making their invest-
ment decisions, normal investors consider them to be utilitarian, expressive, and emotional ben-
efits (Jansen, 2016).  
In short, the normal investor does not distinguish between the role of investor and consumer 
(Jansen, 2016). This means that investor preference is influenced by the trade-off between risk 
and return (utility), values, tastes, status (expressions) and feelings (emotions) (Statman, 2014). 
Normal investors are willing to increase expressive and emotional benefits over utility 
(Derwall, Koedijk & Horst, 2011).  
2.4  Institutional investor 
According to the Bovespa, there are two categories of investors: the institutional investor 
and the non-institutional, or individual investor. 
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 The main distinctions among the subgroups of investors are due to the investment profile 
and the ability of each participant and influence in the market. Whether individuals or corpora-
tions are investors are divided according to the degree of importance, level of influence and 
need for protection in the market.  
Individual Investors (small investor): enters alone into the capital market, through an in-
vestment broker or manager. Usually, it has less know-how and less volume of assets; so it can 
become also a participant in investment funds or clubs. In this sense, it is possible to notice that 
individual investors need more support to avoid losses. This is because this category of investor 
has less strategic knowledge and less familiarity with investments.  
Institutional investor: have more influence in the stock market, since they move significant 
amounts of money in each investment, have a large and varied portfolio and are mostly long-
term. They are, therefore, legal persons, companies and other institutions, with great strategic 
knowledge. For this reason, institutional investors operate on a recurring basis in the market 
and tend to be riskier and, therefore, more profitable. Thus, they can be considered the most 
important investors in the Stock Exchange. 
In analyzing the concept of institutional investor, it is known that for a given legal entity, 
there exists a legal duty stipulated by the government to invest a percentage of equity in the 
market. This is because these institutions have advantages - including taxation - with small 
investors. 
Among the most well-known institutional investors are: 
 Insurance companies; 
 Investing companies; 
 Credit institutions, or banks; 
 Pension and investment funds and their respective management institutions; 
 Venture capital entities; 
 Capitalization entities, 
 And other companies that, according to CVM regulations, are considered institutional 
because of experience and financial volume.  
Most SRI are held by institutional investors. The role of pension funds within institutional 
investors has increased in recent decades. 
Vitols (2011) argues that in Europe the contribution of pension funds in the development 
of SRI is threefold. First, the sheer size of pension funds draws more attention to the behaviour 
of them. The size of pension funds has grown massively in importance, since world’s total 
assets under management from pension funds accounts for $21 trillion in 2005 to $35 trillion 
in 2015 (Towers Watson, 2016). Second, the higher concentration of assets across different 
pension funds helps to implement ESG-criteria. Since most costs are fixed, larger pension funds 
are better able to finance SRI policies, because they encounter a smaller portion of administra-
tive costs. Third, labour partnerships have resulted in a strong role of labour trustees in pension 
funds, which became world leaders among sustainable pension funds (Vitols, 2011).  
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 2.4.1 Fiduciary's Duty 
 As owners, investors can influence companies to take action on risk management and 
to help improve performance. This may mean avoiding companies with activities that in their 
opinion are unpleasant or exert strong pressure on management teams to end certain activities. 
The focus is to identify positioned companies for long-term sustainable growth that will gener-
ate returns for investors and other stakeholders.  
The economic system in which we live has a short view. We have gone through several 
cycles of financial crises. This leaves investors wondering if we can have something more sus-
tainable. Should we seek profit at any cost? Should we only consider the financial gains? Or 
perhaps with the collapse of companies we've seen, starting with Enron in 2001, we're poten-
tially not seeing most of history, that's how companies manage to deliver sustainable value in 
the long run. That is why social, environmental and corporate governance elements are gaining 
prominence (SRI).  
As a fiduciary (person in charge of investing your company or the money of others) you 
have a duty to act solely for the benefit of those you represent. 
Pension funds act exclusively in the interest of pension beneficiaries, rather than serving 
their own interests. Fiduciary duty is a legal duty that obliges pension funds to act faithfully to 
their beneficiaries. 
Fiduciary duty has different definitions and interpretations in several countries, since the 
legal systems of countries are different (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). 
Fiduciary duty shows that pension funds operate within a legal framework to maximize 
fiduciary benefits (Jansen, 2016). The broader interpretation of fiduciary duty aims to stimulate 
pension funds not only to maximize utility, but also to maximize the expressive and emotional 
benefits (Jansen, 2016). 
Vitols (2011) further argues that pension funds need to increase social and economic well-
being by using their influence on business. 
In most jurisdictions, the implication of fiduciary duty is considered to be a question of 
better results (Jansen, 2016). The date of this publication was a discussion of trustees in relation 
to their principal values on members' obligations (Jansen, 2016). However, this means that pre-
cious financial capital funds neglect serious environmental, social and governance (Jansen, 
2016). As a result, pension funds obtained yield high short-term returns, rather than seeking a 
new long-term return alternative (UNPRI, 2016).  
UNPRI (2016) proposes three reasons for moving to a broader interpretation of fiduciary 
duty: 
 Where the materiality of integrating the ESG criteria has a clear meaning, investors are 
expected to take the ESG criteria into account; 
 Investor expectations are changing, which is driven by the increased integration of ESG 
criteria by investment organizations; 
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  The assumptions of dominant finance theories have been questioned in the last decades. 
As a result of the financial crisis, investors aim to reduce risks and take risks and in-
creasingly systemic events have a low probability in consideration. In order to do so, 
investors gain insight into upcoming behavioral theories in their investment decisions 
(UNPRI, 2016). 
Empirical studies in the Netherlands confirm the move towards a broader interpretation of 
fiduciary duty and shows that awareness of incorporating ESG criteria among pension recipi-
ents is increasing (Jansen, 2016). At least 70% of pension recipients want pension funds to 
consider moral issues (Erbé, 2008) or to integrate the ESG criteria by making investments (Mo-
tivation, 2012; I & O Research, 2015; Delsen & Lehr, 2015). This shows that pension benefi-
ciaries have a multi-attribute utility function (Jansen, 2016). As a result, pension beneficiaries 
can be considered as consumers and investors, which means that there is a link between investor 
and consumer behavior and a link between consumers and investor behavior (Statman, 2014).  
2.5  Different views on the ethical attributions of the investment 
Rezende (2006) argues that it does not have an empirically proven relationship of cause 
and effect between the tasks and the financial, and, as the role of companies is a service of 
profit, this new standard that links social responsibility and competitiveness, intensifies the de-
bate is not academic and business.  
The scenario that led to the emergence of the social responsibility of the organizations was 
a world crisis of trust in companies, which provoked the same to promote a politically correct 
discourse, based on ethics, with social action implementations (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, 
Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). According to Mifano apud Rico (2004), such actions can mean 
benefits in the quality of life and work for the working class, as they can become a mere dis-
course of business marketing unrelated to a socially responsible practice.  
According to Rezende (2006): "The relationship between the financial market and the prac-
tices of social and environmental responsibility of organizations is a fundamental point in the 
competitive strategy", arguing that environmental issues are no longer just a collection of soci-
ety, the government and the foreign market. 
Drucker (1984) argued that companies could convert social responsibilities into business 
opportunities. According to Périco, Rebelatto and Santana (2006): "The current economic con-
text of opening up markets and intense competition is marked by the search for qualifications 
by companies in order to secure their positions in the market and seek new ones spaces of 
action. 
The two main visions of Socially Responsible Investments are the stockholders and the 
stakeholders (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). As explained by Am-
aral, Barros & Souza (2006), firstly, the managers have the objective of increasing the return of 
the shareholders or quotaholders of the company, so they act only according to the impersonal 
forces of the market, which demand efficiency and profit. In second place, managers attribute 
the ethics of respect the rights and promote better conditions of quality of life for all agents 
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 affected by the firm, whether clients, suppliers, employees, shareholders or quotaholders, the 
local community, as well as the managers themselves. 
According to the authors, the doctrine of stakeholder theory is based on the idea that the 
final result of the business organization's activity must take into account the returns that opti-
mize the results of all the stakeholders involved, directly or indirectly (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, 
Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). The main conception of social responsibility is that the com-
pany and society are interconnected and not distinct entities, so society has certain expectations 
regarding the behavior and results of the business activities (Amaral; Barros; Souza, 2006). 
Dienhart (2000) states both views converge in the sense that firms have a social function 
to fulfill in society, having ethical attributions, but there is disagreement about the nature of 
such assignments and who will benefit from them.  
Friedman (1970, apud Machado, 2002) argued that if managers add profits and use them 
to increase the value of the company, they both respect the ownership rights of the sharehold-
ers/quotaholders of the companies, promote social welfare in an aggregate way. Making it clear 
that if managers turn to social problems in everyday decisions, they can interfere in the interests 
of the company and consequently in their performance in the market, which would damage the 
general welfare (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). 
According to this vision of strong neoclassical influence, the resources destined to actions 
of social responsibility would be applied better, from the social perspective, if implemented in 
the efficiency of the company (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). In 
addition, this perspective is also based on property rights, whereby managers have no right other 
than to increase shareholder value, focusing on market performance (Bezerra, Lagioia, Maciel, 
Libonati & Vasconcelos, 2009). Managers can use social responsibility actions as a way to 
develop their own social, political and professional agendas, provided they do not involve them 
with those of the company (Friedman, 1970 apud Machado, 2002). 
2.6  Existing hypotheses about return SRI 
Studying the relationship between ﬁnancial and social/environmental performance of an 
investment strategy is interesting for two reasons (Pokorna, 2017). Firstly, the investors who 
invest solely based on their values are sometimes willing to sacriﬁce ﬁnancial return to adhere 
to their values (Pokorna, 2017). With a positive relationship between CSR and investment per-
formance, they could also reap ﬁnancial returns alongside their moral satisfaction (Pokorna, 
2017). Secondly, many investors think about company’s ethics only as a random side eﬀect and 
are still mainly interested in the ﬁnancial return (Pokorna, 2017). Then, even these investors 
who do not have nonﬁnancial interests could make use of the potential relationship, direct their 
funds more eﬀectively and reach the desirable level of returns (Pokorna, 2017). 
One of the main arguments against socially responsible investments is based on Milton 
Friedman’s view of the social responsibility of business (Friedman, 1970). This critique states 
that if it is not possible for investors to achieve desirable ﬁnancial return with SRI (direct way), 
they could still follow their ethical values by investing into diversiﬁed portfolio and then using 
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 part of the ﬁnancial returns to invest in projects which represent their values (indirect way) 
(Pokorna, 2017). For example, instead of giving less weight to (or excluding) a company that 
violates employee gender equality, an investor could diversify and use the returns to invest in 
projects promoting women’ employment (Pokorna, 2017). Therefore, whether strategies based 
on company’s good CSR aﬀect ﬁnancial performance of portfolios positively, neutrally, or neg-
atively is important for the investor to choose between the direct and indirect option (Pokorna, 
2017). 
The ﬁrst relationship that could be expected is a negative impact of high CSR on portfolio 
performance (Pokorna, 2017). On a company level, higher CSR might imply competitive dis-
advantage because it represents costs that could be avoided (Pokorna, 2017). These costs reduce 
proﬁts and therefore also the wealth of shareholders (Pokorna, 2017). This concept is often 
referred to as the agency view of corporate social responsibility, i.e. when pursuing CSR, the 
interests of managers and shareholders are diverging (Pokorna, 2017). Under this view, CSR is 
detrimental for shareholders but is pursued by managers, who fail to obtain compensation for 
good ﬁrm performance, in sight of private beneﬁts (awards and other appreciations from pro-
moters of social responsibility) (Pokorna, 2017). This expectation therefore views CSR as a 
waste of corporate resources (Ferrell, 2016). When considering a portfolio which invests in 
companies with good CSR (i.e. excludes certain companies that normative portfolio theory 
would include), it can be argued that under-diversiﬁcation would lead to sub-par returns 
(Pokorna, 2017). 
The second possible association is a neutral one (Pokorna, 2017). The expectation here is 
that the company’s CSR activities increase the costs and beneﬁts by a similar amount (Pokorna, 
2017). This relationship is supported by Ullmann (1985) who describes that so many factors 
inﬂuence the relationship between CSR and ﬁnancial performance that no prevailing eﬀect can 
be expected (Pokorna, 2017). Also, any resulting relationship could simply be a coincidence 
(Pokorna, 2017). However, Ullmann (1985) states that neutral relationship could also result 
from the lack of empirical data concerning this topic (Pokorna, 2017). This can consequently 
disguise any relationship which is there (Pokorna, 2017). A positive link is the third plausible 
relationship (Pokorna, 2017). One argument could be that good CSR results from exceptional 
management skills which also lower the costs (Pokorna, 2017). Alternatively, high level of CSR 
reduces future risks of corporate scandals or lawsuits concerning negative externalities of the 
company (Pokorna, 2017). That leads to higher expected returns in the future (Pokorna, 2017). 
Another approach is adopted by Derwall et al. (2011). They develop a hypothesis called the 
errors-in-expectations hypothesis. It argues that CSR provides an information about the com-
pany’s intrinsic value, which is not fully understood by the ﬁnancial markets (Pokorna, 2017). 
This then generates abnormal returns until all relevant information is reﬂected in the stock 
prices (Pokorna, 2017). 
The last relationship that is hypothesized is the link between socially controversial stocks 
and ﬁnancial performance (Pokorna, 2017). These stocks are usually referred to as ‘sin stocks’, 
‘controversial stocks’, or ‘vice stocks’. Such companies are not recognized by CSR but rather 
by operating in industries which are generally considered controversial (Pokorna, 2017). 
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 Derwall et al. (2011) formulate a so called shunned-stock hypothesis which assumes that inves-
tors following certain values exclude these stocks and therefore create a shortage of demand for 
these stocks (Pokorna, 2017). This eﬀect can be explained by the model of incomplete infor-
mation and segmented capital markets of Merton (1987). The segmented markets arise due to 
information asymmetry (Pokorna, 2017). Certain stocks are therefore ignored by investors and 
are traded with a discount because fewer investors follow them (Pokorna, 2017). As Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) state, these stocks are neglected especially by institutional investors who 
are usually obliged to follow strict rules to choose investable industries. The prices of such 
stocks then get lower compared to their fundamental values (Pokorna, 2017). Therefore, this 
hypothesis predicts that sin stocks would have higher expected returns (Pokorna, 2017). More-
over, companies with potentially harmful products face higher litigation risks which could be 
reﬂected in the expected returns (Fabozzi, 2008). 
2.7  Advantages and disadvantages of SRI 
Advantages (Wu, 2012): 
 You can invest in a company that you personally believe in; 
 Social fairness; 
 Return is competitive to non-SRI investments; 
 Reduces Risk; 
 Creating positive ethical business environment. 
Disadvantages (Wu, 2012): 
 SRI investments may have higher risk because of lower gross profit margins; 
 Hard to diversify; 
 Always the possibility of lower investment return; 
 Companies may be unable to maximize investment returns; 
 Investor will have to keep their money in the company for longer time period then ini-
tially planned. 
2.8  Determinants of SRI 
The current article aims to identify the determinants of the SRI market. Studies on the 
determinants of SRI is, however, limited (Jansen, 2016). Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) pro-
pose a preliminary model of SRI determinants based on an analysis of four Nordic countries: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The study focused on the composition and size of the 
SRI market.  
The model consists of four determinants:  
 Institutions; 
 Culture; 
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  Economic development; 
 Financial development. 
 
Institutions: 
Bengtsson (2008) argues that institutional factors may explain homogeneity among Scan-
dinavian investors, since institutional factors impact behavior and stakeholder choices. Corpo-
rate practices are influenced by the institutional environment (Gjølberg, 2009; Gjølberg, 2009). 
"Firms operate in different business environments and face challenges in order to strategi-
cally locate and adapt to the diversity of institutions between countries and regions" (Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008). 
Culture: 
According to Hofstede's, culture reflects a set of values of a particular group, which makes 
a connection between the individual and culture (Hofstede & Hofstede, 1991). Culture has been 
argued to be added as a fourth and central pillar for the three original pillars of sustainable 
development: environment, social and economic development (Jansen, 2016). The basis for this 
comes from differences in the interpretation of sustainability and development (Jansen, 2016). 
Culture shapes how a society defines sustainability and development and therefore shows why 
societies behave differently in relation to sustainable development (Nurse, 2006). In addition, 
the decision-making process of firms and families is influenced by their social norms and values 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2010).  
Bengtsson (2008) investigated SRI drivers and emphasized the importance of culture in 
explaining SRI. Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) found that in the Nordic countries women's 
societies, such as Norway and Sweden, feel comfortable with SRI. 
Hofstede (2001) regards culture as a distinctive factor and defines culture as "the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes members of one group or category of people from 
another." Within economics and management, the definition of Hofstede or a comparable one 
is used to define culture (Jong, 2009).  
As the present study is interested in intercultural differences, the dimensions of Hofstede 
(2001) are a good proxy, because relative cultural differences are not affected by the dimensions 
of time (Beugelsdijk, Maseland, & Van Hoorn, 2013). The structure of Hofstede consists of six 
dimensions: avoidance of uncertainty, masculinity versus femininity, collectivist versus indi-
vidualistic, distance from power, long-term orientation, and indulgence versus constraints (Jan-
sen, 2016). Hofstede concluded that: 
 The prevention of uncertainty positively affects SRI; 
 Individualism positively impacts SRI; 
 Power distance negatively impacts SRI; 
 Masculinity negatively impacts SRI (Value-oriented investments are more realized by 
women (Bauer & Smeets, 2011). Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) found that a female society 
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 has a more developed SRI market); 
 Long-term orientation positively impacts SRI. 
Economic development: 
Although Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) have concluded that economic development does 
not affect the size of SRI, this article takes economic development into account because of 
Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs. 
 
Figure 1 - Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (1970) 
 
It is argued that sustainability is at the top of the hierarchical pyramid, meaning that people 
who have already met their basic needs are looking for higher order needs (Jeucken, 2010). 
When enough investors strive for higher order needs, a market is created: the SRI market 
(Jansen, 2016). This means that countries where individuals already meet their basic needs will 
be more willing to meet the higher-order needs and therefore will be more willing to integrate 
the ESG criteria (Jansen, 2016). 
As a conclusion, economic development positively impacts SRI because investors seek 
higher-order needs, such as sustainability.  
Financial development: 
Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) investigate whether the financial indicators: banking sys-
tem, financial markets and institutional investors are related to SRI. 
While financial markets and the banking system are related to the composition of SRI, the 
size of institutional investors encourages investment based on norms and values and responsible 
investments in general (Jansen, 2016).  
2.9  SRI in practive  
In order to create an SRI portfolio, funds must limit their investment universe to contain 
shares from companies that meet certain criteria, which is set by the fund and are within the 
common ethical framework of SRI (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). This is done by applying different 
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 screening processes when selecting shares for the portfolio (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). The 
screening processes that are most often used by SRI funds are:  
 Negative Screening:  
In general, it is an avoidance method, where companies are excluded from the investment 
universe, because they are deemed as unethical/socially irresponsible (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). 
 Positive Screening:  
The positive screening process is focused on including shares in the SRI portfolio, and thus 
it is the counterpart to negative screening. Potential portfolio companies need to fulfil the pos-
itive criteria set by the fund, in order to be included in the investment universe (Norup & 
Gottlieb, 2011). 
 Best-in-Class Screening: 
Confronts the conservative philosophies of especially the negative screening process, since 
it doesn´t immediately exclude any industries or judge them as good or bad. If using the method, 
one is in principle able to invest in all sectors of the market – even the tobacco industry – 
because the method‟s philosophy is focused elsewhere (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). 
 Shareholder Activism: 
Shareholder activism is a method that can be approached differently. In general, it means 
using the position as a shareholder to influence the company in a certain way (Norup & Gottlieb, 
2011). The level of influence is determined by the amount of shares owned in the company and 
the corresponding voting rights (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). An SRI-fund uses this power to en-
force ethical behaviour in their portfolio companies. They typically screen the market for 
“worst-in-class” companies – i.e. companies that practice social irresponsibility – and then seek 
to convert them by getting them to change their policies and implement certain ethical values 
(Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). As indicated, the method usually requires large holdings in order to 
achieve significant influence in the company, and therefore it‟s mostly applied by institutional 
investors and funds (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). 
 Other screenings: 
Through time, several screening methods, which are more specific than the above men-
tioned, have been developed (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). These include screening for companies 
that are engaging in: Sustainable growth, environmental technology, charity support, commu-
nity development, and microfinance (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011).  
 Mapping the ethical framework of socially responsible investing is a complicated task, 
because of the subjectivity associated with this field (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011). Since no uni-
versal code of ethics exists, the concept is open to free interpretation within the boundaries of 
the law (Norup & Gottlieb, 2011).  
2.10  SRI funds vs. conventional funds  
In order to analyze the profitability and performance of investment funds socially respon-
sible and the companies that integrate them, Rezende and Santos (2006) performed a study, in 
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 which they analyzed data from 52 investment funds in the period of November 2001 to Novem-
ber 2004, and evaluated their performance through the use of the Sharpe Index (risk / return 
ratio) and the Z test for comparison of means. They concluded that socially responsible invest-
ment funds have a similar profitability as other equity investments (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017).  
In order to analyze the effect of the use of socially responsible practices on the BM & 
FBovespa, Amaral and Iquiapaza (2013) companies, a study was carried out in which they used 
the data of the shares that made up the Corporate Sustainability Index ) and the Ibovespa Index 
from December 2005 to April 2010, and built two theoretical portfolios, one with shares of 
socially responsible companies (ISE participants), and another with shares of companies with-
out this characteristic. They then calculated the performance of both, using the generalized 
Sharpe Index and Jensen's alpha, and used Student's t-test for purposes of comparison of port-
folio return averages. Therefore, they concluded, mainly, that it is not possible to affirm that 
the average returns of the shares of socially responsible companies are different from the returns 
of the companies that do not invest in social responsibility (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). 
Mansor, Bhatti and Ariff (2015), aiming to find out if the return of the investor is affected 
by the different rates (administration rate, performance rate and others), and if the returns are 
significantly different between the analyzed funds, funds (which are socially responsible funds 
or ethics based on faith). The data sample comprised 53 conventional funds and 53 Islamic 
funds from 1990 to 2009. The results showed that there is no significant difference between the 
returns of conventional funds and Islamic funds (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). The investor shares 
the same premium and perhaps the same attribution of risk (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). They 
also showed that the rates have a significant impact on the performance of the stock funds and 
both funds studied, decreasing performance and investor returns (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). 
Lean, Ang and Smyth (2015) examined the performance and persistence of performance 
in SRI funds in Europe and North America. The study sample comprised 500 SRI funds in 
Europe and 248 in North America. The database comprised the period from 2001 to 2011 (Silva 
& Iquiapaza, 2017). To investigate the performance of funds, the authors used the model of 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The results showed that SRI funds perform better 
than their conventional benchmark, defined as the Eurekahedge SRI Funds Index (ESFI) (Silva 
& Iquiapaza, 2017). A dummy variable added to the Carhart model to capture the period of the 
global financial crisis has also shown that SRI funds in Europe have increased performance 
during the crisis, suggesting that SRI funds may be an investment alternative in periods of crisis 
for purposes of hedge (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). 
Maciel and Montezano (2016) used a sample of 127 monthly returns from investment funds 
between 2001 and 2012 to analyze whether socially responsible funds (SRI's) add value or ac-
tually generate a cost for the Brazilian investor. For this, they used one, four and five risk factors 
models to analyze the behavior of these investments (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017). The sample 
comprised 13 active management SRI funds and 323 conventional funds (Silva & Iquiapaza, 
2017). In the analysis of results, the authors point out that the funds and indices aimed at sus-
tainable practices presented historical returns superior to the conventional ones, however, on 
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 average, there is no significant (alpha) performance difference between SRI funds and conven-
tional funds, thus, active management does not differ from passive management (Silva & Iqui-
apaza, 2017). The results also showed that, on average, SRI funds showed lower asset manage-
ment returns than conventional funds, which is a cost to the investor of socially responsible 
funds (Silva & Iquiapaza, 2017).  
3 Research and data methodology 
In this section all the methods and data used in the work will be described. 
3.1 Data and methods 
Based on the preliminary model of Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) presented in the previ-
ous section, the present study uses a data set of the following variables (Jansen, 2016): 
 Socially Responsible Investments; 
 Institutions; 
 Cultural dimensions; 
 Economic development. 
This sub-section elaborates on how the dependent variable (socially responsible invest-
ments) and the other variables are obtained (Jansen, 2016). 
As there is no unified definition of socially responsible investments, this study follows 
Eurosif (2014) and defines SRI as: “any type of investment process that combines investors’ 
financial objectives with their concerns about environmental, social and governance issues” 
(Eurosif, 2014). This definition for European studies is also reflected in similar studies in the 
United States, Australia, Canada and Japan (Jansen, 2016). The shared definition is provided 
by the GSIA (2014) and defines SRI as “an investment approach that considers environmental, 
social and governance factors in portfolio selection and management.” (GSIA, 2014).  
In order to have clear understanding of sustainable investing it can be divided into two 
major strategies: core and broad investments (Jansen, 2016). The core SRI segment consists of 
multiple ethical exclusions, such as norms- and values-based as well as different types of posi-
tive screens, such as Best-in-Class and thematic funds (Jansen, 2016). On the other hand, the 
broad SRI segment consists of the use of simple exclusions, engagement, and integration 
(GSIA, 2014). Data for both core and broad investments are available of the European SRI 
market for the period between 2005 and 2013 (Jansen, 2016). Studies on sustainable invest-
ments in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan do not make a distinction be-
tween these different strategies, meaning that there is only data available covering the total SRI 
market (Jansen, 2016). European data are obtained from the Eurosif studies (Jansen, 2016). 
Data for USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan are obtained from USSIF, Respon-
sible Investment Association Canada, Responsible Investment Association Australasia and the 
Japan Sustainable Investment Forum, respectively (Jansen, 2016). The use of different sources 
could lead to different measures, since SRI is a broad and no unified concept (Jansen, 2016). 
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 Despite this, the measures can be compared, because the GSIA compares also these different 
measures in its report in 2012 and 2014 (Jansen, 2016). In order to compare the data properly 
the values are converted into US (Jansen, 2016).  
The current study follows Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) and measures the size of the 
pension funds by its assets (Jansen, 2016). In order to control for the size of the economy, the 
pension fund assets are measured as a percentage of the national GDP (Jansen, 2016). Data is 
derived from the OECD (2016) website. 
 
Table 1.4.1. Univariate test Pension fund assets 
This table presents the results of the univariate test. It shows the mean, standard deviation, median of pension fund 
assets as a % of GDP for CME and LME countries and its difference. The t-test is used to test the difference of the 
mean.) 
 
 
Table 1.5. - Descriptive statistics 
(The table presents the mean, standard deviation, median and skewness of the variables used in this dataset (Jansen, 
2016). Socially Responsible Investments are corrected for the size of the economy, by taking the percentage of 
SRI relative to GDP (Jansen, 2016)).  
 
This study follows Hall and Soskice (2001) by determining the institutional setting (Jansen, 
2016). The CME-dummy equals 1 when the economy is a coordinated market economy and 0 
otherwise (Jansen, 2016). Uncertainty avoidance indicates to what extent a culture programs its 
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations (Jansen, 2016). 
Masculinity is the distribution of roles between the sexes (Jansen, 2016). Power distance is the 
extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) 
accept and expect that power is distributed unequal (Jansen, 2016). Individualism describes the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into groups (Jansen, 2016). Long-term orientation 
describes the prioritisation of countries to deal with present and future challenges (Jansen, 
2016). GDP per capita is in US$, constant prices, constant PPP and reference year 2010 (OECD, 
2016). The pension fund is a pool of assets forming an independent legal entity (Jansen, 2016). 
This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2016)). 
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 3.1.1 Interpretation of data and discussion 
Table 1.1. (annex) shows the development of the ISR market as part of a country's GDP, 
where despite some missing values, there is clear growth between 2005 and 2013 (Jansen, 
2016). The table is first sorted by the highest share in 2013 and second by the values of 2011 
(Jansen, 2016). As can be seen, the top 5 countries are located in Europe, demonstrating the 
high SRI market in Europe (Jansen, 2016).  
The table 1.2. (annex) provides an overview of the cultural dimensions per country (Jansen, 
2016). As follows from the table, there are large differences across the countries (Jansen, 2016). 
Power distance ranges from 11 in Austria to 68 in France and Poland (Jansen, 2016). Further-
more, masculinity ranges from 5 in Sweden to 95 in Japan (Jansen, 2016). Long-term orienta-
tion ranges from 21 in Australia to 88 in Japan (Jansen, 2016). Uncertainty avoidance from 23 
in Denmark to 94 in Belgium (Jansen, 2016). Less extreme differences are found in the dimen-
sion: individualism (Jansen, 2016). 
 
Table 1.2.1. - Univariate test Uncertainty Avoidance 
(This table shows the univariate test results where the mean, standard deviation, median uncertainty avoidance for 
CME (coordinated market economy) and LME (liberal market economy) countries and their difference can be 
observed (Jansen, 2016). The t-test is used to test the difference in mean (Jansen, 2016).) 
 
 
Still in table 1.2. (annex) shows a distinction between CME and LME countries. Uncer-
tainty avoidance is considered as the main dimension that distinguishes the CME and LME 
countries (De Jong, 2009). A univariate test is performed in order to test whether CME score 
higher on uncertainty avoidance (Jansen, 2016). According to table 1.2.1., the mean of CME 
countries is higher (59.3) in comparison to the mean of LME countries (45.8) (Jansen, 2016). 
This suggests that CME countries score higher on uncertainty avoidance on average (Jansen, 
2016). The t-test performed in this paper shows that CME countries score higher on uncertainty 
avoidance, significantly (p = -2.9953) (Jansen, 2016). 
The current study uses the traditional measure of economic development: GDP per capita. 
The reason to measure economic development by GDP per capita is twofold (Jansen, 2016).  
 First, Maslow’s (1970) pyramid of needs argues that people living in a country that has 
high economic development are more towards the top of Maslow’s hierarchical pyramid 
of needs. This makes sense, because individuals in higher economic developed countries 
are more able to fulfil their needs (Jansen, 2016). To include economic development for 
testing the Maslow theory, GDP per capita is often used (Hagerty, 1999).  
 Second, Hofstede (2011) suggests to include GDP per capita when assessing his cultural 
dimensions, because “if ‘hard’ variables predict a country variable better, cultural indexes 
are redundant” (Hofstede, 2001). Data are obtained from the OECD database and illustrated 
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 in table 1.3. (annex). 
The table distinguishes CME and LME countries. Hall and Soskice (2001) analysed the 
role of different types of capitalism and economic development, using a large dataset between 
1974 and 1998. 
 
Table 1.3.1. - Univariate test Economic Development 
(This table presents the results of the univariate test. It shows the mean, standard deviation, median of economic 
development for CME and LME countries and its difference. The t-test is used to test the difference of the mean.) 
 
 
Despite some variation over specific periods there is no system superior to the other in the 
long run (Jansen, 2016). The current article performs a univariate test (table 1.3.1.) in order to 
analyse whether this is in line with Hall and Soskice (2001). The table shows that the mean of 
CME countries (10.662) is higher in comparison to LME countries (10.585)^2 (Jansen, 2016). 
The t-test performed in this paper shows that the difference (- 0.0767) is significant (p = -2.056) 
(Jansen, 2016). This indicates that institutions could condition economic development, meaning 
there is an indirect effect on SRI through economic development (Jansen, 2016).  
Table 1.4. (annex) illustrates the size of the pension funds. The increasing size of pension 
fund assets confirms Vitols (2011), who argues that the size of pension funds is increasing. As 
can be seen, there are large differences across these countries (Jansen, 2016). Whereas the Neth-
erlands’ pension assets as a percentage of its GDP is 149% in 2013, Belgium has only 5% 
pension fund assets (Jansen, 2016). Table 1.4. makes a distinction between the two types of 
capitalism. LME countries are expected to have more funded pension and CME countries on 
non-funded pensions (Wiß, 2011; Ebbinghaus, 2015).  
The current study performs a univariate test (table 1.4.1.) and shows a difference between 
CME and LME countries. Whereas the mean of pension fund assets as a % of GDP in CME 
countries is 38.40, the mean in LME countries is 65.14 (Jansen, 2016). The difference is signif-
icant on a 1% level (p = 2.7199) (Jansen, 2016). This indicates that institutions condition pen-
sion fund assets, meaning there is an indirect effect on SRI through financial development (Jan-
sen, 2016).  
Table 1.5. (annex) presents the descriptive statistics, in which the mean, standard deviation, 
median and skewness are illustrated. The dependent variable (socially responsible investments) 
and to a lower extent, GDP are positively skewed (as mean > median), meaning that the obser-
vations are not normally distributed (Jansen, 2016). As a result, this study takes the natural 
logarithm and transforms these variables in order to correct for this (Jansen, 2016). As the table 
presents, the log function of SRI and GDP are less skewed and therefore roughly normally 
distributed (Jansen, 2016). 
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 3.2   Empirical models 
The current study analyses the impact of the four determinants proposed by Scholtens and 
Sievänen (2013) on the size of SRI (Jansen, 2016). First, the model as a whole will be tested 
using a multivariate analysis (Jansen, 2016). Second, the mediation effects will be tested, using 
the Sobel test (Jansen, 2016). 
Panel data analysis allows researchers to measure time-variant variables (t) and time-in-
variant variables (i) (Jansen, 2016). Equation 4.1 presents the functional form of the model, in 
which socially responsible investments are denoted as SRI, institutions is specified as I, eco-
nomic development is represented by E, F is the financial indicator and ϵ stands for the error 
term (Jansen, 2016). 
SRIit = αi + β1Ii + β2Ci + β3Eit + β4Fit ϵit i = 1,…,16 t = 1,…,5             (4.1) 
The pooled OLS regression assumes that the parameter values of the countries are identical, 
since the pooled regression pools every single regression into one single regression (Jansen, 
2016). As a result, it uses 96 data points to estimate the parameters (Jansen, 2016). This is, 
however, a strong assumption that is unrealistic to impose (Jansen, 2016). A more flexible es-
timation is to assume that the parameters are different from each other, but are fixed over time 
(Jansen, 2016). Creating a dummy variable for each country allows to have separate equation 
for each country (Jansen, 2016). This, however, can only be used when having a dataset that 
that is “long and narrow”, meaning that the dataset considers many years and only a few cross-
sectional units (Jansen, 2016). Since this dataset is “short and wide”, creating a dummy variable 
for each country is not of practical value (Jansen, 2016). The fixed effects model is an estima-
tion procedure that considers a different intercept for each country and can be applied with any 
number of cross-sectional units (Jansen, 2016). This allows each parameter to change for each 
cross-sectional unit in each time period (Jansen, 2016).  
A restriction of this model is that it cannot consistently estimate 3*I*T parameters, 
when there are only IT observations (Jansen, 2016). Therefore, this model restricts the slope 
parameters to be constant across all countries and all time periods (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). 
As a result, only the intercept parameter varies, meaning that “all behaviour differences between 
countries are captured by the intercept” (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). As equation 4.1 indi-
cates, the error term consists of an error term specific for time variant and time invariant varia-
bles (Jansen, 2016). The fixed effects model gets rid of the error term, because it omits all time 
invariant variables, i.e. variables that do not change over time (Jansen, 2016). This model is, 
however, not of practical value since the variables institutions and culture will be omitted in the 
estimation procedure (Jansen, 2016). The random effects model assumes that each cross sec-
tional unit is centered around a mean intercept, meaning that time- invariant variables will be 
estimated (Jansen, 2016). The generation process is relevant, because the model assumes that 
the sample is randomly drawn (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). As this study considers macroe-
conomic data, it can be assumed that the sample is randomly drawn (Jansen, 2016). Since the 
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 pooled OLS regression is unrealistic, dummy estimation procedure and the fixed effects model 
are not of practical use (Jansen, 2016). 
Mediation: 
A simple mediation model aims to identify the relationship between the independent vari-
able and the dependent variable by the inclusion of a mediator variable (Jansen, 2016). The 
diagram (Figure 3) shows that the direct effect is equal to the coefficient “C” (Jansen, 2016). 
The indirect effect is a product of the coefficients “A” and “B” (Jansen, 2016). The direct effect 
measures the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, when the mediator 
remains stable (Jansen, 2016). The indirect effect measures how much the dependent variable 
changes when the independent variable remains stable and the mediator changes with the 
amount it changed when the independent variable increased with one unit (Jansen, 2016). 
Figure 3 – Mediation model (Adapted from Baron and Kenny (1986)) 
 
In order to analyse mediation, it follows the estimation procedure outlined by Baron and 
Kenny (1986): 
 Regress the mediator as dependent variable in order to confirm the independent varia-
ble is a predictor of mediator (Path A). 
Eit = αi + β20Ii + β21Ci + β22Fit + ϵit  (4.3) 
 Regress the dependent variable on the independent variable and the mediator (Path B). 
SRIit = αi + β30Ii + β31Ci + β32Eit + β33Fit ϵit  (4.4) 
 Estimate the regression in order to identify the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable (Path C). 
SRIit = αi + β10Ii + β11Ci + β12Fit + ϵit  (4.2) 
A variable functions as a mediator when (Jansen, 2016): 
1) variations in the independent variable (β10) account significantly for the mediator (Path 
A). 
2) variations in the mediator (β32) significantly account for the variation in the dependent 
variable (Path B). 
3) variations in when path A and B are controlled.  
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  Full mediation occurs when the relationship of the independent on the dependent varia-
ble (Path C) becomes zero, after the inclusion of the mediator (Jansen, 2016). Partial mediation 
occurs when the mediator accounts for some, but not all (Jansen, 2016). 
 When the relationships are significant, the significance of the mediation effect will be 
analysed using a Sobel’s test (Jansen, 2016). This means that in case one of the relationships 
are not significant, the current study will not perform a Sobel’s test. In econometrics, the So-
bel’s test is a useful tests in order to test the significance of the mediation effect i.e. how much 
the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable reduces after inclusion of the 
mediator (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
3.2.1  Empirical results 
3.2.1.1 Results of empirical tests and mediation effects. 
Table 1.6. (annex) presents the results of the direct effects, using a random effects model. 
The table presents four regression analyses. Where the first takes all variables into considera-
tion, the second, third and fourth analysis excludes individualism, long-term orientation and 
uncertainty avoidance, respectively. - Data taken from an empirical study by Jansen (2016). 
Table 1.6 presents the results of the random effects model. 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
are represented as ***, **, and * respectively (Jansen, 2016). The first regression analysis in-
cludes all variables (Jansen, 2016). 
Mediation:  
Mediation effects are tested using the estimation procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986):  
 The first effect of mediation is economic development (Jansen, 2016). Table 1.7. (an-
nex) shows the results of the regression analyzes.  
 The second mediation effect is institutions on pension fund assets (Jansen, 2016). Table 
1.8. presents the results of the regression analyses. 
 The third mediation effect is uncertainty avoidance on institutions. Table 1.9. (annex) 
presents the results of the regression analyses.  
 The fourth mediation effect is culture on economic development. Table 1.10 (annex) 
presents the results of the regression analyses. 
 The fifth mediation effect is power distance on pension fund assets. Table 1.11. (annex) 
presents the results of the regression analyses. 
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 Correlation and Variance Inflation Factor: 
Table 1.13. – Correlation matrix (Jansen, 2016) 
 
This table presents the correlation between the variables (Jansen, 2016). SRI is Socially 
Responsible Investments, CME is Coordinated Market Economy (Jansen, 2016). UA is Uncer-
tainty Avoidance, IND is Individualism, PD is Power Distance, MSC is Masculinity, LTO is 
Long-term orientation (Jansen, 2016). Pension is Pension fund assets as a % of GDP (Jansen, 
2016). 
4  Interpretation of results 
As can be seen in all the analyses, economic development positively impacts SRI at a 1% 
significance level (Jansen, 2016). This is in line with the expectations, since economic devel-
opment is expected to positively impact SRI (Jansen, 2016). Furthermore, masculinity nega-
tively impacts SRI at a 5% significance level (Jansen, 2016). This variable is also in line with 
the expectations, since more feminine societies exhibit more SRI (Jansen, 2016). These results 
correspond with Scholtens and Sievänen (2013), since masculinity is found to impact the size 
of SRI (Jansen, 2016). 
The CME dummy is negatively insignificant (Jansen, 2016). A negative coefficient implies 
that CMEs exhibit lower SRI in comparison to LMEs (Jansen, 2016). This is not in line with 
the expectation, since it was expected that CMEs exhibit more SRI (Jansen, 2016). The coeffi-
cient of long-term orientation is positive and in line with the expectations, but insignificant. 
Individualism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance on the other hand are not in line with 
the expectations, since these are respectively negative, positive and negative (but insignificant) 
(Jansen, 2016). Pension fund assets relative to GDP is in line with the expectation, since the 
coefficient is slightly positive, but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). This does not correspond with 
the findings of Scholtens and Sievänen (2013), since the size of pension fund assets are found 
to positively impact SRI in general (Jansen, 2016). 
Tables 1.12. (annex) and 1.13 provide an overview of the correlations between the varia-
bles. If independent variables are highly correlated, the accuracy of the model is reduced, be-
cause it affects the calculations of the variables (Jansen, 2016). This phenomenon is called mul-
ticollinearity and will be tested using a variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF provides an 
index that measures how much the variance increases, because of multicollinearity (Jansen, 
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 2016). As can be seen the CME dummy has a high VIF value (16.24), indicating that this could 
affect the estimation procedure. A VIF value of 16.24 indicates that the standard errors “in-
flated” with more than four times (√16.24 = 4.030), which means that standard error of this 
variable is 4.03 higher than it would be if the variable was uncorrelated with the other variables 
(Jansen, 2016). This value is problematic, since a threshold of 10 is often used (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  
The correlation matrix in table 1.13. provides an overview of the correlation coefficients 
between the various independent variables. As can be seen, CME has its highest correlation 
with individualism (-.7327). A correlation coefficient of 0.7 is considered as a threshold (Hair, 
et al., 2010) meaning that individualism could affect the estimation procedure. As a result, 
individualism is excluded in the second analysis (Jansen, 2016). The VIF value of CME drops 
to 9.47, which is an improvement (Jansen, 2016). As can be seen, the coefficients remain almost 
the same (Jansen, 2016). The coefficients become slightly smaller for all the variables (Jansen, 
2016). This could indicate that the VIF value was not problematic for the estimation of the 
coefficients or the problem still exists (Jansen, 2016). Despite the other coefficients are below 
the threshold of 10 (VIF) or 0.7 (correlation), several correlation can still be problematic for the 
analysis (Jansen, 2016). The second column presents the results of the analysis in which indi-
vidualism is excluded (Jansen, 2016). The correlation coefficients of long-term orientation with 
CME, and uncertainty avoidance are 0.6150 and 0.6628, respectively (Jansen, 2016). The VIF 
value of long-term orientation is 6.09 (Jansen, 2016). Excluding long-term orientation in the 
analysis drops the VIF value of 2.55 for CME (Jansen, 2016). The regression analysis without 
long- term orientation is illustrated in the third column (Jansen, 2016). As can be seen in table 
11 the signs of the coefficients do not change (Jansen, 2016). The impact of economic devel-
opment on SRI drops to 5.556, but is still significant (Jansen, 2016). The overall fit of the model 
seems to increase, as indicated by the R2 (Jansen, 2016). Although the VIF values dropped, the 
correlation between uncertainty avoidance and power distance and masculinity are 0.5952 and 
0.5628, respectively (Jansen, 2016). As a result, uncertainty avoidance is excluded in the anal-
ysis (Jansen, 2016). The results of the regression analysis without uncertainty avoidance is il-
lustrated in column 4. The signs of the coefficients remain the same (Jansen, 2016). The overall 
fit of the model improves slightly, since the R2 increased slightly (Jansen, 2016). In summary, 
the results of the random effects model show that masculinity and economic development sig-
nificantly impact SRI negatively and positively, respectively (Jansen, 2016). 
 
Mediation:  
Economic development functions as a mediator when variations in the institutions variable 
account significantly for economic development (Path A) (Jansen, 2016). The coefficient is 
0.084, but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). In addition, variations in the economic development 
significantly account for the variation in SRI (Path B) (Jansen, 2016). Economic development 
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 positively impacts SRI (Jansen, 2016). Full mediation occurs when the relationship of institu-
tions on SRI (Path C) becomes zero, after the inclusion of economic development (Jansen, 
2016). The impact of institutions is increased, since the coefficient becomes higher (from -.338 
to -.881), but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). As a result, there is no mediation effect (Jansen, 
2016). 
Pension fund assets functions as a mediator when variations in the institutions variable 
account significantly for pension fund assets (Path A) (Jansen, 2016). The coefficient is -
10.265, but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). In addition, variations in pension fund assets signifi-
cantly account for the variation in SRI (Path B). Pension fund assets positively impacts SRI, 
but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). Full mediation occurs when the relationship of pension fund 
assets on SRI (Path C) becomes zero, after the inclusion of economic development (Jansen, 
2016). The impact of institutions is reduced, since the coefficient becomes smaller (from -.984 
to -.881), but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). As a result, there is no mediation effect (Jansen, 
2016). 
Institutions functions as a mediator when variations in the uncertainty avoidance variable 
account significantly for the institutions (Path A) (Jansen, 2016). The coefficient is 0.158, but 
insignificant (Jansen, 2016). In addition, variations in uncertainty avoidance significantly ac-
count for the variation in SRI (Path B) (Jansen, 2016). Uncertainty avoidance negatively im-
pacts SRI, but insignificantly (Jansen, 2016). Full mediation occurs when the relationship of 
uncertainty avoidance on SRI (Path C) becomes zero, after the inclusion of institutions (Jansen, 
2016). The impact of institutions is reduced, since the coefficient becomes smaller (from -.034 
to -.013), but insignificantly (Jansen, 2016). As a result, there is no mediation effect (Jansen, 
2016). 
Economic development functions as a mediator when variations in culture account signif-
icantly for economic development (Path A) (Jansen, 2016). The coefficients for uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance and masculinity are -.001, -.001 and -.001, respectively, but insig-
nificant (Jansen, 2016). In addition, variations in economic development significantly account 
for the variation in SRI (Path B). Economic development positively impacts SRI (Jansen, 2016). 
Full mediation occurs when the relationship of economic development on SRI (Path C) be-
comes zero, after the inclusion of economic development (Jansen, 2016). The impact of culture 
is to some extent reduced, since the coefficient of masculinity (from -.052 to -.045) is reduced, 
significantly (Jansen, 2016). The coefficients of uncertainty avoidance (from -.018 to -.013) 
and power distance (from .031 to .030) also become smaller, but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). 
Despite the significant reduction of the coefficient of masculinity, there is no mediation effect, 
because masculinity does not account significantly for economic development (Path A) (Jansen, 
2016). 
Pension fund assets functions as a mediator when variations in the power distance account 
significantly for the pension fund assets (Path A) (Jansen, 2016). The coefficient is 1.147, but 
insignificant (Jansen, 2016). In addition, variations in the pension fund assets significantly ac-
count for the variation in SRI (Path B) (Jansen, 2016). Pension fund assets positively impacts 
SRI, but insignificantly (Jansen, 2016). Full mediation occurs when the relationship of power 
27
 distance on SRI (Path C) becomes zero, after the inclusion of pension fund assets (Jansen, 
2016). The impact of power distance is reduced, since the coefficient becomes smaller (from 
0.036 to 0.030), but insignificant (Jansen, 2016). As a result, there is no mediation effect (Jan-
sen, 2016). 
5 Sensitivity analysis  
The results of this of study can be questioned due to some limitations: 
 This study addressed the problem of different interpretations of SRI using a compre-
hensive definition (thus using a more widely known sustainable investment measure, 
just an indication of determinants of SRI size); 
 Data consistent with the GSIA (2015) are applied to the sources of the categories as 
categories are not very strict; 
 Data are measured only for two years and make no difference between small and large 
investments; 
 Due to the verification of statistics and the availability of SRI data, the assessment is 
15 countries and 5 years under consideration. 
 
In this way, to test the robustness of the model (suggestions for an upcoming study):  
 Addressing the problem of different interpretations other than the general definition, 
we could obtain other determinants of SRI size; 
 Making the difference between large and small investments, we would obtain a more 
complete study; 
 A study with fewer / more countries and less / more years may improve the veracity of 
the article; 
 For mediation purposes, a study not focused solely on SRI size would be a good idea; 
 Still taking SRI as an independent rather than dependent variable, it would be interest-
ing to perform. 
6 Conclusion 
Due to globalization, and consequently to raising awareness and awareness of society, new 
concepts have emerged, among them Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), a concept that has 
been growing continuously in the consciousness of investors around the world for the last four 
decades. This theme was chosen not only for its relevance, but also for the need to convey to 
people the greatness of the theme and its importance in today's society. 
Nowadays, the issue of SRI, its impact on society and its correlation with ethics is frequent. 
Gradually companies have come to realize that they are not alone and that they are part of 
society. Moreover, in the economic situation we live in today, where companies are increas-
ingly playing a fundamental role in the lives of workers, consumers, the environment, among 
other things. 
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 It is now acceptable to say that managers know what social responsibility is and know their 
practices. Due to globalization and public knowledge, managers have incorporated their social 
responsibility practices into their investment practices. They understood that, rather than gen-
erating profit, they should pay attention to how they act. In this way, the strategies pass through 
the concern with the interests of the stakeholders, with whom they interact daily. 
For these reasons, the world is more demanding and aware of the responsibility of all in 
the protection of social and economic rights and in this sense, raise expectations regarding the 
implementation of socially responsible investments. 
This article first sought to understand the concept of SRI, which should be emphasized, 
however, that there are substantial problems associated with the fact that the concept of SRI is 
open to interpretation. The funds operate with subjective definitions of SRI and selection crite-
ria, which means that they can be of very different character and operate with different invest-
ment universes. In principle, any investment fund has the prerequisites for labelling itself as 
socially responsible. This makes it problematic to measure the true financial effect of ethics, as 
each fund operates with different conditions and interpretations of the concept. As a conse-
quence, the overall performance results of an SRI sample may not be reliable. Therefore, this 
study addressed the problem of different interpretations of SRI using a comprehensive defini-
tion. The SRI concept is old, with most SRI being owned by institutional investors. 
Regarding the distribution of SRI by the market, the 2009 SRI world market size is esti-
mated at approximately 5 trillion dollars, with a 53% share of the SRI market in Europe, 39% 
in the United States and 8% in the rest of the world. During the past two decades, growth in the 
SRI market has made it increasingly important. 
To practice an SRI, the funds must limit their investment universe to contain stocks of 
companies that meet certain criteria, which are defined by the fund and are within the common 
ethical framework of SRI, which is done by applying different selection processes when select-
ing actions for the portfolio. As there is no universal code of ethics, the concept is open to free 
interpretation. 
SRI obtains advantages such as social justice, ethics and greater competitiveness. However, 
they may be at greater risk because of lower profit margins and the possibility of lower return 
on investment. 
Concerning the performance of socially responsible investment funds in relation to the per-
formance of conventional funds, it was possible to conclude that socially responsible invest-
ment funds have a profitability similar to that of other equity investments and that it is not 
possible to assert that the average returns of actions of socially responsible companies are dif-
ferent from the returns of companies that do not invest in social responsibility. The results also 
showed that, on average, SRI funds showed lower asset management returns than conventional 
funds, which is a cost to the investor of socially responsible funds. However, depending on the 
market trend, socially responsible funds have a better risk/return ratio. 
Finally, identifying the determinants that explain the substantial differences in the size of 
the national ISR market in 15 developed countries between 2005 and 2013 was the ultimate 
goal and the most profound of this study. 
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 In addition to numerous positive theoretical findings of this article he contributes to the 
academic literature, as he examines relevant factors both theoretically and empirically. 
In order to achieve the proposed objective, the article was based on the preliminary model 
of Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) on the four SRI determinants: institutions, culture, economic 
development and financial development. 
In short: 
 CME countries (with a coordinated market economy) exhibit more SRI than the LME 
countries (liberal market economies); 
 The prediction of uncertainty positively affects SRI; 
 Individualism positively affects SRI; 
 The energy distance negatively affects SRI; 
 Masculinity negatively affects SRI; 
 Long-term orientation conditions economic growth, which positively affects SRI; 
 Economic development has a positive impact on SRI; 
 The capitalization of the pension fund positively impacts SRI; 
 Institutions condition economic development and the size of pension funds; 
 Avoiding uncertainties conditions, the type of institutions. 
It was found that the CMEs do not exhibit SRI anymore, which means that the institutions 
measured by Hall and Soskice (2011) cannot be related to the SRI size. This supports the pre-
liminary model of Scholtens and Sievänen (2013), which could not relate the institutions to the 
SRI size. 
Female societies presume to exhibit more SRI, which is in agreement with Bauer and 
Smeets (2011). 
The other cultural values: avoiding uncertainty, distance from power and long-term orien-
tation are insignificant (Jansen, 2016). This is in agreement with Scholtens and Sievänen 
(2013), because they conclude that female societies seem to relieve SRI and it is not possible 
to find associations with the other cultural variables. 
Economic development has a positive impact on SRI, which supports Jeucken (2010), who 
applied Maslow's theory of needs to SRI (Jansen, 2016). Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) could 
not relate the economic development measured by GDP to SRI size (Jansen, 2016). The reason 
for this is that economic development in the Nordic countries is quite similar, while the current 
study considers more countries and years (Jansen, 2016). 
Pension fund assets, however, could not be related to the SRI size, and were not in agree-
ment with Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) who ended up saying that the size of institutional 
investors (measured by pension fund assets relative to to GDP) encourages investment taking 
into account standards and values and SRI in general. It does not support the importance of 
pension funds according to Vitols (2011). 
Nevertheless, as negative aspects of this work, mediation damages were not reached, as 
justified in section 3.2.1.1., Indicating that institutions are not conditioned to economic and 
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 financial development, but rather to a culture that does not influence institutions and develop-
ment economic and financial size of the ISR. 
In short, this article was done with data often small and unequal, which makes conclusions 
incomplete or not adequate to reality. It is true that the results of the analysis may be inconclu-
sive, but following the whole line of reasoning, the results turn out to be valid and reasonable. 
Even Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) recognized that more research is needed to identify SRI 
drivers in order to generalize these findings and to argue that several alternative measures can 
be used for their domains. 
It was also found that investors and other stakeholders also perceive SRI differently, and 
this has led to many views, about which funds are socially responsible, and which are not. 
Considerable differences may therefore exist in the sample SRI fund performance studies, since 
a change in the definition of SRI could lead to more funds being included or excluded from the 
sample. Changes in the SRI definition can therefore affect performance results, and since there 
is no particular right or wrong when creating a definition, there is the possibility of manipulation 
with results. This also means that the comparability of performance studies is potentially weak. 
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 Annexes 
Table 1.1. - SRI as a % of GDP 
(Data are obtained from Eurosif studies, USSIF, Responsible Investment Association Canada, Responsible Invest-
ment Association Australasia and the Japan Sustainable Investment Forum (Jansen, 2016). Afterwards the data are 
converted into US Dollars, using the exchange rate on 30 September of the particular year and divided by the 
country’s GDP (Jansen, 2016). Data on GDP are obtained from the OECD website (Jansen, 2016).) 
 
 
Table 1.2. - Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
(Data are obtained from https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html, based on the definitions of Hofstede 
(Jansen, 2016).) 
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 Table 1.3. - GDP per Capita in US$, constant prices, constant PPP, reference year 2010 
(Data are obtained from https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702#. Data are initially in “national currency, 
in current prices and constant prices (national base year, previous year prices and OECD base year i.e. 2010) - and 
for comparative purposes in US $ current prices and constant prices (using exchange rate and PPPs). Expressed in 
millions and in indices. For the Euro area countries, the data in national currency for all years are calculated using 
the fixed conversion rates against the euro” (OECD, 2016)). 
 
 
 
Table 1.4. - Pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP 
(Data are obtained from https://data.oecd.org/pension/pension-funds-assets.htm. “Pension funds' assets are defined 
as assets bought with the contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension plan 
benefits (Jansen, 2016). The pension fund is a pool of assets forming an independent legal entity. This indicator is 
measured as a percentage of GDP” (OECD, 2016)). 
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 Table 1.6. - Random Effects; four regression analyses on the determinants of SRI (Jansen, 
2016) 
 
(1): includes all variables  
(2): excludes individualism 
(3): excludes individualism and long-term orientation 
(4): excludes individualism, long-term orientation and uncertainty avoidance 
 
Table 1.7. – Mediation of institutions on economic development (Jansen, 2016) 
(*Economic development is the dependent variable (Jansen, 2016). This table presents the result of the mediation 
analysis (Jansen, 2016). Path A presents the results of the relationship between institutions and economic devel-
opment (dependent variable) (Jansen, 2016). Path B shows the relationship between institutions and SRI (Jansen, 
2016). Path C presents the relationship between institutions and SRI, without taking economic development into 
consideration (Jansen, 2016). The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are represented as ***, **, and * respec-
tively (Jansen, 2016).) 
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 Table 1.8. - Mediation effect institutions on pension fund assets (Jansen, 2016) 
(*Pension fund assets are dependent variable (Jansen, 2016). This table presents the result of the mediation analysis 
(Jansen, 2016). Path A presents the results of the relationship between institutions and economic development 
(dependent variable) (Jansen, 2016). Path B shows the relationship between institutions and SRI (Jansen, 2016). 
Path C presents the relationship between institutions and SRI, without taking pension funds into consideration 
(Jansen, 2016). The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are represented as ***, **, and * respectively (Jansen, 
2016).) 
 
Table 1.9. - Mediation of uncertainty avoidance on institutions (Jansen, 2016) 
(*Institutions is the dependent variable (Jansen, 2016). This table presents the result of the mediation analysis 
(Jansen, 2016). Path A presents the result of the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and institutions (de-
pendent variable) (Jansen, 2016). Path B shows the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and SRI (Jansen, 
2016). Path C presents the relationship between institutions and SRI, without taking institutions into consideration 
(Jansen, 2016). The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are represented as ***, **, and * respectively (Jansen, 
2016). Institutions is measured by a dummy variable, meaning that a random effects model is not appropriate 
(Jansen, 2016). A logit model is used in order to estimate the effect of uncertainty avoidance on institutions (Jan-
sen, 2016). Despite the small variation in the sample, a cross sectional analysis is used (Jansen, 2016). Furthermore, 
the number of variables are reduced, meaning that power distance, economic development and pension fund assets 
are used as control variables (Jansen, 2016).) 
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Table 1.10. - Mediation effect culture on economic development (Jansen, 2016) 
(*Economic development is the dependent variable (Jansen, 2016). This table presents the result of the mediation 
analysis (Jansen, 2016). Path A presents the results of the relationship between culture and economic development 
(dependent variable) (Jansen, 2016). Path B shows the relationship between culture and SRI (Jansen, 2016). Path 
C presents the relationship between culture and SRI, without taking economic development into consideration 
(Jansen, 2016). The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are represented as ***, **, and * respectively (Jansen, 
2016).) 
 
Table 1.11. - Mediation of power distance on pension fund assets (Jansen, 2016) 
(*Pension fund assets are dependent variable (Jansen, 2016). This table presents the result of the mediation analysis 
(Jansen, 2016). Path A presents the results of the relationship between power distance and pension fund assets 
(dependent variable) (Jansen, 2016). Path B shows the relationship between power distance and SRI (Jansen, 
2016). Path C presents the relationship between power distance and SRI, without taking pension funds into con-
sideration (Jansen, 2016). The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are represented as ***, **, and * respectively 
(Jansen, 2016).) 
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 Table 1.12. - Variance Inflation Factors (Jansen, 2016) 
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Chapter 2
The Problem of PPI Costs
2
Gomes, Jose´ and Vargem, Maria
Abstract
This article have as objective study a problem very important that hospitals confront dailythe
costs (are linked to PPI (Physician Preference Items) of physicians) with the providers (the
latter may send sales representatives to train and demonstrate the new PPIs to physicians in
order to facilitate their implementation more quickly). Cara J. Dienes (2011); the author of
this dissertation; tries to solve this gap with the help of Game Theory. When the different
tests were carried out, it was verified that the games with sales representatives indicate that
if they train and assist the physicians, they increase the frequencies of the PPIs where the
producer wins. Increasing a sales representative’s ability to provide effective physician training
leads to a positive effect of physician‘s payoffs, where tests lead one to conclude that they
are almost always better when have a sales representative who provides effective training,
contrary to one that does not. To finalize our study we added another test, we were looking
for professional opinions on adopting a new generation of product/PPI in the long run. Where
we can conclude that, with the right incentives, professionals may prefer to make long-term
adoptions.
2This paper is based on Dienes, C. (2011), A game theory model of the physician preference
item supply chain (Master’s Thesis), Iowa State University.
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 1. Introduction 
This dissertation, written by Cara J. Dienes (2011), refers us to a very important problem, 
which is the costs that hospitals have with suppliers, specifically with physicians' PPIs, and 
how to increase efficiency in implementing new items of medical preference.  
It has three research questions. The first sees the hospital as passive and seeks to know 
how the physician's average ability to become aware of the PPI update will affect the pace of 
product upgrade. The second one also sees the hospital as passive, but seeks to know how the 
ideal pace of product update is affected by the manufacturer, by providing a sales representative 
to train and assist the physician, and the last research question is concerned with control of the 
costs, making a limitation on the doctor's selection for a manufacturer's product update and the 
decision of the average time of adoption of the doctor will be affected or not. 
The objective is trying to find solutions to reduce the costs of PPI supplies and, at the same 
time, to increase the efficiency of the implementation and updating of the PPIs. 
This work will be organized in four parts: Literature Review; Methodology; Application 
and Conclusion. The first one will include several authors who have similar problems to the 
author of the dissertation. In this part will be deal with conclusions that each one has about the 
problem that presents. The second has the methods and data that Cara J. Dienes used in her 
dissertation. In the third point will be present the results and their discussion and a sensitivity 
analysis. Finally, in the fourth point will be the Merit of the research - Objectives evaluation 
and the Contribution for Science - Conclusions / Contributions. 
To finalize our study we added another test, we were looking for professional opinions on 
adopting a new generation of product / PPI in the long run. Where we can conclude that, with 
the right incentives, professionals may prefer to make long-term adoptions. 
2. Literature Review 
Cara J. Dienes made several references in her dissertation on esteemed authors who had 
similar problems to what she presents. It also divided into four parts for a better understanding 
of the problems presented but we only address three because we find the most important. The 
first part concerns decisions about the product update time and refers about fifteen authors in 
which we researched their articles in order to have more information about these problems 
studied. 
One of the first authors to be Christensen, C.M. This author presents a very important 
problem which is the marked decrease in market share when the company chooses some 
management principles to create new products and also shows "a discussion about the benefits 
a company can experience by implementing a time tracking strategy in a Harvard business case 
about Medtronic" (Dienes, 2011). It aims to simplify and coordinate the activities so that a 
company can create and put on the market a new generation / update or a new product. To 
obtain conclusions he had to carry out the following tests as the case of using an explicit 
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 strategy, joining the project planning, receiving several projects that leads the company to 
create and establish a platform of derivatives and others. As a conclusion, it was retained that 
it is possible to reduce the last-minute changes in the future product upgrade. This is because 
team members knew when the new features developed should be ready to be added to the next 
generation of the product. 
 The second one is Eisenhardt and Brown. The problem presented by these two authors is 
that most companies need to adjust to the market constantly due to several factors, such as 
competition movements, changes in technology or new demands on the part of customers. The 
method they used to study this problem was that they showed how certain companies 
implemented the two essential aspects of the rhythm of time and it contains two aspects: the 
management of transitions (for example: switching from a project to develop a new product to 
another) and set a right pace for change and the dissertation further notes the following 
"contrasted the proactive nature of time control versus the reactive nature of event pacing and 
discussed the benefits of having a predictable pace of change within an organization" (Dienes, 
2011). As a conclusion, Eisenhardt and Brown argue that companies that adapt to the measure 
of time end up gaining momentum in the market and that the companies that manage the 
transitions underpin this decision without losing important rhythms. 
The next author is called Fine and presents a still current problem that affects large 
corporations that says companies can quench quickly if they do not anticipate and adapt to 
change. The methodology used was the introduction of new strategies to understand the forces 
of competition and it is easier for companies to be able to decide more strategically and thus 
determine the fate of the company. Fine also uses the term "clockspeed" which is the company's 
evolutionary life cycle in which it is measured by the rate at which it includes processes, 
organizational structures, and even new products. The contribution to the "clockspeed" of a 
firm depends on 2 sub-metrics that are well defined: "1) the clockspeed process, which 
describes the speed with which production technology and processes change, 2) the 
organizational clockspeed that describes the speed with that the organizational structure and 
leadership of a company evolve and 3) the clockspeed product that describes the rate of new 
product launches and updates "(Dienes, 2011).As a conclusion, Fine says that business 
managers must learn in internet services, computers and multimedia entertainment. He also 
points out that clockspeed serves a part of the new laws of value chain dynamics and offers 
suggestions for gaining industry leadership through the process and supply chain and product 
design. Clockspeed contributes to the creative process in business strategy thus helping change. 
The next ones are the problem that Wilson and Norton point out is when a company must 
incorporate a line addition or an improvement in the product to maximize the overall product's 
initial profit and line extension. They also identify three issues that affect the answer to the 
question: the first is the interrelationship between sales of the two products because of diffusion 
and substitution, the second is the relative margins of two products and finally, the third deals 
with the relationship between the fulfillment of the company's planning and the diffusion time 
of the initial product. As a method, Wilson and 
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 Norton create a model in which the first product contributes a larger unit margin but with 
a reduced development and the second is the extension of the line where it contributes with a 
smaller unit margin and influences in part the sales of the initial product, however, increases 
the market. As a conclusion they show that it is more favorable to incorporate the line extension 
each time at the beginning of the initial product life cycle or else it should not introduce and 
still exist the consideration of dynamic phenomena can make the difference, and in this last 
conclusion it tells us that the results indicate that in many cases the line extension should be 
introduced early, whereas in a simpler static analysis it could indicate that line extension should 
never be introduced. According to the author`s dissertation “this research considers how the 
product update pace relates to other members of the manufacturing firm's supply chain and will 
not address how that pace impacts internal processes.”  (Dienes, 2011) 
The authors Mendelson and Pillai have a problem the industries and segments of 
companies are characterized by the clockspeed in that it measures the speed of the change in 
external business environments and it still defines in the companies the rhythm of the internal 
operations. They used as a test the data of the electronic companies, where they developed and 
authenticated an incorporated metric for the clockspeed, considering the factors of the side of 
the demand and of the offer.” Their data, collected from electronics manufacturers over a span 
of 4 years, demonstrated that industries with higher clockspeeds tend to have a higher rate of 
organizational change and "product redesign”” (Dienes, 2011). The conclusions obtained by 
the authors show that after managing the product diversity and other factors, a greater 
clockspeed of the company is associated with a more rapid execution in the development and 
production of the products and changes in the organizational part of the company more 
regularly. Also, the findings made by Mendelson and Pillai may help to study other companies 
and conclude that the data provide references that make it easier for professionals to compare 
and rank their companies.  
Souza et al present the following problem: how does an industry's clockspeed (referring to 
internal factors) determine the optimal timing of the introduction of a new company product 
and product quality decisions. They use as a method the uncertainty modeling of the market 
demand, the structure of the internal costs of a company and the competition, using an infinite 
horizon Markov decision process. It should be noted that Souza et al analyzed a numerical basis 
on a large scale. They conclude that the introductions of new products more frequent are 
favorable in situations of faster clockspeed. In their conclusion they further highlight the 
finding of the optimal decision on the quality of a company's product is governed by the relative 
costs of a company to introduce new products with incremental improvements versus more 
substantial improvements and show that a strategy of introduction of products with time control 
results in a production policy with a basic form of simple stock and perform well in relation to 
optimal policy. The results provide analytical support for the management belief that the 
industry marketing clockspeed are closely related is the latest conclusion presented by the 
authors. It is important to highlight that the author of the dissertation gives us very important 
information “Souza also incorporated learning into his analysis, from the manufacturer's 
viewpoint” (Dienes, 2011). 
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 The notion of an industry clockspeed and the key factors that drive proper decision making 
in this area remain relatively unexplored is the problem presented by Carrillo. This author uses 
as a methodology the development of a simple definition and a corresponding analytical model 
that explains the interdependent relationship between a company's new product “development 
activities and an industry clockspeed” (Carrillo, s.d.). Carrillo presents the following 
conclusions: the results of the single-company model show the conditions under which specific 
companies have the “incentive to accelerate their new product development activities” 
(Carrillo, s.d.), and still win the company's unique NPD clockpeed decisions at the industry 
level , creating appropriate metrics that characterize different types of companies. 
The problem discussed in the article by Morgan et al focuses essentially on a comparison 
that is quality versus the exchange of time-to-market for a single product generation in the case 
of several generations. As a methodology, these authors have evaluated the factors that indicate 
the ideal length and intensity of the development cycle using a future-oriented model that 
enables multiple generations of products and still make comparisons with limited versions of 
the model that reflect the approaches of a single generation and the single sequential generation. 
As conclusions, Morgan et al claim that it is important to accept that one technology is 
extensive and consider the potential of several generations. They further state that rapid quality 
improvement rates lead to longer development cycles for single generation models, however, 
shorter cycles should be used in the case of the multi-generation model geared towards future. 
They conclude that with only one generation, variable costs have a greater impact on the 
duration of the cycle. However, in the case of several generations fixed costs have a greater 
impact on the duration of the cycle. 
Authors Krankel et al present as a problem how the decisions that should be taken by the 
company on the incorporation of time for the succeeding generations. The methodology 
presented by the authors focuses on examining the case of a company that introduces several 
generations of a product, and the demand is characterized by a process of diffusion of demand. 
They also consider (under fixed costs of introduction) the case when the available product 
technology improves randomly and specified a model based on the state of the diffusion of 
demand and constructed a decision model to solve the problem of the time of introduction of 
the company. Krankel et al conclude that postponing the introduction to a subsequent date 
could lead to the capture of other technological improvements, such as the cost of slowing sales 
of the current product. They also prove that if an improvement in model technology is 
introduced, the optimization of a boundary policy (where a state is dependent) manages the 
company's product introduction decisions. Finally, these authors conclude by saying that the 
model developed by them helps to explain the behavior of the introduction of the products of 
the companies and provides an alternative to the previous explanations of the decisions of the 
time of introduction of IBM`s to successive generations of its mainframe computers.  
The competitive pressures that drive the price of high technology products to degrade over time 
is the problem presented by authors Wilhelm and Xu. As a methodology, the article describes 
a decision support tool to maximize profit, and there are three related decisions: product 
improvement, production level and prices. Wilhelm and Xu also used a Dynamic Programming 
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 (DP) stochastic model to determine when to upgrade a product and what new technologies to 
incorporate to maintain product competitiveness and profit margins. These authors conclude 
that those who manage the companies can use the DP model to coordinate the decisions related 
to the update of operations to better achieve the business objectives.  
Lin and Ji claim that the problem in their article is that companies may choose not to launch 
a next generation product when a more efficient or better product design technology is ready. 
The tests that the authors will perform for this problem was the use of a model to analyze the 
launch decisions and the decisions to update an incumbent vs. incoming configuration. Authors 
Lin and Ji, in concluding their article, have found that large product profit margins in their next 
generation alone do not provide enough incentives for launching a next generation of products. 
However, the small profits that the companies are getting can lead to the deterrence of the 
participant to join the competitiveness. They also conclude that the participant intends to enter 
the market sooner, should consider improvements of the process that reduce the costs of 
launching the company of the current product of the generation and also that in anticipating the 
arrival of the participant, the person in charge should upgrade to the next generation. Finally, 
they conclude that the incumbent also has a cost advantage in the race to launch the product of 
the next generation. 
The authors of Druehl et al present the problem of the fact that some companies use a time 
control strategy for product development (PD), incorporating new generations at regular 
intervals, and this introduction was in a fast paced or slow-paced pace to negative effects for 
the company. The authors developed a model to understand the factors that determine the rate 
and then considered the rate of diffusion, the margin decline, and the degree to which a new 
generation stimulates market growth, thus testing the problem presented. Druehl et al 
concluded in their research that they made discoveries, the first being that a faster rate is mostly 
associated with a faster diffusion, a higher market growth rate and a faster margin decrease, 
and the second relatively small differences in the development cost function can affect the pace.  
Arslan et al refer in their article that the big problem they have is the timing of introducing 
the new products and the price that the various generations of the products of a company 
possess. In order to reach a conclusion, they carried out tests that allowed the analysis of the 
case in which a company generates several generations of a given product and that the demand 
of each generation is impacted by the prices of all the existing generations and the introduction 
of the new generations. Moreover, if two successive generations of products are involved, 
Arslan et al provide closed expressions of the optimal product introduction time and optimal 
pricing strategies in two scenarios (in the case of the complete replacement of the initial product 
by the new product and the in the case of coexisting generations) and also use as a methodology 
the closed supply to a duopoly environment (only two companies operating in the market). 
They take as their main conclusion that the results of their work can help companies better 
manage the introduction of the product and the price of the life cycle of the various generations 
of products.  
Bass sees as a problem the forecast of sales of new products and compares the latter with 
durable goods. As a methodology, this author used a growth model for the initial purchase of 
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 new products and developed and tested experimentally against eleven durable goods. However, 
Bass concluded that the model gives good predictions of peak sales.  
In the second point of the Literature Review, Cara J. Dienes, refers to product rollover 
decisions that are intertwined with product update time decisions, and the company can 
eliminate older generations of the product. With this subject, the author`s dissertation addresses 
the following authors: 
The authors Billington et al are faced with the problem that companies need a process of 
planning and coordinating the rollovers of the products and managing to reduce the associated 
risks. To do so, they used as a methodology the early planning of rollovers by companies, at 
the time they plan the introduction of the new product. At the end of their studies they were 
able to identify two strategies that could be used by companies, the main ones for rollover of 
the products, namely the roll of the solo-product and the roll of the dual-product. In the same 
context, they found that if changed product and market conditions increase the risk of the 
product, companies can choose between four contingency strategies (significant discounts; 
postpone the introduction of the new product; introduce the new product ahead of schedule; 
two or more dual line product strategies. Companies can also significantly improve their 
product rollovers by exploring opportunities to reduce product and market risk for each new 
product. 
Erhun et al. tries to tackle the problem of ever smaller product lifecycles and the fastest 
time to market where this problem leads companies to introduce their new products more often. 
The authors have developed a process to try to facilitate the taking of the new products, where 
it analyzes the risks that affect a transition, is able to identify a set of factors among the 
departments that look for these risks, that is able to control the evolution of these factors over 
time and develops, finally, scenarios for mapping risks and responses. Through this process 
they can help managers design and implement appropriate policies to increase sales of new 
products and reduce sales of new products and reduce sales of existing products by balancing 
supply and demand of both so combined sales can grow no problems. 
The two authors (Lim and Tang) tried to solve the problem of implementing a new product 
and successfully eliminate an old product, that is, to plan a rollover of a successful product. To 
do so they developed an analytical model to try to analyze the profits associated with two 
rollover strategies of the products (rollover of a single product and rollover of two products). 
Lim and Tang (2006) determined the optimal prices of both products, but also as the perfect 
time to execute these products' rollover strategies, also concluded the conditions for which the 
double product rollover strategy is optimal. 
Li and Gao say that the main problem to be studied in their article is the process of 
introducing the new products and removing the old products in phases. This process is called 
rollover. To study this problem, they considered a periodic inventory system consisting of a 
producer and his retailer. The producer incorporates new and improved products in the long 
run using the solo-roll strategy. They also considered two scenarios: the first when the producer 
does not share the upstream information about the incorporation of new products with the 
retailer and the other when the producer shares this information. A conclusion drawn from the 
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 authors' study indicates that they have shown that when the inventory system is coordinated, 
sharing information will improve the performance of the two entities in the supply chain. They 
also show that the producer has no incentive to betray the retailer about new product 
information in the information sharing model. Another conclusion is that when there are 
fluctuations in demand and this increase, information sharing adds more benefits in the supply 
chain. Finally, his paper concludes that this study provides insight into the coordination of 
product, financial and information flows in the supply chain with product rollover. 
The last point to be addressed in this literature review is the cost control policy of PPI in 
Hospitals. The authors that Cara J. Dienes refers to in her article about PPI cost control efforts 
for hospitals have limits to case studies and commercial publications. (1) to reduce the number 
of PPI brands purchased, in order to gain volume discounts, and (2) to influence physicians to 
consider price when determining their preference for PPI. "(Dienes, 2011) 
The author`s dissertation addresses the following authors: 
Montgomery and Schneller argue that the problem is what strategies hospitals should adopt 
to influence supplier behavior in PPI procurement. As a methodology to try to solve the 
problem, two models of standardization have been created, the first being the "Form" Model 
that addresses the limitations of the variety of manufacturers or products and the "Payment 
Limit" model that refers to price ceilings for categories of specific items. The authors conclude 
their article by pointing out that the Form Template is more difficult to implement because of 
the doctors' resistance to top-down advice, whereas in the Payment Limit Model it is the most 
viable, this is because it preserves the decisions of doctors and limits the power of producers. 
They conclude by saying that hospitals can influence the involvement of physicians through a 
harmonization process, including a commitment to improve clinical settings, scheduling, and 
training, as a result of growing a culture of trust and mutual respect. 
Schneller and Smeltzer sought to find a solution to the strategic management of the health 
supply chain and its role in health care strategy. They were based on fundamental concepts, 
namely, supply of materials; demand forecasting; selection and use of distribution models; and 
risk assessment. These two authors have shown their pursuit of excellence in the management 
of supplies in the health sector. 
The authors Ketcham & Furukawa identified as a great problem the quality and the access 
to share the gains that can reduce the costs, when aligning the hospital and medical incentives. 
To try to find a solution they examined the effects of thirteen benefit sharing programs on 
coronary stent patients. Where they concluded that the shared-earning hospitals reduced their 
costs per patient and found that the available access and quality measures suggest that none of 
them were reduced or access to drug-eluting stents before 2006. 
In their article, Burns et al. report a very current problem, which is the large number of 
suppliers, which leads hospitals to try to dissuade doctors from reducing the number of 
suppliers and containing the costs of implants. As a methodology, these authors studied all 
orthopedists who performed 12 or more implant procedures annually in Pennsylvania. What 
the study identified was the physician's preferred provider, alignment of interests with the 
provider and hospital stakeholders, exposure and responsiveness to hospital cost containment 
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 efforts, supplier financial payment, and provider use during training. Authors Burns et al 
conclude that physicians have long-standing relationships with their implant providers, but 
only a few receive financial payments. They further conclude that doctors support hospital 
efforts to try to reduce the number of providers, however the decision of the provider is not 
limited. Finally, in their article, they affirm that the main factors driving doctors' alignment and 
posture regarding cost reduction are their ownership and receipt of supplier payments. 
3. Methodology 
Cara J. Dienes begins by formalizing his problem by addressing the producer and 
physician relationship. The producer provides the physician with several generations of a 
product, the latter having a constant evolution, helping "in the coordination of internal 
processes of product development" (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; Christensen, 1997). The 
producer decides when to launch the new generation of the product and when it is in the market, 
the popularity of a generation follows a curve and the latter can descend or rise. These swings 
give us the volume of sales or customers they have over time. This curve is called Shaped 
(Rogers, 2003) and is drawn according to the producer's choice by excluding the old 
generations of a product. 
This decision can be called "product rollover policy" which has two types of strategies: 
the launch of the solo product and the double product (the old generation of the product and 
the new generation are in the market simultaneously). 
The new generations of products have a profit per unit, and the producer encourages 
physicians to buy products with the addition of new features thus leading healthcare 
professionals to buy the new generation that is more expensive. The price of the new upgrade 
increases with time between successive generations of products increasing. 
First, an adoption decision is needed in which physician are responsible for this action. Health 
professionals must decide whether to acquire the new generation and may even change the 
brand of PPI they use. However, physician is usually loyal to whoever produces their PPI. 
Before purchasing the new generation of PPI, the physician has the time to become aware of 
the existence and update of the new generation of items for the health professional to decide. 
The physician acquires knowledge of the new update of the new PPI in pairs. This peer learning 
was studied by Pisano et al, in which the author of this dissertation comments that the authors 
studied several hospital cultures and presented two examples: "one organization with high 
levels of cross-department communication, teamwork, and engagement from the adopting 
physician". 
Team members who are involved in the new procedures worked to develop an 
understanding of both their roles as well as other members. However, in other hospitals they 
saw that learning could be affected by team stability, lack of communication in departments 
and by the adoption of technology. Thus, Pisano et al affirm that organizational communication 
and learning are very important for the improvement of clinical results obtained by experiences. 
The concept in which physicians determine whether to adopt a new generation of the product 
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 sooner or later is the basic concept of this study, where we can represent the time of adoption 
as a random variable. 
There are several features that will affect your physician's results, including PPI features 
and the generation experience you have taken. The theory of learning was used to enable us to 
understand how the results of physicians improve with their experience. In a PPI supply chain, 
in order to achieve maximum clinical efficacy and productivity with a new generation of the 
product, we should have to improve on the learning curve. To increase the experience of a 
physician with the generation of the product adopted, we can consider several factors, the main 
one being the accomplishment of the procedures where, with the addition of the same, the 
experience and productivity will improve considerably. 
Cara J. Dienes introduces a new agent (sales representative) to his problem formulation. 
This representative is the element that manages relationships with physicians. The sales 
representative will provide a way for the producer to shorten the time it takes for a physician 
to advance during the evaluation period or the physician's learning curve after adopting a new 
generation. It should also be noted that if a physician has a long relationship with the sales 
representative, the producer can persuade the physician’s loyalty. 
To limit the adoption of new generations of products by physicians, hospitals can implement 
policies for this purpose. One such restriction policy is the example of the policy of restricting 
the maximum price of the product. 
Hospitals place a price cap will influence two important aspects of the supply chain for 
three players. This policy will reduce physicians' power of choice (they will not be able to 
purchase PPI's for prices above the threshold) and will also reduce PPI procedures in hospitals. 
Options such as this cost control will result in physicians being able to transfer patients to other 
facilities. However, it may also be beneficial for the physician as it may lead to increased 
experience with the new generation of products and consequently a better version of the 
product will be given to patients. We can see in Figure 1 how this action develops with the 
interaction of the physician, sales representative and the hospital. 
In this study, game theory is used to help us resolve conflicts and increase efficiency 
among the 3 players (Hospital, Physician and Manufacturer), we have the following definition 
of game theory “"a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that 
we observe when decision-makers interact”. (Osborne e Rubinstein (1994)).  
We have three main scenarios in this research, the first two can be formulated with only 
two players (physician and manufacturer), where what the physician learns and the introduction 
of the sales representative by the manufacturer can affect the pace of updating the 
manufacturer's product. The third scenario is related to the policy of controlling the costs of 
PPI by the hospital, where a third player (Physician, Manufacturer and Hospital) will be added. 
The length of time that the physician delays evaluating the product before deciding to 
adopt it may affect the goals of each of the intermediaries in the problem (in either two-player 
or three-player play), in other words, players are competing for time.  
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 Figure 1 - Influence Diagram of the PPI Delivery Chair 
 
The Static Game is used so that we can understand the plays between the manufacturer 
and the physician, meaning that none of the players will say their next move. Manufacturers 
within the PPI industry compete for innovation, since information such as rollover policy and 
the pace of product upgrade should be private.  
To make a model we have a choice that we have to take important, which is whether the 
game will be finite or infinite, where we will have to decide what will be the scenario with 
more precision in the model considered. However, if there is no logic to be repeated in the 
behaviour of the system then it is better to use a single game. 
Updating the products in the PPI supply chain can be seen as a repeated game for each 
new generation launched in the market, where we have several variables to be repeated 
throughout the various games (Rollover Policy of the manufacturer's products, adoption 
decisions and the time of evaluation of the physician). The time control policy means that the 
manufacturer's product rhythm of product updates takes place only once during the game. One 
way we can use a non-repeated game is when the manufacturer and physician do not have 
intentions to re-enter future interactions with each other as they decide on the product upgrade 
game.  
The game that leads us to show the uncertainty in the supply chain of PPI is the stochastic 
games, however, in this case presents difficulties. Players who are present in the PPI supply 
chain do not know the current state, in other words, are unsure of certain parameters. The 
concept of incomplete information turns out to be useful if we can model uncertainty. 
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 All parameters within the model must be known to all players before they have performed 
whatever their strategies. The uncertainties that the players present in the supply chain of the 
PPI also have the will of all the players, where none of them has private information that can 
reduce the uncertainty of these parameters.  
In order to predict the behaviour within a PPI game, without adding more parameters, we 
can use the Pareto classification. The Pareto classification is used to make basic predictions 
about players' behaviours, where we do it when the game has multiple pure Nash equilibrium. 
Cara J. Dienes presents in his formulation the model and medical-producer notation where 
she models a static game with two players (physician and producer) with complete information, 
in which both agents are competing for the usefulness of the time of adoption. 
In this situation there are two players (Producer and Physician). The producer is playing to 
maximize their profit that comes from maximizing the revenues of the new generation of PPI. 
The physician tries to maximize his or her clinical outcomes (e.g., mortality or patient recovery 
time) which represents the motivation of a health professional to achieve good performance. 
The producer action represented by A1 is transcribed by the possible values for the product 
update interval (θ) and the rollover policy (p). The product update interval is the time between 
the arrival of successive generations of products to the market. Rollover is the time when the 
previous product is on the market after being incorporated a new generation of the product. 
The area of action for the physician, represented by A2, gathers all the values for the moment 
the physician prefers to adopt the latest product generation, on average. The variables used in 
this part are included in Annex 1. 
As for the producers' payoffs, Cara J. Dienes focuses more on profit maximization and 
says that the producer's income is used as their goal. In the initial formulation of the PPI supply 
chain, price and quantity are addressed by proxies. The clinical value of the new generation of 
products, V (θ) is used as proxy for the price, while for quantity it is characterized by the 
adoption in rollover. The t is represented by the time of action and S (θ) is the average 
probability that the physician becomes insidious to his favourite producer. To do this, use the 
following formula:  
𝑢ଵ,ூ = Pr (τ ≤ ρ) [1 – S(θ)] V(θ) 
Another point addressed by the author is the effects of the rollover policy at the time of 
adoption. In this part, it refers to the first component which is the average probability of the 
physician acquiring the new generation of the PPI prior to the elimination of the previous 
generation of the product (uଵ,୍) and that the beta distribution is used to form the distribution of 
the times of adoption of the physician (τ). The parameters, λ ଵ and λ ଶ (ρ, ω, λ ଵ), are limited to 
being greater than one. The distribution τ is given by: 
Pr (τ < x) ~ Generalized Beta (λ ଵ, λ ଶ, ω ୫୧୬ – 1, ω ୫ୟ୶ + 1) 
= 
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 ∫ ଵ஻൫஛ భ,஛ మ (ఘ,ఠ,஛ భ)൯
௫
ன ౣ౟౤ ି ଵ
ቀ ௫ି ன ౣ౟౤ାଵ
ன ౣ౗౮ାଵି ன ౣ౟౤ାଵ
ቁ
஛ భ ି ଵ
ቀ1 − ௫ି னౣ౟౤ାଵ
னౣ౗౮ାଵି னౣ౟౤ାଵ
ቁ
஛ మ ି ଵ
 dx 
The plot (ω ୫୧୬ − 1 and ω ୫୧୬ + 1) are determined to reach the full range of the physician 
's action space and therefore Cara J. Dienes indicates in its formulation that: 
Pr ൫𝜏 <  (ω ୫୧୬ − 1)൯  =  0 
and 
Pr ൫𝜏 >  (ω ୫ୟ୶ + 1)൯  =  0 
When λ ଵ is reported, the second parameter (λ ଶ(ρ, ω, λ ଵ)) is determined by the physician's 
adoption time (ω) and the producer's policy (ρ, and λ ଵ). E [τ] (definition of the mean of the 
beta distribution) is a formula used by the author to align the payoff of the producer with the 
action that the physician selects in the game. 
E [τ] = ω ୫୧୬ − 1 + (ω ୫ୟ୶ + 1 − ω ୫୧୬ + 1)
஛ భ
஛ భ ା ஛ మ
 
The relationship between λ ଶ and ω is second to author "a simple piecewise linear function 
is used to model the manufacturer's ability to influence physician adoption time through the 
rollover policy." (Dienes J.) (Annex 2). This relationship must be valid so that the rollover 
policy (ρ) decreases and persuades the physicians to acquire the new generation of the product 
sooner than they should. The λ ଶ is a parameter that concerns physicians who are not influenced 
by the producer to acquire the updated version of the PPIs earlier when p (rollover policy) is 
greater than a certain threshold (p ଶ). Since p is below this limit, persuasion over physicians is 
higher by lowering the median time of adoption chosen by the physician. This action does 
"increases the decreases until a second threshold is reached at. At this point, the maximum 
effective level of influence is reached." (Diernes J.) (Annex 3). 
The parameters p ଵ, p ଶ and k determine the slope and interval of the rollover policy effect 
(p) and distribution format of the adoption time. This relation that is linear is expressed 
mathematically by: 
 
λ ଶ (ρ, ω, λ ଵ)  
=
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ ൬
ω ୫ୟ୶   − ω ୫୧୬ 
𝜔 −  ω ୫୧୬  +  1
 −  1൰ kλଵ ρ ≤  ρଵ
ቌ
𝑘λଵ  −  ቀ
ω ୫ୟ୶  −  ω ୫୧୬
𝜔 −  ω ୫୧୬  +  1
 −  1ቁ λଵ
ρଵ  −  ρଶ
ቍ (𝜌 − ρଵ) + ൬
ω ୫ୟ୶  − ω ୫୧୬
𝜔 −  ω ୫୧୬  +  1
 −  1൰ kλଵ ρଵ  <  ρ <  ρଶ
൬
ω ୫ୟ୶  −  ω ୫୧୬
𝜔 −  ω ୫୧୬  +  1
 −  1൰ λଵ ρଶ  ≤  ρ
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Another point addressed by the thesis author is the effects of the update interval on the 
probability of exchange. What this topic is about is the effect of the physician leading to the 
change of brand preferences due to the inadequate product refresh interval. If the producer 
decides to modernize the PPI several times, the physician's chance of becoming insidious due 
to the successive changes in the product increases. However, if the producer does not change 
his product regularly enough, the possibility of the physician becoming disloyal also increases 
because there will be new generations of the product that will be available by competing 
producers. The author of the dissertation uses the deterministic bathtub curve to describe the 
possibility of the health professional leaving the producer and purchasing products from the 
competition with the function of the product update interval (θ). 
We also must consider the effects that exist in the refresh interval in the product value. 
Cara J. Dienes states that in the producer's payoff function, the effect of the refresh interval is 
its third component. In order to have a more plausible game in which the new generation has a 
greater value, on the part of the producer, we will have to have a lower frequency. A PPI 
upgrade may be less valuable when the new update is done regularly. The clinical value of the 
new product update (V (θ)) in the range of zero to one can be mathematically defined by the 
following formula and graph (Annexe 4) present in the Annexe. 
V (θ) = V (0) + ቀ୚ (஘ౣ౗౮) ି ௏(଴)
஘ౣ౗౮
ቁθ 
By introducing these effects into the producer's payoff function, it is mathematically 
represented by: 
uଵ,୍ = ቈන
1
𝐵൫λଵ, λଶ (𝜌, 𝜔, 𝜆ଵ)൯
൬
𝑥 −  ω୫୧୬ + 1
ω୫ୟ୶ + 1 − ω୫୧୬ + 1
൰
஛భିଵ
൬1
ఘ
னౣ౟౤ ି ଵ
−
𝑥 −  ω୫୧୬ + 1
ω୫ୟ୶ + 1 − ω୫୧୬ + 1
൰
஛మ(ఘ,ఠ,஛భ)ିଵ
𝑑𝑟቉ [1 − 𝑆(𝜃)] ቈ𝑉(0)
+ ቆ
V (θ୫ୟ୶) −  𝑉(0)
θ୫ୟ୶
ቇ 𝜃቉ 
As for the payoff of the physicians we can mention that in model supply chains, these 
health professionals can be economically motivated. Physicians in the PPI supply chain do not 
pay for the resources they use. Not having this concern with cost, the physician's goal is to 
maximize their clinical outcomes and to achieve it according to Cara J. Dienes “we model the 
physician’s payoff to be the average clinical results during the PPI product generation’s 
lifecycle which can be represented by: 
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 uଶ,୍ =
1
tଷ
න R(t)dt
୲య
଴
 
The manufacturer and physician are based on different theories for the payoff decision, 
where for the manufacturer he seeks to use the theory of diffusion, and the physician inserts 
himself into the theory of the learning curve.  
When we add a new generation of the product, the product that already existed undergoes 
a reduction of its clinical results, as it is correlated with the degree of inequality with the new 
generation. In the perspective of the physician turns out to be the risk he must take when 
adopting a new generation of PPI. 
The physician can reduce the negative impact of the new generation of new products on 
their clinical outcomes, so he can lengthen the waiting for adoption because by waiting you 
can learn more from your peers before adoption. 
By formulating the following function by parts, we will be able to encompass the three 
distinct phases of the clinician's clinical outcomes depending on his decision to adopt the new 
generation. 
 
R(t)  =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
R (0) 𝑡 < 𝑡ଵ
𝐷ᇱ(0)𝑅(0) ቌ𝑡 − 𝜔 + ቆ
𝐷ᇱ(𝜔)
𝐷ᇱ(0)
ቇ
ଵ
௕ᇲ
ቍ
௕ᇲ
𝑡ଵ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡ଶᇱ
(1 +  V (θ)) R (0) 𝑡ଵ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡ଶᇱ
 
 
The effects of the player's decisions are divided into three segments. The first concerns the 
termination of the physician's average clinical outcome function when a manufacturer 
replacement policy occurs prior to the physician's preferred adoption or in the case of the 
physician adopting the PPI update. The second segment receives a cut in one of the three 
different points of the time line, where, with a policy of overlap of the manufacturer, the 
physician encountered the obstacle of not being able to adopt at his preferred moment, which 
leads to the cut of the second segment. Finally, the last segment comes to an end when the new 
generation of products ends or if the final segment cannot be reached due to a policy of 
replacing the products by the manufacturer, this makes it impossible for the have their preferred 
time of adoption.  
In order to be able to study the influence that the manufacturer's sales representative has 
on the ideal product update interval and adoption time decisions, a static two-player game was 
formulated with complete information.  
In this model of the Sales Representative, it has been found that the two players are the 
manufacturer and physician of PPI, as the representative is considered to belong to the 
manufacturer. 
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 The sales representative aims to build relationships with the physician and at the same time 
give you the information and training on the new generations of products. In the manufacturer's 
payoff function, which consists of three components already described previously, it undergoes 
minor changes because of the introduction of the sales representative in the game. 
As we have seen in the original Physician-Manufacturer model, the generalized beta shows 
us the distribution of the probability of adoption time for a new generation of PPIs by 
physicians. For the end point to be cut to the end of product availability on the market, the time 
distribution of adoption must be constrained by ρ. Using the formula presented above, we can 
solve the endpoint of w, where this formula manages to reduce the variation of adoption time, 
thus managing to analyse the impact of the sales representative on the behaviour of the 
physician's adoption. 
 
w = ൜2ω 2ω <  ρρ ρ ≤  2ω 
 
With the introduction of the sales representative you can lead physicians to have loyalty 
about the manufacturer. In other words, the sales representative can be a strategy that will 
influence both the manufacturer and the physician, because we can identify three possible 
scenarios with the implementation. The first scenario is when the representative manages to 
gain complete physician loyalty, that is, it gives no incentive for the physician to divert to the 
competition. The second scenario is when, even with the loyalty of the physician, the constant 
evolution of the products may influence the physician to change, however, the representative 
is able, in most cases, to benefit from the loyalty. Finally, the third scenario is when the sales 
representative has a negative impact on the physician, which leads him to want to switch to the 
competition. 
The product value is the manufacturer's final payoff function variable, where it is 
considered an important component of the chain set and PPI supplies in the results of the 
Medical-Manufacturer Kit. In order to analyse the same, we need to add three modes. The first 
is the simple linear mode, where a value of the product is used in the clinical value of the new 
generation of the product. The second mode shows us a hypothesis of decreasing returns over 
time. Finally, the last is when we can achieve a breakthrough in R&D, and then the value we 
should achieve accelerates. 
With these changes to the payoff function of the original manufacturer, we had to rewrite 
a new payoff function. 
𝑢ଵ,ூூ = ቈන
1
𝐵(𝜆ଵ, 𝜆ଵ)
൬
𝜏 − 𝜔௠௜௡ + 1
𝑤 − 𝜔௠௜௡ + 1
൰
ఒభିଵ
൬1 −
𝜏 − 𝜔௠௜௡ + 1
𝑤 − 𝜔௠௜௡ + 1
൰
ఒభିଵ
𝑑𝜏
ఘ
ఠ೘೔೙ିଵ
቉ [1
− 𝑆(𝜃)][𝑉(𝜃)] 
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 The physician's payoff is the average of the clinical results you get from the lifetime of a 
product's generation; however, we need to tailor your payoffs to the implementation of the sales 
representative by the manufacturer. 
With the implementation of the sales representative, the physician ends up not having to 
postpone the purchase decision in order to learn more about the product, because the represents 
ends up diminishing this effect by providing information and training about the product. 
The sales representative is assumed to act in favour of the manufacturer, however there 
are several aspects that may affect the effectiveness of the representative in providing the 
information to physicians. We have as examples the number of physicians assigned to the 
representative, the skills they have and, finally, the infrastructure available to sales 
representatives to share information with each other. 
There are two factors in the physician's learning that are influenced by the gain of the sales 
representative. The first is when the representative manages to reduce the risks of the physician 
in adopting the new generation of the product. Where we can check this effect in the original 
drop / peer learning function. 
 
D’ (ω)  =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧D’ (0)  +  qω 𝜔 <  
1 −  𝐷ᇱ(0)
𝑞
1 𝜔 ≥  
1 −  𝐷ᇱ(0)
𝑞
 
 
The second factor is when the reduction of the time needed to master the new generation 
of PPI by the physician is achieved. To demonstrate this effect, we have the following formula. 
L’ = (1 – α) L 
With the implementation of the sales representative by the manufacturer, we must rewrite 
the expression of the clinician's clinical results over time. 
R(t)  =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
R(0) 𝑡 < 𝑡ଵ
𝐷ᇱ(0)𝑅(0) ቌ𝑡 − 𝜔 + ቆ
𝐷ᇱ(𝜔)
𝐷ᇱ(0)
ቇ
ଵ
௕ᇲ
ቍ
௕ᇲ
𝑡ଵ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡ଶᇱ
(1 +  V (θ)) R (0) 𝑡ଶᇱ < 𝑡 < 𝑡ଷ
 
In the hospital cost control model, with the players Physicians and Manufacturer, we must 
add a new player in the PPI supply chain, namely the hospital. With the introduction of the 
hospital into the equation, we must consider that we have a third space of action introduced. 
This introduction of a third steel space consists of the maximum amount that the hospital will 
pay for a single unit of PPI.  
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 In order to formulate the function of the hospital payoff we must consider two aspects. The 
first is how to make up for the average of the physician’s clinical results. The second is a proxy 
for the average time cost. 
𝑢ଷ,ூூூ = 𝛼𝑢ଶ,ଶ − (1 − 𝛼)𝑀 
If the hospital puts restrictions on adoption to physicians, the payoff function changes. 
𝑢ଷ,ூூூ = ൛൫1 − 𝐻(𝑉)൯[𝛼𝑅(0) − (1 − 𝛼)𝑀]ൟ − ൛𝐻(𝑉)ൣ𝛼𝑢ଶ,ଶ − (1 − 𝛼)𝑀൧ൟ  
The hospital should pay off the maximum claimed value, even though the physician will, 
over time, evolve in the learning curve to achieve its maximum clinical value of a new 
generation of PPI. In other words, the physician in selecting a new generation of PPI, the cost 
that the hospital charges go from its initial level to the claimed value of the product. 
The "Declared Clinical Value" is the proxy we use to use the cost of the new generation 
of PPI. We can also model an important feature in this subject, which is the disparity between 
actual and claimed clinical value. 
In this line of reasoning, we can create a two-step function that expresses the cost of the 
hospital. 
C(z)  = ൜
R(0) Z <  Zଵ
R(0) [Ṽ(θ, Δ)  +  1] Zଵ  ≤  Z <  Zଶ
 
In the function of hospital costs, we can find break points between segments by parts. The 
first is characterized by starting at zero time. The physician may not adopt the PPI, behind this 
we have reason why the hospital limits the adoption of the physician using the politics of the 
control of the price press claimed. 
Physicians and hospitals choose their actions without any problems for each other, the 
limit of the two segments by parts happens when the first two segments of the function of 
clinical results by the physician reach the limit. In case the hospital prevents the physician from 
being able to adopt a new PPI to be used in that same hospital, where what is prevented is the 
maximum amount claimed, it causes the hospital never to have expenses with the new PPI. 
Even without the hospital paying the new generation of the product, the physician will always 
have the option of using this new generation of PPI in another hospital that allows it. 
The hospital by restricting the use of a new generation of PPI will lead to the physician 
deciding to adopt to carry out its procedures in another hospital with this new generation, 
however, continuing to carry out the remaining procedures at the hospital of origin. This case 
leads us to conclude that part of the procedures is lost by the hospital and that, on the part of 
the manufacturer, there is a loss in unit sales. 
In the following table, it shows us four scenarios between the hospital and the physicians, 
where when choosing scenarios, A, B and C payoff functions do not need to be changed, as 
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 discussed so far. However, the option D the two are in conflict, which is the hypothesis that the 
hospital limits the adoption of a new generation that physicians want to acquire. 
 
Table 1 - Hospital-Physician Agreement Scenarios 
In the three-player game, the physician’s payoff is influenced by the actual clinical value 
of the PPI. One of the ways to decrease the likelihood that the physician will change hospitals 
is to have a low clinical real value of the product. However, if this figure is high it will lead to 
the physician having a high probability of changing hospital to be able to use the new 
generation. In order to analyse these effects, we introduce the following formula. 
H൫V(θ)൯ =
H൫V(𝜃௠௔௫)൯
V(𝜃௠௔௫)
𝑉(𝜃) 
Now we have two chances to add in the payoff function of the hospital. The first is when 
the physician is encouraged to use another hospital for some of the parts of their procedures. 
The second hypothesis if the physician does not change hospitals. 
𝑢ଷ,ூூூ = 
= ቊ
𝛼𝑢ଶ,ூூ − (1 − 𝛼)𝑀 y(1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  0
   (1 –  H(V))(αR(0) – (1 –  α) 𝑀௬ୀଵ) – (H(V)( 𝛼𝑢ଶ,ூூ – (1 –  α) 𝑀௬ୀ଴)) y(1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  1
 
We can also conclude (according to manufacturers) that the results obtained by physicians 
are driven by the actual clinical value of the PPI and not by the value of the new generation. 
As we have seen previously we have 4 scenarios to perform our tests, in the payoff function of 
the physician we divide in two parts, the first part encompasses the scenarios A, B and C, where 
the physician does not change hospital, and the second option encompasses scenario D , where 
the physician is in conflict with the hospital. 
𝑢ଶ,ூூூ =  ൜
𝑢ଶ,ூூ y (1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  0
   [1 –  H (V (θ))] R (0) +  H (V (θ)) 𝑢ଶ,ூூ y (1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  1
 
With the three-player game, the manufacturer's payoff function must be changed, adjusting 
in two ways. The first is when the physician adopts the new generation of PPI (Scenarios A, B 
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 and C). The second adjustment, the reward may suffer from hospital restrictions on the 
adoption of physician PPI (Scenario D). 
𝑢ଵ,ூூூ =  ቊ
Pr (τ ≤  ρ) [1 –  S (θ)] [Ṽ(θ, Δ)] y (1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  0
   H (V) Pr (τ ≤  ρ) [1 –  S (θ)] [Ṽ (θ, Δ)] y (1 – 𝑥ଵ)  =  1
 
The author of this dissertation examines the definition of the product update interval by 
the manufacturer. One of the most efficient ways for producers to liberate generations from 
their products is to try to be consistent in their cycles, in other words, to free generations every 
year, every six months, quarterly, or another time unit. 
Before we can carry out the study, one of the fundamental characteristics to do is to identify 
the space of action of the manufacturer, where, considering that we need viable combinations 
of values for the decisions, we must have defined the update interval (θ) and the Rollover policy 
(ρ). Cara J. Dienes throughout his study decided that the manufacturer's refresh interval is not 
performed with a frequency higher than quarterly. With the same ideology the rollover policy 
of the manufacturer was also restricted to a quarterly level where, as a result, it gave rise to 
thirteen possible values for ρ. A monthly interval was also defined after the launch of a new 
generation of products (1 to 48 months). 
In this work, for each of the presented scenarios the pure Nash equilibria were calculated. 
This process was carried out in order to identify patterns and complete the parameters that may 
lead to restricting game results. 
When we perform the complete factorial experiment, we deduce ten parameters from the 
model entry, where we can verify at least two levels that are defined for each factor. 
The Manufacturer-Physician game must take into consideration the likelihood of the 
physician changing his preferences for a competing product, by that ideology, we have to 
include as a factor of the experience. On this aspect we can identify three levels. Where the 
first is a "bathtub" curve, which is characterized by a tendency for players to switch to 
competitors, identified by a refresh interval of the product that is too fast or too slow. The 
second is characterized by a group of players who are influenced by frequent updates, however, 
the PPI they obtain is not subject to high levels of competitive innovation. Finally, determined 
as a population that is not easily influenced by the frequent updates, but in contrast, the acquired 
PPI obtains a highly innovative market level. 
In the Payoff function of the manufacturer previously formulated, we can define the 
distribution of adoption times for the physicians' population with four of the ten factors (ρଵ, 
ρଶ୼, κ and λଵ). To perform an analysis of the different types of behaviour of populations we 
use the parameters mentioned above, where we also use to modify the form of the Payoff 
function of the manufacturer. 
In order to verify an increase in the value of the generation of the new products when we 
verify the increase of the interval of the update of the product of the manufacturer, we must use 
the V (θ௠௔௫). 
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 The remaining factors relate to the physician's learning, where the D (0) and q parameters 
are used to demonstrate the physician's decline in clinical outcomes when adopting a PPI 
update for the first time. The time a physician takes to fully learn the up-to-date product and 
the number of clients the physician can meet monthly are represented by factors L and P, 
respectively. 
To establish the value of the product we must consider three forms, namely, original 
(linear), diminishing returns (concave) or threshold (convex). These three ways can 
demonstrate the possible relationships between the interval of the manufacturer's product 
update and the value of a new generation. In this study we used the three test forms with a low 
maximum value and a high maximum value in order to be able to test the impact of the 
maximum value of the product. 
The author performed at the maximum level of L (the duration that a physician needs to 
master the update) 75 procedures to reach the maximum value. To verify the effectiveness of 
the sales rep's training, a high (25%) and low (5%) level was used that is included for the sales 
rep gain factor. 
Considering the Hospital Cost Control model, the model entry parameters allow the study 
of behaviours that can be verified in the PPI supply chain of the three participants. 
The concept of "claimed value" versus "real value" of new product generations is 
considered in the Hospital Cost Control game. The Δ parameter was used to test a 
manufacturer's benchmark interval, where it was tested at three levels (-25%, 0% and 25%). 
As a follow-up to the work carried out by Cara J. Dienes (author on which we base our 
dissertation), we investigated another alternative for this study. As an initiative we went to look 
for a company in which we could carry out a questionnaire in order to test the opinion of some 
employees of the company in question. Our test consists of trying to understand to what extent 
PPI's customers and other products are willing to make long-term product generations changes, 
in other words, with a minimum ceiling of 1 year and a maximum of 5 years, however, giving 
assurance that these generations will be of quality, with efficient applicability and with a sales 
representative to assist in learning them. We carried out the questionnaire to 24 employees of 
the respective company, where it asked to remain anonymous. 
In the questionnaire we conducted the study, within the period in question, whether 
employees would accept these changes and what would be the maximum time they would be 
willing to accept those changes. Finally, if they were willing to accept the long-term changes, 
we asked whether they would always remain faithful to the same manufacturer or, after the 
generation deadline, they would carry out a market study to find the most efficient and priced 
product generation the most advantageous quality. 
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  Accept Don’t Accept 
Are you willing to make long-term product / PPI changes?   
If you answer "yes", what is the maximum amount of time you are willing to wait? 
From one year to two years   
From two years to three years   
From three years to four years   
From four years to five years   
More than five years   
Would it remain faithful, in the long run, to the same 
manufacturer of the product / PPI? 
  
4. Application 
The application aims at the results obtained and their discussion as well as a sensitive 
analysis. Thus, the author begins to address the results of the game in the Medical-Producer 
case. Therefore, this section will include the analyses of the results obtained by Cara J. Dienes. 
The author tells us that the full-factorial experience relates to 1500 normal games that produced 
13 506 values for 𝑢ଵ and 𝑢ଶ and per game. The interaction of the return surfaces is characterized 
by the computation of pure Nash equilibrium. 
The figures in Annexes 5 and 6 indicate that the payoff functions of the producer and the 
physician are calculated based on a single study. The Nash equilibrium in these two cases occur 
when θ = 72 months, ρ = 48 months and ω = 9 months which are indicated by the red arrows. 
(Dienes, 2011).  
The physician's average result (Annex 6) demonstrates the impact of the physician's 
learning curve. The time of adoption that is ideal and the expected results of the physician has 
an inverse relationship between them, in other words, it is not possible to maximize the benefits 
of new product generation during the life cycle with a future adoption. In other words, as it 
increases, the payoff of the doctor is decreasing involving a large part of the space of action 
where the payoff function reaches its minimum. This previously discussed region indicates 
action combinations for which the physician prefers not to accept the new generation of 
products and remain at the current level of their clinical outcomes. 
Comparing the expected utility of players over the course of the tests, predicted payoffs for the 
Nash equilibrium (Pareto top-up) were normalized in all actions and in all trials (Dienes, 2011).  
Thus, the best Nash equilibria are represented in the Annex 7. In Class 1, the physician 
obtains a moderate return in current clinical outcomes, which occurs in a normalized value of 
51%. In Class 1, the manufacturer receives only a minimum gain. In class 2, both the physician 
and the manufacturer obtain a moderate result. In Classes 3, 4 and 5, the manufacturer gets an 
excellent reward, while the physician's payment is moderate, strong and excellent, respectively 
(Dienes, 2011). 
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 This diagram also presents the advantage to the physician in the product update game. In 
some scenarios, the manufacturer cannot expect to receive a high return. Despite the 
manufacturer's outcome, in almost all cases, the physician will not get worse than it started, 
and, in many cases, the average clinical outcome will improve (Dienes, 2011). 
Also, we can observe that there is a positive correlation between 𝑢ଵ and 𝑢ଶ, that is, when the 
manufacturer's result is improved, that of the doctor as well. In other words, we can also 
mention that there is incentive within the PPI update game for the manufacturer and the doctor 
to cooperate in order to leave the two beneficiaries (Dienes, 2011). 
In the Annex 8 it is possible to verify that 𝑢ଵ increases at a rate higher than 𝑢ଶ, which 
implies that the physician's results are more sensitive to the value of the product than the 
physician (Dienes, 2011).  
In the Annex 9, the values of 𝑢ଵ and 𝑢ଶ are very sensitive and we can see that there is a 
positive correlation with the results between doctor and manufacturer. In other words, we can 
say that both the manufacturer and the doctor can benefit if they cooperate (Dienes, 2011). 
At another point, Cara J. Dienes also refers to the results of the game with the sales 
representative. The full-factorial experience defined, refers to 1680 normal games that formed 
13506 values for 𝑢ଵ and 𝑢ଶ and per game. In this example, the Nash equilibria occur in the 
actions θ = 21 months, ρ = 18 months and ω = 8 months that we can see in the red arrows in 
the Annex’s 10 and 11.  
Thus, in this test we find that the manufacturer benefits from low adoption times by 
physician. This suggests that a manufacturer has an incentive to launch frequent updates of the 
product. Thus, the Nash equilibrium occurs at a moderate value (θ = 21 months), providing a 
compromise between the two players.  
As in the previous point, the payoffs were normalized to be possible to compare the 
different results. In this way, the best Nash equilibria are represented in the Annex 12. In class 
1, the manufacturer receives a minimum payoff and the physician receives a slightly higher 
result than the current clinical results. Both receive a moderate result in class 2. In the following 
class, the physician's results do not improve but those of the physician improve. The results are 
considered strong for both in class 4. Finally, in class 5 the two players achieve exceptional 
results.  
Analysing the Annex 12, we can say that the doctor has an advantage in this game, because 
in the previous game (medical manufacturer in which there was no sales representative) there 
was a strong correlation in the success of both players. But in this model, the medical results 
are superior because the patients of the doctors are better due to the improvement of the clinical 
results associated with the inclusion of a new generation of products. 
In the Annex 13, the payoffs of normalized physicians are shown as a function of the gain 
of the sales representative (α). The orange colour is represented by the results of decreasing the 
doctor's loyalty to the pressures of competing manufacturers. A green, sales rep that has 
negative effects on the doctor's loyalty. Finally, in blue, it shows that the sales representative 
leads the doctor to 100% loyalty. Thus, the Annex 13 shows that " indicates that the physician’s 
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 payoff will improve as the sales rep’s ability to provide training (α) increases.  (Dienes, 2011). 
In relation to the Annex 14, we find that 𝑢ଵ is constant for all values of α, that is, the 
effectiveness of the training of the sales representative does not directly affect the 
manufacturer's results. However, analysing the above (annexes 13 and 14) we conclude that 
the effectiveness of the sales representative training results in a benefit for the physician (this 
is visible in the distribution of the medical payoff results within each class in the Annex 14 on 
the positive slope of the physician's payoff curves in the Annex 13). 
The next topic addressed by the author of the dissertation is the results of the hospital cost 
control game. In this section, the full factorial experiment defined 3,240 sets in the standard 
form. Each attempt formed 78 336 values for 𝑢ଵ, 𝑢ଶand 𝑢ଷ, and the pure Nash equilibria were 
identified for each trial through these values. In relation to hospital payoff (𝑢ଷ) this varies 
across the space of action. 
In the Annex 15 the form of the hospital payoff is shown for both test A and test B in the 
manufacturer's and hospital's actions (ω is kept constant). Regarding the Annex 16, this shows 
that the hospital Payoff is shown in the dimensions of the action of the physician and the 
hospital, where the values of the manufacturer's decisions are constant. Thus, we can say that 
when implementing a restrictive cost control policy, the hospital may have a negative impact 
on its own outcome.  
The imposition of a restrictive limit on the part of the hospital has the potential to affect 
𝑢ଵ, 𝑢ଶ and 𝑢ଷ, that is, it ends up limiting the payoffs of all players (Annexes 17, 18 and 19). 
One of the problems that hospitals face is the lack of coordination, and in such cases, they 
should seek out manufacturers to build relationships and collaborate to ensure that all parties 
receive the best result.  
Analysing the Annexes 20 and 21 we can say that the manufacturer's results are less related 
to the results of the hospital than those of the physician. There is also a positive correlation 
between the results for the hospital - manufacturer and the hospital - physician. Thus, we can 
say that the hospital is likely to benefit by working proactively in coordination with the 
manufacturer and the physician. 
Analysed the scenarios that incorporate hospitals with research and without investigation 
(Annexe 22). Thus, for a research hospital, cutting-edge clinical improvements are valued in 
relation to cost savings (α = 75%). On the other hand, for an hospital without research (α = 
25%), its values cost savings and is satisfied with current clinical results. 
Thus, providers who provide hospitals without research with new generation products, it 
is beneficial for the physician to treat the patient in another institution that allows the adoption 
of new products. On the other hand, providers who provide hospitals with research, players 
expect payoff in classes 5,6 or 7, in other words, the hospital's payoff is positively correlated 
with those of the manufacturer and the physician. 
By adding the cost control component to the hospital, we also find that the results depend 
on a wide variety of supply chain characteristics, in other words, the hospital should not take a 
single approach to PPI cost control policies.  
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 Observing the decision tree present in the Annex 23, we verified that Nash equilibrium 
results were observed in Payoff Classes 5, 6 and 7. Thus, this Payoff represents the highest 
classes for the hospital and that the Payoff class 7 is the highest payoff class for all players. 
From these results, for low-volume PPI procedures in the hospital of research with strong peer-
learning. The key factors that differentiate the results of mediocre and exceptional players are 
as follows: Clinical Value, Doctor's Loyalty to Manufacturer, and Manufacturer's Price. 
The Annex 24 helps to better understand the hospital cost control effects on the outcome of the 
game. The size of each bubble indicates how often the combination occurs. Only in three of 
the four scenarios were observed the best balances of the complete experiment: Scenario B, 
where the hospital does not restrict adoption and the physician adopts; Scenario C, where the 
hospital restricts adoption and the doctor does not adopt; and Scenario D, where the hospital 
restricts adoption and the doctor wants to adopt. 
Thus, for a hospital that lacks the research strand (α = 0.25) "when it is optimal to restrict 
the adoption of the new generation, they are able to move from Payoff class 1 to Payoff classes 
with higher results for themselves and for other players (Payoff Classes 7, 8 and 9). However, 
for the research hospital (α = 0.75), a restrictive return limit is almost never ideal". 
After having completed the questionnaire to the 24 employees of the company our goal is 
to join the results obtained in a single table, where we can analyse and take our conclusions 
from this test. The data obtained are presented in the following also, where it is discriminated 
how many people chose each option from the table previously demonstrated. 
 
 Accept Don’t Accept 
Are you willing to make long-term product / PPI changes? 18 6 
If you answer "yes", what is the maximum amount of time you are willing to wait? 
From one year to two years 9 
- 
From two years to three years 5 
From three years to four years 2 
From four years to five years 1 
More than five years 1 
 
Would it remain faithful, in the long run, to the same 
manufacturer of the product/PPI? 10 8 
 
As we can verify by our data, a large majority would be willing to accept a change of the 
generation of the product in the long term, with the assumptions previously given. We left no 
"Not Accepted" data in the section of which would be the maximum time, as it is not relevant 
to our study. Finally, we also find a balance in whether to stick to manufacturers or not. 
 
63
 5. Conclusions 
Finally, the author of the dissertation presents the conclusions drawn from her study. First, 
it addresses the conclusions he drew from the section between the medical manufacturer. She 
notes that physician-manufacturer's PPI update results show that a physician's ability to master 
a new generation of PPI directly affects the time it takes to adopt a new product. That is, the 
shorter the time it takes for a particular product to be dominated by the physician, there are 
benefits for the manufacturer and the doctor. The results indicate that when manufacturers 
invest in development activities in products with low levels of complexity, this will allow 
doctors to master them more quickly. 
Another important factor is the importance of the clinical value of a product, in other 
words, the introduction of a new generation of PPI is highly sensitive to the actual clinical 
value of this new generation. The results indicate that it is better for a physician not to adopt a 
new PPI product update if the product has a significant learning curve and low additional 
clinical value. 
The results also indicate that the manufacturer's PPI score correlates positively with the 
physician's outcome. When the doctor tests an improvement in clinical outcomes when 
adopting a new generation of PPI products, the manufacturer also benefits. Of course, when 
the new generation of PPI is of high value, that is, when it improves the outcomes of patients 
who receive it, then it is also in the interest of patients that manufacturers and clinicians 
cooperate, whenever possible, to develop new generations of PPIs. 
Secondly, the conclusions that Cara J. Dienes refers to are those of the sales representative. 
The results support the hypothesis that by providing a sales representative to train and assist 
the physician, the manufacturer benefits from increasing the frequency of new generations of 
PPI.  
First, we have found that some trials in the full-factorial Sales Rep Game experience 
provided examples where the PPI manufacturer has an incentive to select the pace of a 
particular product upgrade as quickly as possible. 
When the value of the product that the manufacturer can achieve with a long development 
cycle is low, the results indicate that the best product update times were ideal if the 
manufacturer was able to capture most of the value of the new generation product at the 
beginning of the development cycle. On the other hand, when the achievable value of the 
product was high, the quicker product upgrade steps were also ideal if most of the product 
value could be captured early and, additionally, if physicians were likely to switch 
manufacturers over time. The results also indicate that both (the manufacturer and the 
physician) believe their results will be significantly improved if the manufacturer delays the 
launch of a new generation of PPI to gain significant value from the product. 
Although the value of the product is important, the results show that the experience of 
sales representatives indicates that an increase in the capacity of these sales representatives 
provides a training for the physician, and inevitably has a positive effect on the payoff of 
physicians. That is, the physician is almost always better with a sales rep. So, the best strategy 
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 for a doctor is to select a PPI produced by a manufacturer that not only delivers great value to 
the product but also high-quality training.  
The experience of the sales rep reinforced the importance of physician loyalty to the 
manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer must strive to create a sales force that defer or discourage 
the physicians' brand change decisions. If the manufacturer needs to win and maintain 
physician loyalty by providing high incremental product value and effective training, they will 
have an incentive to provide both. 
Finally, the author of the dissertation refers to the conclusions of the game of control of 
hospital costs. She states that if we include the hospital in the PPI supply set, we find a strong 
correlation between the manufacturer and the physician. 
For a research hospital that values clinical improvements in relation to cost control, 
implementing a price cap to restrict the adoption by physicians of the new generation of PPIs 
will undermine their goals. Thus, the hospital may benefit from contacting the PPI 
manufacturer or the physician in order to gain prior knowledge of the manufacturer's new 
strategies for releasing new generations of products. In these cases, all players have identical 
incentives, and probably do not conflict with each other. 
However, for an uncostly, cost-conscious hospital, the author considers the level of clinical 
outcomes provided by the current generation of PPI to be satisfactory, where all participants 
can benefit if the physician has another hospital that supports adoption. In such cases, it is 
important for the hospital to have a good understanding of the cost-loss loss-of-volume switch 
that would occur as the physician diverts patients to another institution. This result is somewhat 
dependent on the fact that the expected clinical improvement of the product is the actual clinical 
improvement.  
When the new generation of PPI is likely to show a high clinical value increase and the 
manufacturer offers a precise or slightly inflated price, the physician's willingness to perform 
procedures at another hospital can distinguish between lower and higher physician outcomes. 
If the hospital has not decided to focus on cost or innovation and value clinical improvements 
and cost control in the same way, the hospital should conduct medical research or other forms 
of communication with the physician to understand when physicians will choose to practice in 
another institution. 
Also, in the case of a hospital with a double focus, the manufacturer and the doctor can 
benefit if the manufacturer's price for the hospital is reduced as much as possible. By doing 
this, the manufacturer increases the attractiveness of the new generation to the hospital. 
With our study we were able to conclude that if manufacturers by providing and ensuring 
quality in their product generations with efficient applicability and offering a sales rep to help 
their customers with next-generation learning, most respondents are willing to accept the long-
term changes (with a 75% acceptance rate). We could also conclude that of the volunteers who 
accepted the long term, a large majority preferred that the implementation of the new 
generation of the product take place between the first and second year (with a 50% rate among 
the 18 respondents who accepted the long-term changes). Finally, we conclude that it is 
balanced between staying true to the same manufacturer or carrying out a market study to 
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 always choose the best producer and the most efficient among the changes of the generations 
(with about 56% deciding to be faithful to the manufacturer among the 18% respondents who 
accepted the changes in the long run). 
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Chapter 3
Problematic Issues in the Negotiations of the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
3
Luz, Pedro and Silva, Lisa
Abstract
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed trade agreement
between the European Union and the United States. The aim of this partnership it to promote
trade and multilateral economic growth. This Master’s thesis applies Robert D. Putnam’s
Two-Level Game Theory to the TTIP Negotiations. This Game Theory will analyse how the
influence and the activities of various stakeholders and other factors within the EU and the
USA contributed to put pressure on the chief international negotiators and contributed to
freeze the negotiation of the TTIP. On the EU side, the stakeholders opposed to the TTIP
because they had the idea that it would harm EU’s relatively higher standards; consumer
safety; environment; and agricultural market. They also said that the TTIP’s negotiation
process was non-transparent, and they protested with the inclusion of the Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS). The campaign of anti-TTIP around Europe was also
supported with the presence of anti-American sentiments. In the USA, the main barrier to the
TTIP negotiations, begun with the decision of the Congress to grant the President of the USA,
at the time, Barack Obama the access to the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), because it
is frequently designated as unconstitutional and non-transparent. The American anti-TTIP
interest groups protested mainly against the convergence of the financial regulations; the
EU’s proposals for TTIP’s energy chapter; and EU’s requirement for full access to the US
procurement market. The anti-trade sentiments in the United States contributed to the
collapse of the TTIP negotiations.
Keywords: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; TTIP; European Union; United
States of America; Free Trade Agreements.
3This paper is based on Cimalova´, N. (2017), Problematic Issues in the Negotiations of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (PhD’s Thesis). Univerzita Karlova.
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1 Introduction  
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America.  
For this master’s Thesis the TTIP analysis was chosen because it was label as the 
largest and most ambitious trade and investment agreement ever negotiated between the 
world’s two most advanced world powers. Its intention was to boost the economic growth, 
create jobs and to encourage companies to be more innovative and compete abroad. The 
TTIP is also believed to have the potential to shift the economic power back to the 
Transatlantic area, not only because it would increase it’s trade, investments and GDP, 
but it would enable the EU and USA to become the rule-setters for international trade and 
regain their global leadership. 
This Thesis will apply the Two-Level Game Theory, by Robert D. Putnam’s into the 
TTIP negotiations, as well analyse the activities and the influence of various stakeholders 
and factors within the EU and USA and that put pressure on the chief negotiators and 
contributed to the freeze of the TTIP negotiation. This thesis reveals that the Anti-TTIP 
Arguments of the second-level stakeholders in the EU and USA differed to a great extent, 
“Advocates and opponents of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
agree on very little. But both share the view that the negotiations to create a free trade 
agreement (FTA) between the two largest economies in the world, the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US), represent a ‘game-changer’.” (De Ville, F., Siles-
Brügge, G., The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016) pg. 1.)  
The European stakeholders opposed to the TTIP because the idea that it would harm 
EU’s relatively higher standards was in their mind, the products and consumer safety as 
well the environment and the agricultural market was on the list. They also claimed that 
the TTIP posed as a threat to the democracy and sovereignty of the state members, 
especially due to the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(ISDS).  
The fact that the negotiation process was alarmingly non-transparent was a problem 
too them. The anti-American sentiments of several EU’s politicians and public, played a 
huge role in the negative aspect of the TTIP negotiations.  
In the USA, the main barrier to the TTIP negotiations was when the Congress took 
the decision to grand President Barack Obama the access to the Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), because it was frequently designated as unconstitutional and non-
transparent. The Anti-TTIP were mainly against the convergence of financial regulations; 
with the EU’s proposal for TTIP’s energy chapter and with the EU’s requirement for full 
access to the US procurement market.  
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Both sides of the Anti-TTIP argued that TTIP negotiations lacked transparency and 
that the agreement could weaken the democracy and sovereignty of the EU and USA.  
With the election of the new President of the USA, Donald Trump, the anti-TTIP 
sentiments in the United States increased, this contributed to freeze the TTIP negotiations, 
because there was a belief that the free agreements lead to lower wages and loss of jobs.  
The fact that President Obama was not able to complete his trade initiatives before 
the end of his term and with the victory of the opposition, the negotiation froze. 
Despite having different points of interest, both European and American anti-TTIP, 
managed to effectively put pressure on the chief of negotiation and contribute to freeze 
the negotiations.  
Using Robert D. Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory, this thesis analyses the way the 
European and American Anti-TTIP stakeholders influenced the development of the 
negotiations process. However, this thesis is aware that you can’t compare the strength of 
the induvial lobbies and interventionist groups.  
This thesis is divided in four chapters. The first chapter will present the state of the 
art, discusses the arguments for and against regional trade liberalization and introduces 
the Two-Level Game Theory by Robert Putnam’s, which was central to this thesis. About 
the State of the Art, there are contrasting opinions on the free trade agreements (FTA) 
among the world’s leading economist. Daniel Griswold, an American economist, belongs 
to the proponents of regional trade agreements (RTAs). He defends that the free trade 
agreements increase trade competition, which leads to a greater production efficiency, 
wider choice for costumers, lower prices and economic growth. He also believes that 
unlike the multilateral system of the WTO, RTAs offers a faster, easier and more efficient 
way of liberalizing trade. With another set of believes, we have Jagdish Bhagwati, a 
strong opponent of regional trade liberalization – he says that the FTAs are discriminative 
against the third nations and thus distort the very essence of free trade. 
Consequently, he calls for reduction of the chaotic net of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) and for the strengthening of multilateral trade negotiations.  
Another economist, Richard Baldwin, known for his “domino theory of regionalism” 
which explains the rapid proliferation of RTAs, and he also believes that regional trade 
liberalization always creates a certain level of discrimination and undermines the 
multilateral system of negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
As we know the TTIP is a highly complex mega-regional trade agreement and its 
negotiations have been lengthy and difficult, domestic opposition was among the main 
obstacles to the successful conclusion of the negotiations. For that reason, this thesis 
attempts to analyse the influence of the domestic counter activism on the TTIP 
negotiations.  
The base for this analysis is going to be the Two-Level Game Theory by Robert D. 
Putnam’s which is also introduced in chapter one. According to this theory, we have two 
levels on the negotiations of international agreements. International is at Level One and 
Domestic is a Level two. Simultaneously, these levels are in interaction and they influence 
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each other. Chief Negotiators (e.g. Political leaders, diplomats, etc..) are at the 
International level and they negotiate with their counterparts. At domestic level, they must 
interact with the internal pressure from various political parties, interest groups, civil 
society, etc., and try to fulfil the demands of all these groups in other to stay in their 
political position.  
At domestic level, various internal groups put pressure on the national government 
to act in their interest and at international level the states try to negotiate such an 
agreement which would best satisfy the domestic interest groups.  
To Putnam there are two phases of the whole negotiation process. First, a preliminary 
agreement is concluded at the International Level One and secondly there are subsequent 
domestic negotiations with the various domestic groups and constituencies at the Level 
Two there are subsequent domestic negotiations with the various domestic groups and 
constituencies at Level Two.  
However, there is usually also an initiative at the domestic level in the first place, 
which consequently launches the negotiations at the international Level One. 
Simultaneously, the level-two bargaining influences the level one negotiation, and the 
domestic positions often develop over the course of the negotiations, which makes the 
whole process extremely complex. This happened in the case of TTIP, since the 
agreement had to face various kinds of opposition which gradually arose during the 
lengthy process of negotiations. This thesis will attempt to map the domestic forces in the 
EU and USA analyse and compare their impact on the TTIP international negotiations at 
Level One. Chapter one also presents James K. Sebenius’ view of the Two-Level Game 
Theory, which agrees with Putnam’s approach. The chapter will also introduce the 
perspective of the author Davide Bonvicini who claims that Putnam’s Two-Level Game 
Theory is not capable of accurately predicting the development of international 
negotiations. According to Bonvicini, Putnam’s theory cannot be applied to the 
negotiations in the EU where in fact a three-level game takes place. 
Chapter number two focuses on the economic relation between the United States and 
the European Union, as well as on the basic tents of TTIP. The diplomatic relations 
between the EU and USA were established in 1953. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration 
formalized the relations and established a formal political dialogue related to economic 
cooperation (in addition to other issues). In this Declaration, the U.S. and EU made the 
commitment to support economic growth, employment, trade liberalization, and the 
principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), etc. In 1995, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was adopted, in which the U.S. and the EU declared their 
intention to create a New Transatlantic Marketplace, which would increase their mutual 
trade and investments. In 1998, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was 
concluded. TEP aimed to establish mutual alignment of standards connected to goods and 
services, support the multilateral trade liberalization within the WTO, and address issues, 
such as: dispute settlement, intellectual property, labour standards, procurement, etc. 
Finally, in 2013, the U.S. and the EU launched negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade 
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and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This chapter also presents an overview of the current 
economic indicators; trade in goods and services, and foreign direct investment between 
the United States and the European Union – the two largest economies of the world, which 
together account for almost 50 % of the global GDP and one third of the world’s trade in 
goods and services, and whose production is significant in terms of its high value added. 
Chapter Two introduces the background and basic information about the TTIP. It 
was predicted that TTIP would increase the size of the EU economy by 0.5 % of the GDP, 
and the size of the U.S. economy by 0.4 % of the GPD.28 Due to the fact that most tariffs 
on trade in goods and services between the EU and the U.S. are already very low. TTIP’s 
main ambition lied in the harmonization of standards. However, tariff barriers are still 
high for example in case of agriculture or textile. Therefore, due to the size of both 
economies, further elimination of tariffs in these areas would still significantly increase 
the volume of trade. 
Despite the gains from TTIP, the agreement has faced strong opposition, 
predominantly from various NGOs, civil society groups, political parties, lobbyists, etc. 
Both in the EU and USA, these activists at the Level Two have been able to influence and 
shape the negotiations at the international Level One and have contributed to the freeze 
of the negotiations process. 
Chapter three of this thesis focuses on the activities of the level-two actors in the EU 
and analyses the way they influenced the level-one negotiators and shaped the 
development of TTIP. The chief level-one negotiator in the European Union is the 
European Commission.  
Since TTIP includes elements that are beyond the competence of the European 
Union, it is a mixed agreement which must be ratified by the member states as well. From 
the beginning of the negotiations in 2013, the Commission regarded the communication 
on TTIP with various stakeholders at the member-state level as crucial for eliminating 
potential public concerns and for a successful conclusion of the agreement. Therefore, its 
communication strategy aimed at promoting the benefits of TTIP via public opinion 
monitoring, use of media, etc. 
The Commission also identified the main issues that had to be closely watched during 
the negotiations process. This included, for example, pacifying the fear that EU standards 
could be harmed; emphasizing transparency of the negotiations and giving the 
stakeholders room to express their opinions; the necessity for the EU to speak 
unanimously and carefully observe the positions of politicians in the member states; and 
highlighting the geostrategic importance of the agreement, but despite the commission’s 
communication strategy, the chief negotiators have face a massive backlash from various 
second-level actors.  
Germany and Austria were the EU countries that became rather disapproving of the 
TTIP. It was particularly the right-wing populist parties that expressed the opinion of the 
civil society groups and assumed a strictly rejectionist attitude towards the TTIP. 
members of the European Parliament also had to take a clear stand on TTIP, and act based 
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on the preferences of their domestic voters. This was exemplified in 2014 when Jean-Paul 
Juncker ran for the presidency of the European Commission for the European People’s 
Party which had a pro-TTIP stance. Juncker had to make a compromise in relation to the 
TTIP opposition in order to win in the elections, and he said that he would never allow 
for negotiations about potential lowering of EU standards. This is one of the examples of 
how the level-two actors influenced the level-one negotiators and shaped the international 
negotiations process. 
It is important to mention that the EU’s second-level actors assume a normative 
approach which highly politicizes the economic agreements and makes it difficult for the 
level-one negotiators to promote the trade deals in terms of their economic benefits. The 
activities of the EU’s level-two organizations have substantially influenced EU’s level-
one negotiators. In 2014, the European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, 
complied with the public requirements and announced a ‘fresh start’ to the TTIP 
negotiations which aimed to make the process more transparent, release more 
negotiations documents, launch open discussions on investment protection, and include 
civil society in the negotiations. This indicates that the level-one negotiators did not 
manage to depoliticize TTIP or make the agreement attractive to the public through 
highlighting its economic benefits. Rather, the chief negotiators had to constantly use 
defensive arguments and make multiple concessions to the second-level anti-TTIP actors. 
Chapter three of this thesis focuses on the activities of the level-two actors in the EU 
and analyses the way they influenced the level-one negotiators and shaped the 
development of TTIP. The chief level-one negotiator in the European Union is the 
European Commission. Since TTIP includes elements that are beyond the competence of 
the European Union, it is a mixed agreement which has to be ratified by the member states 
as well. 
From the beginning of the negotiations in 2013, the Commission regarded the 
communication on TTIP with various stakeholders at the member-state level as crucial 
for eliminating potential public concerns and for a successful conclusion of the 
agreement.32 Therefore, its communication strategy aimed at promoting the benefits of 
TTIP via public opinion monitoring, use of media, etc.33 The Commission also identified 
the main issues that had to be closely watched during the negotiations process. This 
included, for example, pacifying the fear that EU standards could be harmed; emphasizing 
transparency of the negotiations and giving the stakeholders room to express their 
opinions; the necessity for the EU to speak unanimously and carefully observe the 
positions of politicians in the member states; and highlighting the geostrategic importance 
of the agreement.34 But despite the Commission’s communication strategy, the chief 
negotiators have faced a massive backlash from various second-level actors. 
Chapter four focuses on the anti-TTIP level-two stakeholders in the United States. 
These actors were concerned with areas such as procurement, energy, financial 
regulations, TPA, American sovereignty, independence, or loss of jobs. One of the U.S. 
second-level actors is, for example, The John Birch Society which is a far-right 
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organization putting an emphasis on strengthening American sovereignty and 
independence. The election of Donald Trump has expanded the audience for the John 
Birch Society, giving it greater power to influence and potentially mobilize its readers 
against TTIP. Similarly, to the EU opposition, The John Birch Society claims that the fact 
that business lobbyists have greater access to the negotiating texts than the elected 
representatives poses a danger to U.S. democracy. 
From the United States perspective, the EU’s proposal about energy and raw 
materials are a controversial issue related to the TTIP deal. Their main objection was that 
the inclusion of energy chapter proposed by the Europeans in TTIP could cause increased 
exports of U.S. oil and gas, without being preceded by a proper democratic process. They 
also disagreed with the proposed energy chapter because greater exports of U.S. natural 
gas would also have a negative impact on the environment due to an increased use of the 
gas fracking method. 
Another problem that the US second-level interest groups opposed to was with the 
fact that the EU required full access to the American procurement market on all levels.  
However, the ‘Buy America’ law demands that the goods and services that the U.S. 
procurement buys, must be at least partly American-made, and that construction must be 
partially done in the United States. This law creates serious complications for the 
European suppliers and the EU wanted to remove them via its TTIP procurement 
proposals. 
Another second-level factor in the United States which very likely contributed to the 
freeze of TTIP negotiations are anti-trade sentiments of Americans which have increased 
with the election of President Trump who frequently uses protectionist and nationalist 
arguments.68 Therefore, many Americans have the perception that free trade agreements 
lead to lower wages and job losses.69 But they often do not fully realize that free trade 
actually widens the product choice for consumers and lowers the prices of goods and 
services due to greater competition. Nevertheless, the final dismissal of TTIP negotiations 
in the USA occurred at the Level One due to Obama’s failure to successfully implement 
his trade policies before the end of his term and due to the subsequent victory of Trump 
who inclines to protectionism. In order to be elected, Donald Trump also had to adjust to 
his voters at Level Two who are frequently afraid that free trade agreements would lead 
to a further loss of jobs for Americans. This concern, for example, the white working 
class and their demand for the return of manufacturing jobs. However, it is necessary to 
realize that offshoring is not the only reason for the disappearance of these jobs because 
many of them have been simply automated. 
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2 Literature Review  
2.1 Arguments for and Against Free Trade Agreements: Griswold, Bhagwati, 
Baldwin, Monique Goyens and Claude Serfaty. 
A rapid increase in regional trade agreements (RTAs) which include free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and customs unions urged in the 90s. This era was characterized by 
the expansion of trade liberalization, the collapse of the USSR and the demise of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe. New free economies emerged with the need 
of new partners, while the other democracies continued to intensify liberalization. 
Countries from the Central and Eastern Europe made their way into the EU market while 
on the other side of the Atlantic, Canada, USA and Mexico signed the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Open markets enable further economic growth, return 
to scale and higher effectiveness as a result of competition and a greater choice for 
consumers.  
Free trade agreements enable countries to utilize their competitive advantage, i.e. 
they can focus on the production of what they are best at, and then trade it for products 
other states produce best. This leads to prosperity, greater product choice, competition, 
and innovation. Members of so-called customs unions establish a FTA and common 
external tariffs on imports from third countries. 
An example of a customs union is the European Union. Proponents of RTAs believe 
that such agreements will lead to a global liberalization of trade by reducing tariff barriers 
between states. 
Daniel Griswold, an American economist and an advocate of FTAs, claims in the 
article “Free-Trade Agreements: Stepping-Stones to a More Open World,” that such 
agreements stimulate a more effective production and increase import competition, which 
leads to a wider product choice, workers’ productivity, higher quality, lower prices, and 
economic growth. 
Griswold also states that, unlike long multilateral negotiations within WTO, pursuing 
bilateral and regional agreements is a faster and more effective way of trade liberalization. 
He also believes that FTAs help developing countries adopt economic reforms and signal 
their interest in liberalization of trade. Not only are bilateral or smaller regional trade 
agreements less difficult to adopt, they are also more meaningful in areas of sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations, labour and environmental standards, electronic commerce, 
etc., and they can also provide guidance and examples for other agreements. 
Opposed to Griswold, there are, however, also critics of free trade agreements. Well-
known economist Jagdish Bhagwati believes that FTAs, RTAs, and customs unions in 
fact represent Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) which are highly ineffective 
because they interfere in the very essence of free trade and distort multilateral trading. 
In his book, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements 
Undermine Free Trade, Bhagwati claimed that PTAs destroy the efforts of the 
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International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the WTO, to establish a global non-
discriminatory trading system.  
Bhagwati wrote that “‘[…] such discriminatory trade arrangements could divert trade 
from efficient, low-cost non-members to inefficient, higher cost member-country 
suppliers because the latter no longer had to pay the tariff duties that were still imposed 
on the former.’” 
Bhagwati believes that in order to fight trade discrimination, it is necessary to prevent 
creation of new PTAs and reduce the preferences in the existing ones; conduct multilateral 
trade negotiations and complete the Doha Round; as well as remove the chaos of the so 
called ‘spaghetti bowl`.  
Richard Baldwin is another author that explains the proliferation of regional trade 
liberalization. In his work A Domino Theory of Regionalism, Baldwin challenges the 
widespread claim that RTAs have become so popular because the multilateral trade 
system is too complex and difficult to implement. He says that the recent trade 
regionalism was triggered by the US-Mexico FTA and the European Commission’s 1992 
programme which “had nothing to do with GATT’s health”. According to Baldwin, these 
events were followed by a multiplying domino effect.88 Baldwin defines this domino 
effect as follows: 
Political equilibria, which balance anti- and pro-membership forces, determine 
governments' stances on regional liberalization. Domestic exporters to regional blocs are 
a powerful pro-membership constituency. An event that triggers closer integration within 
an existing bloc harms the profits of non-member exporters, thus stimulating them to 
boost their pro-membership political activity. The extra activity alters the political 
equilibrium, leading some countries to join. This enlargement further harms non-member 
exporters since they now face a disadvantage in a greater number of markets. This second-
round effect brings forth more pro-membership political activity and a further 
enlargement of the bloc. The new political equilibrium is marked by larger regional 
trading blocs. In the meantime, regionalism appears to spread like wildfire. 
Richard Baldwin also belongs to the critics of the chaotic ‘spaghetti bowl’; and 
generally, believes that RTAs always create a certain level of discrimination against third 
countries, as well as undermine the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The general director of BEUC (The European Consumer Organisation), Monique 
Goyens, critics some aspect of the TTIP (Goyens, 2016).  She views trade as having the 
potential to benefit consumers. Well-drafted trade agreements can offer more choice at 
lower prices. Increasing competitive pressure can lead to innovation and higher quality 
products. With the TTIP, EU will have benefits with voluntary discussions between EU 
and USA. For example, toy safety, medical devices and financial services, where US have 
better rules than EU, will be part of the “pros” for the TTIP negotiation.1 
                                                 
1 https://www.deco.proteste.pt/familia-consumo/orcamento-familiar/noticias/ttip-acordo-entre-a-
europa-e-os-estados-unidos-levanta-muitas-duvidas 
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The problem is that the current partnership goes much further. In fact, US 
requirements for TTIP have a potential impact on consumer protection in Europe. She 
gives three examples illustrating this: feed, chemicals and investor protection.2 
Food safety illustrates the difference between EU and the US when talking about 
consumer issues. A common example is chicken with chlorine. The EU follows the 
"meadow-to-plate" approach where preventive actions and control must be effective in 
ensuring that animals are raised hygienically, and the meat is safe for consumption. The 
US tends to rely on decontamination treatments (e.g with peracetic acid), applied to 
carcasses in slaughterhouses. In the case of chickens, it is to rid them of the bacterium 
Campylobacter. Statistics show that EU consumers have no appetite for these washes: 
85% of Danes do not want their meat treated with chlorine decontamination. There is 
evidence to suggest that control of bacteria in the meadow is more beneficial later in the 
food chain, since the bacterium may spread between farms and humans by other means. 
The US is pushing for these chemical washes in chickens to be approved.3  
Another example is with the incompatibility with the chemicals with the systems that 
the EU and the US use. he EU follows the so-called "precautionary principle". This means 
that producers must prove that a chemical is safe before it is put up for sale. Are not 
enough proofs? So, the product cannot go to the market. This contrasts with the US 
approach: here the regulator must prove that a chemical poses an "unjustifiable" risk to 
health and the environment. If there is insufficient evidence, the products may remain for 
sale. Chemicals are discussed in the TTIP, so BEUC is concerned that European levels of 
protection may be threatened.4 
However, the main risk to the European consumer movement in TTIP is the paralysis 
of our regulatory system due to the demands of foreign investors. The Investment Court 
System or investment court system is designed to enable foreign investors to claim 
damages if they feel that their investment in the EU or in a Member State may be 
conditioned. This could dissuade the EU and its members from taking a consumer 
protection measure, for fear of being prosecuted and having to pay. The effect of this is 
the so-called regulatory chill. It is because of this real threat that we do not support the 
trade agreement between Canada and the EU, also known as CETA (Global Economic 
Trade Agreement).5 
Claude Serfaty6 defends three hypotheses about the transatlantic bloc of states and 
the political economy of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). First, 
TNCs (transnational corporations) are not ‘nationality free’ and states are not more or less 
                                                 
2 https://www.deco.proteste.pt/familia-consumo/orcamento-familiar/noticias/ttip-acordo-entre-a-
europa-e-os-estados-unidos-levanta-muitas-duvidas 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
6 Claude Serfati is an associate researcher at IRES (Institute of Social and Economic Research) and at 
CEMOTEV (the Centre for the Study of Globalisation, Conflicts, Territories and Vulnerabilities) at the 
University of Versailles-SaintQuentin-en-Yvelines, France. 
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passive instruments in their hands. States are representatives of ‘capital in general’, that 
is, protectors of the social relations of production and reproduction, a role which is not 
reducible to defending the larger internationalised and higher concentrated segments of 
capital.  
Second, TTIP has been designed with three objectives: ‘policing’ and trying to 
mitigate the competition between US and EU firms; creating a united US-EU front both 
to enhance attacks against workers (whether in or out of work) and to facilitate the looting 
of natural resources; and setting the rules and standards for the ‘rest of the world’, 
targeting the rising economies which are in direct contention with them. Third, this 
agenda is necessarily complex to implement, with internal tensions among both corporate 
and government actors.  
The TTIP is not a ‘turnkey’ project to be easily wrapped up because the negotiations 
require a difficult reconciliation of a range of different interests and perspectives within 
the transatlantic bloc, in addition to dealing with the mounting opposition from trade 
unions and NGOs. The TTIP should therefore be seen less as a done deal and more as a 
work in progress by the USA and the EU, constituting an overarching forum that will 
cement the transatlantic bloc in order to promote the broad interests of the huge 
concentration of capital based on their territories 
3 Methodology 
The methods that were used it depends on the perspectives of the USA or of the UE. 
3.1 EU perspective 
Firstly, it presents the character and problems of TTIP negotiations from the EU 
perspective. The TTIP negotiations between the European Commission and the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) were composed of 3 pillars. The first 
pillar deals with market access. The second post was updated on non-tariff and alignment 
barriers; and the third, on sustainable development, intellectual property or energy. The 
council then applies the contracts on a provisional, total or partial basis. The partial app 
is used the case of the papers that abort areas that is state of the state of United States. 
After the signature, the project is transmitted to the European Parliament for approval. 
Proponents of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership point to a contribution 
to job creation, economic growth, consumer choice and demand, business activity, 
recovery from the economic crisis, etc. on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.  
At the beginning of the negotiations, the first request was sent to the database. 
The European Commission has also identified the main objectives of the Communication. 
In the first place, it was necessary for the public of the member states to clearly state what 
TTIP is and what it is not. The second site was needed are the networks with other data 
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related to. Thirdly, the EU aims to guide its negotiating objectives, especially in the areas 
for which USTR is responsible. 
It was made a Report in 2013, where European Entity fully aware of the fact that 
negotiations were an important part of the interest group persuasion of TTIP's benefit 
policy. The European publisher identified as key areas that needed to be closely watched. 
Firstly, European and European citizens should be informed about the social and social 
reality of TTIP in these areas and of the EU's negotiating power. Secondly, the 
Commission has had the role of resolving the problems of TTIP in relation to EU 
institutions and powers, such as the great pressure of large interest groups and citizens. 
Third, the Commission determined the point of view of a given timeframe, knowing that 
it was a factor of "since no country would become international, because the United States 
and the nations of law, as, precedents and transfer economic power back to the 
transatlantic area. Fourth, a commission that had the same degree of agreement in a TTIP 
agreement, between the two countries, with the same negotiating force and in a 
memorandum of interest. In order to be able to solve challenges, but rather a certain level 
of confidentiality, the criteria to make it easier, fast and effective. 
4 Political forces in the EU and in TTIP 
About the opposition in 2013 and 2014, the main EU countries that have become less 
affirmative about TTIP in their reaction to the voices of civil society groups. And many 
of the Members of the European Parliament also had to take a clearer position on TTIP 
and act on the preferences of voters. This brings the trade agreement to a political level. 
Members of the European Parliament affiliated to the Greens and the Left are against 
TTIP, the Social Democrats are more divided on the subject, but say that under certain 
conditions and commitments they would be willing to accept the agreement. Therefore, 
his approach is more reformist than rejectionist. On the other hand, right-wing populist 
parties also articulate the views of civil society groups opposing TTIP and criticize the 
culmination of power at the hands of some political elites.  
4.1 Non-Governmental Interest Groups and their Impact on the First Level 
Negotiations 
TTIP is still one of the most controversial trade agreements ever negotiated. It has 
faced opposition from various interest groups in the EU, who have managed to present 
the agreement as a threat to democracy, health, safety and the environment. In the public 
discourse on the TTIP, several iconic themes and terms have emerged, which have often 
been used by opposing interest groups. These include the fear of deregulation and the 
reduction of EU standards. This has been compounded by the fact that the United States 
exports less agricultural products to the EU than the opposite, and one of the main areas 
of interest of the TTIP for the Americans is access to the EU agricultural market that 
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creates discord, since Europeans fear the influx of transgenic foods, the reduction of 
consumer safety and the reduction of environmental standards, as a result of the increased 
power given to US corporations. Other issues that have been continuously expressed by 
opposition are the suspicious secrecy of the negotiations, favoring business lobbies over 
others, and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS) and environmental 
protection, as well as corporate power, democracy and national sovereignty are the most 
important topics for various interest groups opposing TTIP at Level 2 in the EU. 
The 'TUP' initiative is an alliance of 500 EU organizations based in Berlin, which 
actively campaign against TTIP. His main argument is that the agreement poses a threat 
to democracy, the rule of law, health, the environment, consumer and employee rights, 
because of the secretive secrecy of the negotiations. 
Most of the criticism of TTIP comes from European civil society, and it is normative 
in character and reshapes the perception of global trade by presenting it as a threat to 
important values, making it difficult for negotiators to successfully promote benefits in 
order to establish standards globally. 
With the rise of civil groups, the idea of a so-called "global civil society" based on 
anti-globalization movements was created. 
Non-governmental organizations play a significant role in encouraging these civil 
society groups to mobilize against trade agreements. 
EU activists have already started protesting the TTIP with the start of negotiations in 
the summer of 2013 and included NGOs with a long history of activism that participated 
in anti-globalization trade movements in the 1990s and 2000s. 
The inclusion of ISDS is generally considered to be one of the most controversial 
and unpopular issues, against which there is a particularly strong opposition at level 2 in 
the EU. 
The activities of NGOs have had a real impact on the TTIP negotiations of the 
European Commission. The Commission had to make concessions to the activists and 
make new assurances that the regulatory cooperation body could not be so powerful as to 
be able to take legal action. 
The strong involvement of several anti-TTIP NGOs has transformed the trade 
agreement into a normative and politicized issue. The TTIP negotiations have revealed 
the limits of using exclusive economic arguments on the need to liberalize trade by 
attempting to depoliticize the issue and obtain public support. The European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) and the American Federation of Labour and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) have acknowledged that TTIP can have a positive 
impact on job creation and economic growth, but it must be ensured that the business is 
made in a totally democratic and transparent way and the negotiations lead to a constant 
maintenance of the consumer, social and environmental safety. 
It is obvious that the main EU negotiators failed to depoliticize the TTIP and make it 
look attractive, presenting its benefits in economic terms such as employment, prosperity 
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or global leadership. Instead, they had to constantly defend it against civil society groups 
and had to compromise. 
The success of the level 2 NGOs in triggering anti-TTIP normative sentiments and 
impinging on the progress of the negotiations could also be very likely to be caused by 
the fact that it is simply natural for people to pay more attention to words like "chicken 
with chlorine" in "doing business". 
4.2 Public opinion, social media and anti-American sentiments in the EU 
A survey by Pew Research finds that Italians, French and Greeks thought TTIP would 
lead to job losses and lower wages. 
The opposition of TTIP is also very active and effective in social media, where the 
agreement tends to be negatively structured. The graphic 1 (Annexes) in is presented that 
relates the positive and negative activity in Twitter regarding TTIP, where it is possible 
to verify that the people who opt for TTIP have been more active in making their opinion 
known. Although level one negotiators responded directly to the level 2 opposition, 
mentioned earlier through making the negotiations more transparent, they neglected and 
underestimated the importance of these online activities. 
Another second-level factor that may have contributed potentially to the collapse of 
TTIP negotiations is the fact that Europeans often have a negative perception of the US. 
"America is not a 911".7 
4.3 USA PERSPECTIVE 
Secondly, it presents the character and problems of TTIP negotiations from the USA 
perspective. According to the Constitution of the United States, it is the Congress that has 
the power to "regulate trade with foreign nations." Congress shares its authority over trade 
with executive power, which allowed the executive branch to negotiate reciprocal trade 
agreements by eliminating tariffs with other countries. The United States Trade 
Representative Office (USTR) is TTIP's top level negotiator in the United States. After a 
reduction in tariffs, the US Congress granted the President the authority to negotiate the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers through the so-called fast track legislation, which is 
officially called the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). The ratification of the TTIP 
depends on the Congressional decision granting TPA to the President where 
Congressional chambers can approve or reject the agreement but there is no room for 
amendment. 
Even if European opposition to TTIP has been dominant the US should not be 
minimized. The "fast track" when approved gave Obama a 6-year TPA renewal giving 
him greater power within the process of completing the mega-trade deals that his 
government had vigorously promoted. Opposition to TPA is not tied to TTIP. Objections 
                                                 
7 SIMONYI András 2015, “Huffington Post” 
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to TPA are typically related to their unconstitutionality, as opponents believe that TPA 
prevents congressmen from being able to oversee or amend the president's proposed 
legislation. TPA lacks transparency and that related negotiations do not ensure public 
participation and the promotion of the public interest. 
Within the US Congress, Democrats were significantly more sceptical of the "fast 
track" than the Republicans, or business lobbies. The vote showed Democrats are 
currently more sceptical about TPA. Many of them suspect that free trade agreements 
lead to job losses and lower wages. 
The main controversies related to Obama's regional mega trade agreements that took 
place at level 1 revolved around TPA and the balance between the powers of Congress 
and the Executive. At Level 1 in the United States, the arguments against the "fast track" 
seem to be in majority, as opposed to those related to the TTIP. It seems that TTIP was 
perceived as an inevitable consequence of TPA. 
4.4 Non-Governmental Interest Groups and TTIP Policy Issues in the US 
During President Obama's administration, civil society groups in the United States 
focused on the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) campaign rather than TTIP. US citizens 
viewed TTIP as an agreement with an advanced economy that could guarantee them better 
standards of consumer, environment, services or employees as a result of the 
harmonization of trade. 
The Citizen trade campaign (CTT) group had the main argument was that the "fast 
track" would defeat the proposals against the proposed trade agreements that would create 
income inequality, unemployment, environmental destruction, etc. 
The government also criticized Obama's statements about the transparency of TTIP 
negotiations, saying that after 3 years of negotiations the public had no access to related 
documents, and that US congressmen are allowed to review them only under strict 
supervision and conditions. They also criticized the fact that large companies could view 
the texts without restrictions. 
In the United States, there was also strong opposition to the TTIP linked to the energy 
sector. There was a letter to the United States Trade Representative expressing his 
opposition to the EU proposal for a chapter on energy and raw materials. 
Another issue that has generated controversy among Americans was the acquisition. 
The EU has attached great importance to full access to the US procurement market for 
European companies which is still restricted to EU suppliers.  
EU producers need to turn US resources into semi-finished products in Europe, and 
then need to finalize production in the US. This process is problematic for EU suppliers 
and investors and then proposed a reduction of the procurement barrier. 
The US side has also designated the EU's precautionary principle as a form of 
protectionism and a barrier to trade. The precautionary principle basically means that "in 
case of insufficient scientific evidence on the existence of a risk". 
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4.5 Public opinion and anti-trade sentiments in the US 
According to a survey conducted by international market research firm YouGov, 
there was a fall in TTIP's public support in the US in 2016. Presidential candidates were 
expressing their criticism of the trade agreement, which contributed to the sharp decline 
in public support of TTIP. 
Another factor that has affected the negotiations is the fact that anti-trade sentiment 
in the United States has increased dramatically in the past two years and peaked with the 
election of Trump. 
Based on the principles of Putnam's 2-level game theory, TTIP is a shining example 
of the interaction between level 1 international negotiators and level 2 nationals. In the 
US, TTIP has been blocked by changes in Level 1 international negotiations, where 
Obama failed to complete the deal until the end of his term, where Trump adopted 
protectionist and contemptuous attitudes to trade agreements that froze negotiations.  
Trump's approach to TTIP is clearly economic protectionism and due to his 
experience in personal business where he has never needed to depend on international 
trade. But when it comes to negotiating international agreements, he had to implement 
the interest of his level 2 constituents, arguing for the phrase "bring jobs back." 
5 Application  
In the EU, anti-TTIP second-tier stakeholders argued that TTIP would lower EU 
standards as a result of trade harmonization. They argued that TTIP would threaten 
product and consumer safety. Europeans protested the lack of transparency of the 
negotiations and the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP because it could increase the power 
of business over the Member States. "Chilled chicken" mobilized the EU public to oppose 
the agreement, bearing in mind that anti-American sentiment was a major factor 
contributing to the freezing of TTIP negotiations. As a result, second-tier stakeholders in 
the EU were able to exert effective pressure on the level one negotiator (European 
Commission), where concessions subsequently emerged and announced a "fresh start" in 
the negotiations. With this many of non-governmental groups managed to influence the 
main negotiators, as its main arguments were linked to consumer protection and the 
environment, corporate power, national sovereignty, ISDS or employee rights. The level 
one negotiator did not pay attention to the power of the social media, benefiting the 
second-level European factors that contributed to the freezing of negotiations, as well as 
the unfriendly feelings of the EU public and politicians towards the USA, endangering 
the completion of TTIP. 
In the US, the riots occurred at level one due to Obama's approval of TPA. Many 
stakeholders opposed the "fast track" because of unconstitutionality and lack of 
transparency. They thought that the TPA would promote Obama's business initiatives and 
increase the chances of TTIP approval without proper oversight. The anti-TTIP second-
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tier actors were based on arguments such as increased fuel exports, European companies' 
access to the US market, and lack of transparency in the negotiations. Anti-trade has also 
contributed to the collapse of the negotiations (guided by Trump's protectionism), which 
is associated with the fact that free trade agreements reduce wages and increase labour 
supply. So, the TTIP negotiations were interrupted by the development of level one in the 
USA, where such an interruption was caused by the fact that Obama failed to complete 
the initiative. The application of these arguments has shown that the US opposition does 
not fall far short of the EU because they argued that the TPA undermined the separation 
of powers, prevented Congress from overseeing negotiations or changing presidential 
proposals, free trade agreements would to lower wages and job losses. With Trump's 
victory in the presidential election, the anti-negotiation sentiments (level two factor) of 
the Americans were matched by Trump's protectionist measures. 
6 Conclusion 
TTIP is an example of Putnam's 2-level Game Theory, knowing that players are the 
international level one- and two-level negotiators. Two-tier negotiators who are 
represented by citizen groups, activists, lobbies, and political parties who put pressure on 
the level negotiators, forcing them to make changes, influence and freeze a negotiation 
should be highlighted. The research is forward to the negotiation, it is possible to have a 
difference in the anti-TTIP arguments the parties of the second level (EU e USA) used to 
influence the parties of the first level, and "messed up" how TTIP trades. 
It is to be concluded that this thesis proved that the players and anti-TTIP arguments 
of the second level (EU and USA) influenced the players (negotiators) of level one 
resulting in a freezing of the negotiation process, degrading the image of the TTIP and 
hindering the role level negotiators to promote the agreement by benefiting economically. 
We conclude that transparency has been a major criticism of how the TTIP 
negotiations have been conducted. 
"I realize that the Commission needs to talk to the United States confidentially so 
that negotiations are effective, but US resistance to publisher documents is not enough 
impediment to hide the process of European citizens." (Emily O'Reilly, European Justice 
Department) 
ISDSs were also one of the major problems of this treaty. From the outset, it is 
anticipated that TTIP will also include one of these mechanisms - CETA foresees this 
process - but the fear of large North American companies could prosecute the Member 
States, preventing the country from legislating or making changes that have been one of 
the central themes of the TTIP discussion. 
Even at the political level, there are several positions in Europe on these mechanisms. 
While proponents of TTIP claim that the EU and many Member States, notably Germany, 
already have such mechanisms in other agreements, TTIP critics are afraid of lawsuits in 
the EU such as the one that took place in Australia between that country and a northern 
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tobacco company (Philip Morris) where the tobacco company sued the state through an 
ISDS because the government wants to introduce a new type of cigarette pack that 
discourages smokers. 
Despite TTIP’s predicted benefits, there has formed strong second-level opposition 
in the European Union. From the start of TTIP negotiations, the EU level one negotiator, 
the European Commission, was fully aware of the importance of communication on TTIP 
with various second-level actors in order to reduce the risk of increased public scepticism 
towards the agreement which could consequently negatively influence its successful 
conclusion.  
Therefore, the Commission put an emphasis on advertising the gains expected from 
TTIP and paid close attention to the main issues which could complicate the negotiations 
process, such as the need for transparency and reducing the concerns about the lowering 
of standards. But despite the EU’s efforts to strategically communicate the benefits of 
TTIP, there has been a massive mobilization of the second-level anti-TTIP forces. 
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Chapter 4
The Influence Of Unconscious Motives On Decision-
Making Of Auditors
4
Gonc¸alves, Je´ssica and Quintal, Cla´udio
Abstract
An audit process consists of a detailed and rigorous assessment of the activities of a company
or financial institution. Its objective is to verify that the activities carried out in a particular
company are following as planned. This requires a true and reliable analysis by the auditor,
but also by the client. This procedure raises a lot of questions from both parties, which raise
questions about whether there are unconscious motives that in some way influence account
decision making. The content of this article inserts the answer to these questions, through a
detailed study of the various factors or reasons that could lead to audit errors. This research
was carried out by students graduated and trained in accounting and finance courses of the
University of Ljubljana, who proposed, in a fictitious context, to evaluate a company. Once
this phase is completed, we apply the same results obtained, determining the hypotheses
that have the most significance on the problem. Finally, a conclusion is reached in which it
states that among several possibilities only two are confirmed to be preponderant. To try to
minimize these errors, some measures are also proposed in order to solve certain errors and
provoke in companies the veracity that was lacking in this audit process.
Keywords: Audit process, maximizing the utility of clients and auditors, preventive mea-
sures, minimization of errors
4This paper is based on Godec, M. (2013). The influence of unconscious motives on
decision-making of auditors (Master’s thesis). Univerza v Ljubljani, Ekonomska fakulteta.
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1 Introduction 
The main objective of the audit is to analyze financial actions independently, in order to 
provide credibility and financial health to the company, as well as to carry out preliminary 
reports together with its clients. However, this code of conduct is often not fulfilled by 
stakeholders for a variety of reasons, including personal favoritism, fear of losing the client 
and unconscious needs. 
As a first step, the objective is to characterize what an audit is and how that process is 
performed so that we get real and fair results. However, some doubts arise as to the veracity of 
the results presented. In order to combat conflict of interest, improvements have been made in 
terms of legislation, such as business rotation. 
According to the European Commission, companies are now required to run the audit firm 
every six years, with an interval of four years until they are rehired. If a company uses more 
than one auditor, that turnover period may be extended to nine years (Brunsden, 2013). In a 
second phase, several studies are carried out in relation to the possible reasons and the various 
types of personality that can influence or even contribute to the favoring of the clients by the 
audit companies. For this, the author uses the Big Five model developed by the authors John 
and Srivastava (1999), where he refers to five distinct personality traits that may expose some 
weaknesses in the auditors' personality. 
In chapters four and five, a link was established between the research methodology used 
(where we essentially dealt with the procedures and variables of the study developed) and 
between the results achieved (important statistical data in the resolution of the initial question). 
Finally, the fifth chapter will be an additional test carried out by the group to students of 
Economics 3rd grade, whose objective is to help in understanding the problem and if possible, 
compare these same results obtained by the thesis author with the results obtained by the group. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Biases in Auditor Decision-Making 
Auditing in general plays a pivotal role in the financial market as it provides reliable 
information on the financial health of companies. 
Contrary to what was foreseen, auditing in the EU and the rest of the world in recent years 
has not been able to achieve the minimum objectives, ie to be in an independent plan where it 
analyzes the financial assumptions and the health of the companies. Since the audits were not 
carried out in an independent and genuine manner, the market eventually declared serious 
financial difficulties. 
To regain market confidence, a number of reforms were undertaken in the area of auditing, 
such as public oversight in the USA, and the EU Tax Directive. In this way good public 
oversight can improve the independence of auditors. The first results are encouraging, but in 
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practice these changes did not hide the weaknesses of the main players, that is, those 
responsible for the financial crisis remain the same, maintaining the lack of independence of 
the auditors and thus lead to new financial scandals. 
One such reform was the implementation of a mandatory audit rotation in the EU, USA 
and Australia. In the EU a minimum and maximum period of fourteen and twenty-five years 
respectively has been established. However, in 2011 this reform was not viewed consensually, 
and some critics such as Catanach Jr & Walker argued that this type of rotation would only add 
costs rather than contribute to improved audits. 
2.2 The need theory off motivation 
Motivation is seen as an internal impulse that drives the human being to action. Thus 
people feel a certain motivation for positive behaviors and vice versa for negative behaviors. 
In this way, we will see later on the direct and indirect incentives that most influence the 
auditor's decision, such as financial compensation, the ability of the auditor to decide 
professionally when the auditor has a personal relationship with the client. 
2.3 Theory of Motivation- The Need 
 The needs vary from individual to individual and are being acquired over time. We can 
thus list some of the most important needs for the continuation of this work, such as the need 
for achievement, opposition, dominance, exposure, rejection and understanding. 
 In general individuals are more likely to meet needs in the immediate with a certain gau 
of unconsciousness. 
2.4 Values and Personality Traits 
Values are essential to determine what auditors will decide cognitively, and represent the 
motivational course throughout life and career. For a better perception of the conduct 
performed by the auditors, it is also important to observe the personality traits, which can be 
divided into five parts and called "The Big Five". 
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Based on these personality traits, motivations, personal values and the needs of auditors, 
it would be easier to analyze what the most likely behavior will be for each one, because many 
of the auditors have different behavior in equal situations due to the patents of figure 1 
2.5 Hypothesis development 
According to Thompson (1995), however small the personal relationship between auditor 
and client, this proximity leads to unconscious interpretations in favor of the client, 
deteriorating the independence in the final decision of the auditor. But on the other hand Moore 
(2010) and Slapničar (2012) through a study conducted show that there is no significant effect 
on decision making when there is a good personal relationship between those involved. In this 
way, it is difficult to choose between these two hypotheses, since there are two discordant 
points of view, based on several studies carried out by these actors. 
To clarify, or at least try to discover which of the two approaches reality, we begin by 
enumerating the hypotheses. 
H1: Personal relationships positively affect the auditor's decision in favor of the client 
During the auditor's interaction process with the client, feelings of familiarity and 
friendship can arise from this next hypothesis. 
H2: Friendship resulting from the personal relationship with the client positively affects 
the decision making in favor of the client. 
Another essential point that until today has not been much studied is rationality and 
emotion. If the client has great economic power, the auditor may be influenced to decide in 
favor of the client, since it conveys being afraid of losing the client and consequently his 
hypothetical high payment for not having decided in the customer's favor. So the third 
hypothesis is: 
 
Illustration 1: The Big Five Personality Traits 
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H3: Fear of losing a customer positively affects the auditor's decision-making in favor of 
the client. 
H4: Unconscious need for affiliation, influence the decision making in favor of the client. 
H5: Money as an important value positively affects the decision making in favor of the 
customer. 
H6:  Agreeableness as a strong personality trait positively affects the decision-making in 
favor of the client. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Participants 
For the accomplishment of this study with two periods, students graduated and in training 
in the courses of accounting and finances of the University of Ljubljana were chosen. The 
number of participants is 104 people, who could have a financial compensation between 0 and 
10 euros for participating in the study. The average monetary compensation was € 5.2 per hour, 
which made student participation appealing. Among participants, 46% were students and 56% 
were graduates. The average age is 23.3 years, 59% are female, and the average work 
experience is 4 years. 
The individuals were randomly divided into groups of two (auditor-client), totalizing 52 
groups, where half had some type of relationship and the other half was not known. The study 
Illustration 2:Conceptual Model 
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has as main role the auditor, but the client also has a preponderant role, since they are used to 
create a personal relationship with the auditor, in the cases in which they knew each other. 
3.2 Design 
This study is seen as a perfect information game with the participation of 2 players where 
each of them knows what happened before making a decision. In figure 3, the game design is 
represented, using a sequential tree. 
In the first scenario created, auditors would have to approve the costs of developing 
product X as an intangible asset in the company's balance sheet or as a company expense. 
Clients who are with auditors may try to convince them to approve costs as an intangible asset. 
If they do, they would be approving rather positive predictions for product X. The second 
choice has a more in-depth forecast, which takes into account costs and profits. As we will see 
later, the compensation that is given to the auditor is superior when the auditor does not decide 
in favor of the client in the first round, but if it decides in favor of the client in the first and 
second round, maximizes the compensation. On the customers' side, their compensation is 
realized if the company makes a profit. 
The compensation that is reserved to customers is designed to make them more aggressive 
in an attempt to convince the auditors to decide in their favor. In the case of non-personal 
relationships, where there is no contact between the parts, the auditors know that their payment 
is dependent on their decision. 
In the first round it is defined that the client has already hired the auditor. As it is 
observable in illustration 3 the auditor has to make a decision in favor or unfavorably. If he 
decides unfavorably to win 5 euros and the customer earns 0 euros, if he decides in favor both 
earn 3 euros. 
 The second round represents the second audit period, in which the client has to decide 
whether or not to hire the same auditor again, based on the decisions of the first round, and the 
client can have a reward between 0 and 3 euros, if auditor maintains the trust of the client the 
gains are equal, however if this confidence does not hold, he can only win 1 or 0 euros, with 
equal probability, getting dependent on the random choice of the computer. 
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3.3 Procedure 
The experience was realized by two distinct means, a paper and a computer. The initial 
part, in which the instructions and decision-making were carried out, were conducted through 
the computer, and the experimental task was presented on paper. 
The next step is to divide the participants into two random groups. This results in the 
existence of a group with a non-personal relationship between the auditor and the client, and 
in other group with a personal relationship. After reading the instructions and the case, each 
pair was entitled to 10 minutes of discussion about product X's development, development 
costs, and the auditor's decision. 
In the following step and after the debate between both, the decision of the auditors was 
revealed through the computer. The reward was made based on the auditors' take-backs and 
consequent customer implications. Thus, the second round was held, where clients chose 
whether or not to continue to hire the same auditor. Thereafter, the 10 minutes of the debate 
between the two men again took place, revealing again the decisions of each one and 
consequent rewards. 
Illustration 3: Auditor-Client Game 
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3.4 Variables 
 Personal relationship with client 
The variable takes value 0 if there is no personal relationship, and value 1 if there is a 
personal relationship. 
 Friendship 
Among the groups with a personal relationship, 46.2% are not friends, and 53.8% are 
friends. 
 The auditor's decision 
This variable takes the value 0 if the auditor implements development costs as an expense, 
and value 1 when approving costs as an intangible asset. 
 Change of auditor in preferences 
This variable has a value of 0 if the auditor makes the same decision as the first round and 
the value 1 if the decision is different. 
 The client's decision 
The customer in the second-round sets to 0 if he decides to hire a different auditor, and 1 
if he contracts the same. 
 Unconscious needs 
This parameter was based on the questionnaire in which the auditors' unconscious needs 
are measured, such as the needs of achievement, power and membership. 
 Personality traits 
A questionnaire was carried out where the value 1 is assigned if they disagree with it, and 
it takes the value 5 if they agree. In this questionnaire the Big Five theme is approached, which 
allows us to evaluate the personality traits of each individual. 
 Values 
To find out the importance each individual attributes to personal values, they are asked to 
rate from 1 to 5, where 1 means not important and 5 is very important. In this sequence, it was 
also requested to number from 1 to 7 the importance of the following values: society, ethics, 
power, money, friends, fame and independence. 
 Fear of losing the client 
On a scale of 1 to 5 it is classified as value 1, the case in which the auditor is afraid of 
losing the customer, and the value 5 otherwise. 
 Control variables 
Within this parameter are involved 11 variables, whose objective is to control the 
dependent variable. Within these variables we have as example the influence of trust, company 
profit and reward. 
The following table shows all the variables used in the study. 
 
Table 1 
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4 Results 
4.1 Dimension Reduction and Reliability Analysis 
Given the high number of variables, there is a low covariance between them, so they must 
be eliminated at any of these. As for unconscious needs and personality traits, it is difficult to 
accurately analyze their preponderance. Since the main objective is to understand what 
motivated the auditor to decide in favor or against his client, we excluded the in-depth study of 
the calculation of confidence levels, pleasantness of variables and personality traits. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: First Round 
Variable 
Relat Friend A.Dec1 A.Rew1 C.Rew1 
(%) (%) (%) (EUR) (EUR) 
N 52 26 52 52 52 
Mean .500 .538 .731 3.538 2.192 
Std. Error .070 .100 .062 .124 .186 
Median .500 1.000 1.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .505 .508 .448 .896 1.344 
Variance .255 .258 .201 .802 1.805 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 3.00 .00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 
Sum 26 14 38 184 114 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Second Round 
Variable C.Dec2 A.Dec2 A.Rew2 C.Rew2 A.RewT C.RewT A. Change 
Pref 
(%) (%) (EUR) (EUR) (EUR) (EUR) (%) 
N 52 37 52 52 52 52 37 
Mean .712 .784 2.596 2.077 6.135 4.269 .216 
Std. Error .063 .069 .211 .194 .196 .312 .069 
Median 1.000 1.000 3.000 3.000 6.000 6.000 .000 
Std. Deviation .458 .417 1.524 1.398 1.415 2.250 .417 
Variance .209 .174 2.232 1.955 2.001 5.063 .174 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 3.00 .00 .00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 10.00 6.00 1.00 
Sum 37 29 135 108 319 222 8 
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In the tables above, the descriptive statistics made in the first and second rounds are shown 
respectively. Of the 52 audit-client pairs, half (26) are related to each other, while the other half 
is not personally related. 
At the level of those who have a personal relationship, 46.2% have no friendship, in 
contrast, 53.8% have friendship with each other. As a result of the first round, of the 52 auditors, 
73.1% favor their peers, thus obtaining an average reward of 3.5 euros, and the client has 
already achieved a reward of 2.2 euros. With regard to the second round, 71.2% of clients re-
hired the same auditor, with 10.8% of the 37 re-employed not favoring their client in the first 
round. Of the auditors rehired in the second round, 21.6% did not decide in favor of the client. 
Regarding the average rewards of the second round, the auditor reached 2.6 euros, while the 
client reached 2.1 euros. As a result of these rewards the client ended up achieving a total 
average value of 4.3 euros, while the auditor obtained 6.1 euros. 
4.2.1 Differences in variables between the personal and non-personal relationship subgroups 
Based on table 4, we found that 92.3% of the auditors with personal relationship favor 
their clients, and of the peers who do not have a personal relationship, auditors only favor 
53.8% of the cases. In the second round, we noticed that 84% of the auditors who have a 
personal relationship favor their clients, while the auditors who do not have a personal 
relationship favor 66.7% of the cases. More relevant data can be observed in the same table, 
which also states that 96.2% of clients in personal relationships decided to hire the same auditor 
again, in non-personal relationships, only 46.2% of the auditors were rehired. 
 
Table 4 
Through table 4 we can see that pairs that have no personal relationship, on average, earn 
less than those who have a personal relationship. Such a discrepancy is more significant in 
customer gains. Another variable studied and that will influence the auditor's decision is the 
fear of losing the client. This variable does not differ significantly between groups, however, 
variables such as auditors' desire to maintain a long-term business relationship with the client 
and mutual trust are more important for the group where the stakeholders have a personal 
relationship. Other variables also considered in decision making are: customer reward; reward 
equity; pressure from a customer. 
4.3 Test Hypotheses 
Through H1, which questions whether the existence of a personal relationship with the 
client influences the final decision, we conclude from the data provided in table 12 that there 
is a significant effect of this independent variable, since F = 2,77 and p = 0,006. 
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Table 5: Logistic Regression: H1. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor’s Decision 1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P > | z | [95 % Conf. Interval] 
Personal Relationship 2.331 .843 2.77 .006 .679 3.982 
_cons .154 .397 .39 .698 -.624 .933 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (1) = 7.65; Prob > chi2 = 0.0057; Pseudo R2 = 0.1748. 
 
Cross the table 6, which represents hypothesis number six, considers all the variables used 
in these hypotheses, in which also their significance will be evaluated. The results that stand 
out with a significant effect are the existence of a personal relationship with F = 2.80 and p = 
0.005, and the fear of losing the client with F = 3.28 and p = 0.001, and the other variables 
considered, have an insignificant effect, except for the friendship variable.  
In the first hypothesis, the friendship has a low significance, but with the introduction of the 
variables in the following hypotheses, the same is gaining great significance, but there is a 
certain complexity of knowing if the pairs go from a personal relation to a friendship, since 
with over time individuals will build empathy with each other and gain trust. For purposes of 
study, the variable friendship is considered insignificant, because the results do not differ from 
the peers with friendship or with personal relationship. 
 
Table 6 
We could do a total of six tables, in which we would add the variables one by one to their 
total of six, but doing this step during our study, we realized that the variation of all the 
hypotheses did not present a change in the final significance , in which only the variable 
personal relationship and the fear of losing the client were of constant significance and all the 
others continued to have a value of persistent insignificance, so we chose to attach the 
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remaining tables. In illustration 4, we present in a schematic the values of the coefficients 
shown in hypothesis 6. 
4.3.1 Additional Test by the Economics Group 
When we conducted an extra study, in which we asked for the collaboration of the teacher 
and the students of the Theory of Games 2018/2019 at the University of Madeira (15 
participants), we introduced in the study an extra variable, Evaluate the Same Client for Several 
Years, a which was not mentioned by the author in the initial study.  
We observed through figure 1 that the variable added to our study, Evaluate the Same 
Client for Several Years, holds the highest significance, followed by the two variables used in 
the initial study Knowing the Client and Fear to Lose Client, respectively. Given the 
introduction of the new variable, we found that the result of the initial study may be partially 
skewed, as we found the introduction of this variable in the study to be fundamental. Although 
our results are based on the surveys, we admit that this study may be superficial since few 
participants were used and also that we did not use more advanced statistical programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to counter favoritism between the auditor and the client, we asked our respondents 
what would be the best way to prevent this from happening. Of the two scenarios selected, the 
Elect a Different Auditor Every Year option gains a voting advantage over the Decrease the 
Evaluation Period option. Given the conclusion of the additional study, we can not safely state 
that the conclusions drawn from this study may be the most correct, since we do not have 
sufficient information to deduce the best period of rotation for audit firms. 
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Illustration 4: Empirical Model 
Figure 1-You Favor Your Client for The Following Reasons 
110
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
Auditing is an area which we already had a minimum knowledge, but which did not allow 
us to carry out a more in-depth work, hence we decided to do a research to more completely 
master the motivations and needs of the auditors and their clients. 
The great question posed during the work was to understand what motivated the auditor to 
decide for or against his client. To answer this question we seek to provide empirical evidence. 
To see the reality, we observed what was happening in the European zone, and a little bit around 
the world, because of this there is a great tendency for the auditors to decide many times in 
favor of the client, when the financial and economic evidences did not foresee such an outcome. 
To try to justify such behavior, we first attempt to trace personality traits, incentives, 
motivations, and auditors' needs. Then we analyze the importance and influence of personality 
traits in the auditor's decision based on "The Big Five”. 
Through the personality traits, values and needs, a database was created with all the 
variables that would determine the most probable response of the auditor. When the work was 
analyzed, some variables were eliminated, due to their low covariance. Taking the variables 
that were not excluded, we analyzed the descriptive statistics for the first and second rounds. 
One of the outcomes relates to the monetary value that each participant in this study received, 
on average the auditors had a greater reward than the clients in the two rounds. With regard to 
rehired auditors, the data indicate that around 71.2% of the auditors were rehired for the second 
round, where only 10.8% of the rehired ones had not favored the client in the first round, 
through these data we can observe that there is a high pressure  to auditors decide in favor of 
the client, otherwise there is a high probability of being excluded. 
The most prominent point of the study are the decisions most often in favor of the client 
by the auditors who have a personal relationship, unlike peers who have no personal 
relationship, which favors in just over half of the cases. Already in the second round, the 
percentages vary, but the conclusions are identical to the first round. This outcome is 
empirically reinforced when logistic regressions are performed, in which the variables, 
personal relationship and fear of losing the client are of great relevance. 
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Figure 2-Method to Combat The Favoring Between The Auditor And Client 
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With the analysis of the data obtained, it is also necessary to understand the limitation of 
this study, since the actors for the accomplishment of the statistics are not professionals with 
great experience of the audit area, hence have a considerable margin of error. Another 
limitation we find is related to the small number of participants in the study. 
One of the issues that we are curious about work is the most accurate and fair rotation 
period for auditing companies, so that they maintain a degree of efficiency and independence. 
It was also in our thinking the degree of subjectivity that the results could achieve if we had 
questioned professional auditors instead of the students, since the result could conclude that 
they decided favorably to the client for other reasons approached, such as, unconscious needs, 
power and financial reasons. But we cannot make any kind of conclusion because we do not 
have enough data to do so, but we have some curiosity in the future to investigate in a more 
truthful way the main motivations that influence auditors decisions.                                                                                       
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Appendixes 
Table 1: Variable Abbreviation and Type 
Variable Abbreviation Variable type 
Relationship between auditor and client Relat Manipulated independent 
variable 
Friendship between auditor and client Friend Independent variable 
Auditor's decision in the first round A.Dec1 Dependent variable for 
auditor 
Auditor's decision in the second round A.Dec2 Dependent variable for 
auditor 
Client's decision in the second round C.Dec2 Dependent variable for client 
Reward Rew Independent variable 
Auditor’s change of preferences A.ChangePref Dependent variable for 
auditor 
Difference in decision made as an 
auditor and 
as an advisor 
A.Bias Dependent variable for 
auditor 
Fear of losing the client A.Fear Independent variable for auditor 
in the first round 
Need for affiliation Aff Independent variable 
Need for achievement Ach Independent variable 
Need for power Pow Independent variable 
Personal trait agreeableness Agree Independent variable 
Personal trait extraversion Extra Independent variable 
Personal trait neuroticism Neuro Independent variable 
Personal trait openness Open Independent variable 
Personal trait conscientiousness Cons Independent variable 
Personal value money money Independent variable 
Personal value society society Independent variable 
Personal value friends friends Independent variable 
Personal value ethics ethics Independent variable 
Personal value power power Independent variable 
Personal value fame fame Independent variable 
Personal value independence indepen Independent variable 
Influence of own reward Reward Control variable 
Influence of client's reward A.CReward Control variable for auditor 
Influence of auditor's reward C.AReward Control variable for client 
Influence of fair reward for both FairReward Control variable 
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Influence of trust Trust Control variable 
Influence of company's profit Profit Control variable 
Influence of the desire to maintain a 
long-term 
business relationship 
A.Longterm Control variable for auditor 
Influence of pressure from a client A.Cpressure Control variable for auditor 
Influence of pressure from an auditor C.Apressure Control variable for client 
Influence of belief in more objective 
choice - 
development costs as expenses 
Objective Control variable 
Influence of client's decision on 
auditor’s 
decision-making in the second round 
A.CDecision Control variable for rehired auditor 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Relationship 
 PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
NON-PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
DIFFERENCE 
Variable N Mean Std. 
Error 
N Mean Std. 
Error 
Mean Std. 
Error 
Friend 26 .538 .100 26 .000 .000 .538** .100 
A.Dec1 26 .923 .053 26 .538 .100 .385* .113 
C.Dec2 26 .962 .039 26 .462 .100 .500** .107 
A.Dec2 25 .840 .075 12 .667 .142 .173 .161 
A.RewT 26 6.385 .193 26 5.885 .339 .500 .390 
C.RewT 6 5.192 .355 26 3.346 .450 1.846* .574 
A.ChangePref 25 .120 .066 12 .417 .149 -.297 .163 
A.Fear 26 3.000 .248 26 2.885 .268 .115 .365 
A.Reward1 26 3.308 .234 26 2.923 .260 .385 .349 
A.CReward1 26 3.000 .222 26 2.077 .207 .923* .303 
A.FairReward1 26 3.885 .238 26 2.962 .239 .923* .337 
A.Longterm1 26 4.154 .173 26 3.154 .297 1.000* .344 
A.Trust1 26 4.000 .235 26 1.923 .221 2.077** .323 
A.CPressure1 26 1.962 .225 26 1.231 .128 .731* .259 
A.Profit1 26 3.038 .232 26 2.654 .222 .385 .321 
A.Objective1 26 2.808 .229 26 3.308 .282 -.500 .363 
A.Reward2 25 3.120 .254 12 3.667 .376 -.547 .449 
A.CReward2 25 2.920 .215 12 2.417 .358 .503 .397 
A.FairReward2 25 3.600 .216 12 2.833 .386 .767 .410 
A.Longterm2 25 3.800 .208 12 3.500 .399 .300 .407 
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A.Trust2 25 3.800 .231 12 2.167 .405 1.633** .435 
A.CPressure2 25 2.120 .260 12 1.417 .229 .703 .409 
A.Profit2 25 2.920 .199 12 2.917 .398 .003 .397 
A.Objective2 25 2.760 .233 12 2.667 .414 .093 .441 
A.CDecision2 25 3.800 .224 12 3.500 .435 .300 .440 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression: H6. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor’s Decision 1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P > | z | [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Relationship 4.227 1.508 2.80 .005 1.271 7.184 
Friendship 2.541 1.691 1.50 .133 -.774 5.856 
Fear of Losing the Client 2.635 .802 3.28 .001 1.062 4.208 
Need for Affiliation 1.130 1.012 1.12 .264 -.854 3.113 
Need for Achievement -1.258 .685 -1.84 .066 -2.601 .084 
Need for Power -1.059 .634 -1.67 .095 -2.302 .185 
Value Money 1.059 .748 1.42 .157 -.407 2.525 
Trait Agreeableness -.779 .654 -1.19 .233 -2.060 .502 
_cons -10.577 3.223 -3.28 .001 -16.893 -4.261 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (8) = 19.66; Prob > chi2 = 0.0117; Pseudo R2 = 0.5818. 
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression: H2. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor’s Decision 1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P > | z | [ 95 % Conf. Interval ] 
Personal Relationship 2.244 1.127 1.99 .046 .035 4.453 
Friendship .167 1.487 .11 .911 -2.747 3.081 
_cons .154 .397 .39 .698 -.624 .933 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (2) = 7.64; Prob > chi2 = 0.0219; Pseudo R2 = 0.1750. 
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Table 4:Logistic regression: H3. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor's Decision 1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P > | z | [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Personal Relationship 2.788 1.450 1.92 .055 -.055 5.630 
Friendship 1.008 1.757 .57 .566 -2.436 4.451 
Fear of Losing the 
Client 
1.529 .411 3.72 .000 .723 2.336 
_cons -4.082 1.137 -3.59 .000 -6.311 -1.854 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (3) = 19.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.0003; Pseudo R2 = 0.4661. 
 
Table5: Logistic Regression: H4. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor's 
Decision 1 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P > | z | [95% Conf. Interval] 
Personal 
Relationship 
3.439 1.244 2.76 .006 1.000 5.877 
Friendship 1.668 1.543 1.08 .280 -1.356 4.691 
Fear of Losing the 
Client 
1.888 .581 3.25 .001 .749 3.026 
Need for 
Affiliation 
.603 .588 1.03 .305 -.548 1.755 
Need for 
Achievement 
-.886 .755 -1.17 .240 -2.366 .593 
Need for power -.496 .405 -1.22 .221 -1.290 .298 
_cons -5.082 1.764 -2.88 .004 -8.539 -1.625 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (6) = 16.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.0130; Pseudo R2 = 0.5278. 
 
Table6: Logistic Regression: H5. Dependent Variable: Auditor's Decision 1 
Auditor’s Decision 1 Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z P > | z | [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Relationship 3.733 1.175 3.18 .001 1.431 6.036 
Friendship 1.879 1.694 1.11 .267 -1.442 5.200 
Fear of losing the Client 2.121 .552 3.85 .000 1.040 3.203 
Need for Affiliation .576 .743 .78 .438 -.880 2.032 
Need for Achievement -1.013 .723 -1.40 .161 -2.430 .405 
Need for Power -.920 .602 -1.53 .127 -2.100 .261 
Value Money 1.073 .739 1.45 .146 -.375 2.522 
_cons -9.241 2.587 -3.57 .000 -14.310 -4.171 
Note. Number of obs. = 52; Wald chi2 (7) = 25.67; Prob > chi2 = 0.0006; Pseudo R2 = 0.5545. 
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Chapter 5
Security in Telecommunication Operators
5
Pestana, Miguel and Arau´jo, Pedro
Abstract
Telecommunication systems are very vulnerable systems that may be subject to a cyberat-
tack. There for the necessity to prioritize security in this kind of systems. A successful attack
on a telecommunication operator could mean a big loss to the company. The investment
in security may prevent these attacks, but we need a great understanding on attackers and
on dependencies between systems. Thus it’s critical to have a framework for better security
decision-making. To help us understand the criteria of investment decision by the operator
we’re going to use static security investment games. We then study attacker’s behavior and
their decision-making efforts. From this work we take that when taking into account that at-
tackers have incentives and strategic preferences, operators need to visualize how to apprehend
attackers. Conclusively, it’s crucial to invest in security. However, operators shouldn’t com-
pete with each other concerning security when it should be a collaborative effort.
5This paper is based on Panda, S. (2018). Modelling Telecommunications Operators and
Adversaries using Game Theory (Master’s thesis). Aalto University, Finland.
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1 Introduction 
“Our increasing reliance on computer networks and information systems are making them 
attractive targets for cybercriminals.” (Symantec, 2017). “The continuous evolution of computer 
networks and mobile applications has drastically changed the nature of their security and 
privacy. As networks play an increasingly important role in modern society.” (H.Manshaei, 
2013) With this increasing role “the cyber threat environment is intensifying dramatically.” (Roy 
et al, 2010). “Huge amounts are being invested in information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) such as mobile phones and their telecommunications infrastructure.” (Konkel, 2009).  
“Even though cybersecurity problems have been paid attention to for over two decades, the 
problems are far from being resolved.” (Panda S. , 2018) 
Added to the fact that cyber criminals are getting more focused on financial gains and are 
more invested in it with more diversity of attack strategies. The uncertainty behavior of users in 
terms of security is any issue that needs to be studied and analyzed so we can understand their 
choices. The telecommunication world is also complex and difficult to analyze. Operators 
sometimes depend one each over to facilitate operations and this could facilitate security 
breaches. 
In this paper we are going to analyze the behavior of telecommunication operators and the 
attacker (cybercriminals with the intention of braking in the operators system in their benefit) by 
using game theory models. Game theory is mathematical modelling tool for studying multi-
personal decision making scenarios that is a great way of analyzing the behavior and preferences 
of the operators and attackers. It’s important to understand these characteristics because it would 
enable us to predict their behavior and actions.  
2 Literature review 
In this paper we’re going to describe Sakshyam Panda’s methodology that he used in his 
thesis “Modelling Telecommunications Operators and Adversaries using Game Theory”. 
“The interacting participants in the telecommunication domain can be broadly categorised 
into segments based on their characteristics such as roles, offerings, objectives, or on a 
combination of these. These participants, known as players, are the central decision makers. The 
players are categorised as operators (defenders), attackers and policy-makers.” (Panda S. , 2018) 
The objective of the paper is to enhance cyber security by understanding attacker’s behavior. 
To achieve this were going to apply a game-theory approach to understand the decision making 
of telecommunications operator in investing in security. To understand the choice of attackers we 
will use a behavioral game-theoretic approach.  
The base of Pandas model is Kunreuther and Heals security dependency model.  Kunreuther 
and Heals try to respond to the problem “Do firms have adequate incentives to invest in 
protection against a risk whose magnitude depends on the actions of others?” (Heal, 2003). They 
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call this the interdependent security problem. Panda will extend their theory and apply it to a 
telecommunication operator security scenario.  
Contrary to traditional game-theoretic security modeling, that suggests that cyber attackers 
are irrational when deciding on attacking operator, Panda attributes attackers with strategic 
incentive and designed a decision model capturing the choices of attackers. 
So Panda with his thesis tries to explore two questions.  
“What are the core parameters and how do they influence the security investment decisions 
of Telecoms operators?” (Panda S. , 2018) 
“What factors moderate the strategic priorities of attackers?” (Panda S. , 2018). 
“Game theory is a great method to understand complex real-life situations by making it an 
abstract representation. It helps to analyze what could happen in a strategic interaction.”   (Panda 
S. , 2018).  
To understand the conditions influencing the security investment decisions of 
Telecommunication operator we will apply a game theory approach.  
Then, to understand the behavior and choices of cyber criminals/attackers we will use a 
behavioral game-theory approach. 
The ultimate goal of this paper is to understand the preferences and behavior of attackers. 
Achieving this would allow us to anticipate their behavior making it possible to introduce 
suitable measures to strengthen cybersecurity.     
2.1  Basic Game Theory 
Game Theory was conceptualized in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern. Its purpose is 
to analyze multi-person decision-making interaction scenarios. A game is composed by a set of 
players/participants that interacted with each other; they have a set of actions available and a 
resultant pay-off to each action. There are also other rules that can affect the payoffs like order of 
choice, how many times they play, etc.  
There are different types of games like Cooperative game, Zero-sum game, static game, 
Dynamic games, Perfect Information games, complete information games.  
The players can use different strategies to achieve their desired payoff. A strategy can either 
be a pure strategy or mixed strategy. In a pure game strategy, the player has a unique action to 
take in a situation. Well in mixed game strategy they player uses probabilities distribution over 
all the available actions. 
3 Methodology 
We have different types of players that participate in the game. First we have the operators, 
who are the defenders, which goal is to successfully defend against malicious attempts.  Next we 
have the attackers, who are offensive players, with an aim to compromise the target (operator).  
Finally, we have the policy-maker. They are external influencers who set policies and laws. They 
won’t be considered in this paper. 
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Panda defined a security game as a static game between the operator and the attacker where 
the operator’s goal is to maximize his chances of successfully defending against attackers and the 
attacker’s goal is to compromise his target and optimize the investment of resources. 
3.1. Telecommunication operator strategy 
There’s a sub-game played between the operators which is the security investment game. It 
involves non-malicious operators who decide to invest or not in security. This investment could 
lead to complete protected state or not. The operator’s goal is to minimize cost while maximizing 
protection against malicious attackers.  
The author of this thesis separates the operators as dependents or independents. He then 
subdivides them into coordinating or cooperating if dependent, and as competing if independent. 
If those operators are competing, he then splits them again as small or large operators. The 
cooperating operators are operators that share resources (normally an association of operators). 
The coordinating operators (subset of cooperating operators) only demonstrate specific 
responsibilities rather than sharing resources. The competing operators are independent from 
other similar operators and have a lack of motivation for external collaborations. Therefore, the 
author considers cooperating and competing operators as extensive units. 
The operator has to make a choice (decision space), invest or not invest in security. If it 
chooses to invest, that same security will provide protection against direct and indirect threats 
independently of its form and class (perfect protection).   
In a discrete security model, the general assumption is that when an operator decides to 
invest in security the risk is zero, meaning it has perfect or complete protection. This kind of 
assumption is used by Lelarge and Bolot in their model. However, Panda defends that investing 
in security does not mean perfect protection, but it will improve the probability of defending 
successfully a range of attacks. “The investment in security will positively enhance the chance of 
successfully defending against a range of attacks.” (Panda S. , 2018) 
3.1 Attackers Behavior and strategies 
“Attackers are entities with malicious intentions” (Panda S. , 2018). They attack companies 
with the intention to obtain personal data with value. (Parker, 1998)describes them in various 
categories as terrorist, criminal, foreign government, foreign military, non-state combatant and 
business. (Herley, 2010). Described them from an economics perspective as scalable and 
targeted attacks (Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack) in his paper “The plight of the 
targeted attacker in a world of scales”.  In other words, the effort depends on the target.  
However, the barriers in aptly modelling adversaries are due to the lack of credible 
information on potential adversaries, and the interactions being extremely complicated and 
extensive (J. Pita, 2012)Also, speculating the intentions behind attacks is challenging. Moreover, 
the difficulty in identifying, confirming and quantifying the intents further limits our 
understanding of cyber-attacks and adversarial behaviour. Humans are bounded rational rather 
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than being perfectly rational (Simon, 1972). To comprehend the strategic choices of humans we 
use behaviour game theory. Behavioural game theory differs from the traditional game theory by 
predicting human behavior utilizing "experimental evidence and psychological intuition" 
(Camerer, 2011).  
The attacker has an extended decision space with a multiple choice of actions. First, the 
attacker chooses to attack or not to attack. If he chooses to attack, then he needs to decide if it is 
a full attack, a partial attack, a probing attack, among other types of attack. If he doesn’t attack, 
he can watch what happens, or ignore it, or something else that he thinks is the best to do at the 
moment.  
By not attacking the targeted operator, it doesn’t mean that the attacker has simply ignored 
the target, or that operators are not under threat. Surely, to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of attackers viewpoint, there is a need to acknowledge possible implications of 
such behavior. In other words, it can simply be a strategic move from the attacker to not attack 
(direct attack) and observe operators’ reactions (passive attacks). 
After this, there is a model illustrating the decision-flow of attackers. This model represents 
the cognitive flow of attackers during the attack process. 
Firstly, the attacker thinks of an attack, he then looks for vulnerabilities and at the same time 
decides what type of attack he will execute (these two influence each other). After this, prepares 
his strategies properly and posteriorly decides if wants to commit to an attack, or not. Taking into 
account that he commits to an attack; the attacker will try to exploit the target. If doesn’t commit 
to an attack, the whole process starts all over again. 
Summing up, this cognitive process initiates from the thought of an attack and ends on a 
definitive decision of either attacking or not attacking. This choice is sustained by either 
searching for vulnerabilities to breach or choosing a specific attack to perform within the 
attacker’s capabilities. There could be numerous other decision-flow paths to select based on the 
context of an interaction. The comprehension of the intents and motives will reinforce a better 
interpretation for estimating attacker’s behavior and comprehensively anticipating their behavior. 
4 Application 
4.1 Inter-Operator Payoff structure  
The decision of investing or not in security is a decision that can affect not only the operator 
how chooses. Depending on another operator is a common decision made by operators so that 
there cost of entering a new operating area can be easier and less cost effective. The following 
represents the cost that can be sustained by those affiliations. 
r – Is the available expendable resource for an operator to invest without involving any 
expenditure and loses, 
c – Is the cost of investment in security, 
l – Is the loss to an operator when its system is compromised, 
l’ – represents the loss imposed by another operator. 
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4.2 Game with independent operators 
This game shows the competitive scenario between two independent operators. The 
investment made by an operator can affect other operators by diverging attacker to other 
operators. 
  
Figure 1 – payoff matrix for the security investment game involving independent operators.  
The Figure 1 shows the payoff matrix for the security investment game between two 
independent operators. The top left chamber represents if both operator chose to invest, they both 
get the same payoff which is the difference between the available expendable resource for 
security and the cost of investing in security. If O1 invests in security and O2 doesn’t the payoff 
for 01 is the same but for 02, he has to bear the loss of direct breach and the loss of induced risk 
of breach (top right chamber). The lower right chamber is the reverse. If both chose to not invest 
they both have to bear the loss of direct breach and the loss of induced risk of breach.  
From this we can see that operator will invest in security if  
r - c > r – l - l’ 
c < l + l’ 
This condition states that investing in security will be a dominant strategy for an operator. If 
we don’t verify this condition, the operators don’t have the incentive to invest in security.  
A mixed strategy were the operator are indifferent in their choices can be achieved by the 
mini-max solutions where the operators best responds would be a strategy maximizing their 
payoff and minimizing their opponents payoff. For the optimal strategy, operators most mix their 
choices so that opponents don’t have a preferred choice of action. To achieve this they must, 
U opponent(invest)=U opponent (don’t invest) 
P*(r-c)+(1-p)*(r-c)=p*(r-l-l’)+(1-p)*(r-l-l’) 
C=l+l’ 
This means, in uncertain conditions that the operators must spend in security as much as the 
cost of being compromised. 
128
  
 
4.3 Game with dependent operators 
Operators sometimes form coalitions to facilitate the entry in a new market. With this kind 
of collaboration the operators can complement each other’s requirements. This means that an 
operator decision can influence the other operators’ payoff. 
In the case where there is a single dependent operator (one operator is protected by another 
operator) this means that when the depending operator (Odng) invests in protection he will 
successfully defend the attempted attack. The Dependent operator (Odnt) will also remain 
protected even without investing in security. On the other hand if Odnt is attacked, the whole 
system will be compromised because he didn’t invest in protection. Even if Odng had invested in 
protection, his system will be compromised. This is represented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 - payoff matrix with an operator depending on the other 
  
From the figure we can observed that for the Odnt to invest in security it must have, 
r – c > r - l and r – c – l – l’ > r – l – l’ 
 Solving the inequalities we obtain c < l and c < 0. The condition of investing in security 
and the cost being below 0 is unrealistic. While c < l operator odnt would be incline to not invest 
in security. The ambiguity leads to an undetermined solution for the possible Nash equilibria 
being both investing or not.  
4.4 Game with Interdependent operator 
In an interdependent security scenario, any successful attack will compromise both 
operators.  
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Figure 3- payoff matrix with interdependent operators 
 
In this case, if both invest in security, then each have to bear the cost of investment that will 
provide them with complete protection. If O1 invest and O2 doesn’t then O1 will incur the cost 
of investment and the risk of propagation breach (l’) and O2 has to incur the cost of being 
compromised (l). If neither of them invests in security then both have to bear the loss of own 
system being compromised and loss due to contagious from the other unprotected operator. To 
invest it in security, it has to be a dominate strategy, as so it must be 
r – c > r – l, and 
r – c –l > r – l – l’ 
Solving the inequalities, we obtain c < l meaning that operators will invest in security if its 
cost is lower than the expected loss of a successful attack. 
Using similar calculations as with independent operators, 
U opponent (invest) = U opponent (don’t invest) 
P * (r-c) + (1-p) * (r-c-l’) = p * (r-l) + (1-p) * (r-l-l’) 
c = l 
The optimal strategy is when the cost of investing is equal to the expected loss. This is a 
weak Nash equilibrium. For investing in security to be a dominant strategy the condition must be 
c < l but the optimal strategy is c = l and the game finishes by both players investing in security 
considering the propagation risk. 
4.5 Strategic analysis  
The weaker operators are constantly in danger due to lack of protection, and investment in 
security is vital. For a dependent operator, investing in security is not affirming that it will be 
protected, although it is safer to rely on operators with security measures rather than on the ones 
without it. 
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It is financially beneficial for both weaker and stronger operators to not to invest in security. 
In the case of the weaker, they will depend on operators with protection, and free-ride on the 
stronger partner. For the stronger operators, they will only allow operators with protection to be 
dependent on them. The stronger operators can free-ride on the positive externalities created by 
security investments of depending operators. 
These conditions, from a strategic perspective, favor operators to divert the attention of 
attackers that will most likely to attack the operator with the weakest protection. A strategic 
move would be using an operator as a decoy to receive all attacks protecting other operators that 
depend on him. Thus, knowing the most likely point of attack, the operators would have a 
strategic advantage over the attackers. 
Particularly, it might be economically beneficial from the weakest player in the dependency 
chain determining that he will be attacked, in this way investing in self-insurance rather than in 
self-protection.  
Fundamentally, investment in security is always at operator’s advantage. Nonetheless, 
operators should not compete against security rather security should be a collaborative effort 
making a breach harder for attackers. 
4.6 Optimizing attack strategies 
It’s difficult for attackers to optimize their decisions because of the inability to assess the 
environment and have complete and perfect information against an operator. “For example, 
attackers might have information about alliances among operators but gaining information 
regarding an operator’s investment in security and on what specific security might be 
challenging.” (Panda S. , 2018) But essentially attacker has to choose between attacking and not 
attacking the target (operator). 
 
Figure 4 
 
The figure 4 illustrates the expected payoff of an attacker against a targeted operator in 
uncertain conditions. We assume that if the system is unsecure the payoff for the attacker is 
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positive and if secure it isn’t. The painted box represents an additional step that won’t be 
analyzed in this paper. The attacker must identify viable and not viable targets so that the gains 
from the attack should be at least equal to the cost. For example, a telecommunication domain 
with N operators that was Nc operators share security dependencies and Nn independent 
operators compete against security. It isn’t viable for attacker to attack an operator in this 
environment because it can be extremely expensive and it can be very complicated. They can 
have various tactics to address this kind of situation like randomly choosing a target operator and 
attempt breaching there defense. But this brings uncertainty to the attacker ability to be 
successful. The attacker could also search for a specific vulnerability and then attack. But this 
approach would require a substantial amount of research. However, it will require less effort in 
the breaking-in effort.  
The expected utility (U) is the payoff that the attacker will receive when occurs a successful 
attack on a target. The expected utility is the cost of the attack minus the expected gain from a 
successful attack. The cost of the attack can be from information searching, target searching, 
vulnerability searching and breaking in. 
The gathering and sharing of information are essential for improving cybersecurity. But the 
attacker using commonly known information about telecommunication operators can optimize in 
attack strategy. Using known information reduces the information searching cost to a static Ci 
rather than a variable. However, there is still the cost of vulnerability searching to bear, Cv is a 
common cost irrelevant to any choice of target. 
In a cooperating environment the operator state is also influenced by other operators. 
Knowing that a set of corporations (Nc) are cooperating the attacker can choose to just search his 
target between the cooperating corporations, reducing his search effort. 
Uc =  Ci +  cost(Breaking୧୬) +  Cv ෍ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡൫𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡௦௘௔௥௖௛௜௡ ൯ 𝑁௖(௧,ି௧) − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
In a non-cooperating environment will encourage competing operators to invest in higher 
security. The attacker must choose the operator who has lower security and resistance. So 
identifying if they are competing will reduce the effort of search because it economically 
beneficial to attack the losing operator. 
Uc =  Ci +  cost(Breaking୧୬) +  Cv ෍ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡൫𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡௦௘௔௥௖௛௜௡௚൯ 𝑁௡(௧,ି௧) − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
G represents the minimal gain that the attacker desires to achieve from an attack. The 
attacker from an economical point of view will try and maximize G so that he has the most gain 
from an attack. So, he will try to maximize U minus G. Resuming, the attacker decides to attack 
if U grater or equal to G and doesn’t attack if U smaller than G. 
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5 Discussion 
The emerging priority of modern information driven economy is the protection of 
information systems and given that eliminating the attempts of attack is unrealistic it very 
important that operator reanalyze there security system. “Trust is an essential component of 
computer systems” (Marsh, 1994) “but trust demands a reason for belief, and this belief bases 
itself on the ‘expectation’ of how a trustee will behave or perform.” (Gambetta).  
Computer systems have predefined outcomes when it comes to identical characteristics as 
the delimited rational players in games. The key of this paper is the understanding of the 
behavioral characteristics of players to after being applied in the study of systems defining trust 
on them. 
Research has an ineffective empirical evidence to indicate ‘intent’ and ‘motive’ behind 
attacks. The attack framework described in this paper can help in categorizing attacks around 
different dimensions. 
On the other hand, to predict the attackers behavior in a realistic way we need a deep 
understanding of their behavioral characteristics. It asks for a multi-disciplinary approach with 
an adequate application of concepts from behavioral psychology and economics, and cognitive 
science. Comprehending attackers characteristics will help us evaluate the emerging threats, 
vulnerabilities and comprehensive tactics supporting effective risk decision making. 
The assumption, made by this game-theory model, such as the knowledge players have, 
action sets and sequence of interaction, helps to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of real 
life interactions making it computationally feasible to model. However, a lot of information is 
lost and we are restricted to a tiny portion of the solution space. 
Repeated games are an ideal choice to model players behavior because in real life players 
have to interact with partners and competitors multiple times. “Repeated games assist in 
determining efficient equilibrium” (Laszka, Felegyhazi, & Buttyan, 2015) but not all attacks are 
with the intention to gain financial goods. A novice attacker may want to gain experience or 
reputation.  
6 Conclusion  
The telecommunication system is a complex environment and that is exposed to a diverse 
amount of attack possibilities that can be very unpredictable. The inability to predict precisely 
the adversities of an attack adds challenges to choosing an adequate security solution for the 
telecommunication operator. This paper tries to analyze the telecommunication operators and 
attackers decision making by using game theory and the factors that may influence them. 
We analyzed the interdependency of operators on their choices of investing or not in 
security. In this analysis we reconfirmed that investing in security isn’t guaranteed that the 
operator is fully protected against threats. Operators need to complement their investment in 
security with operators that have a relationship with them also investing in security. This will 
guarantee a better protection. 
133
  
 
Then we analyzed the attack by the attacker’s perspective to better understand their method 
of choice (attack or not attack). Contrarily to traditional game-theory approaches, we considered 
the attackers as rational entities.  
A decision flow model was designed that captured the choices of the attackers. The result of 
this is a generalized attack framework describing the effort needed in the time of the attack 
process. Applying the framework, we intended attack strategies optimizing attacker’s effort in 
achieving their utilities as it is a fundamental parameter moderating attacker’s choices. 
Due to the complexities in molding decision-making processes of humans, the results are 
still on a theoretical level. In addition, lack of consistent temporal information and each and 
every one security incident being incomparable advances the challenges in modelling human 
rivals.  
Specifically, the impediments in decisively inferring the intentions, motives and other 
possible factors that may guide attacker’s actions from the already existing security known 
information.  
Nevertheless, through this assignment, we are probing the foundations for drawing 
inferences in relation to attacker’s characteristics based on the empirical evidence from 3 
following papers. “Behavioral modelling of attackers choices.” (Panda, Oliver, & Holtmanms , 
2018), “Subscriber profile extraction and modification via diameter interconnections” 
(Holtmanns, Miche, & Oliver, 2017), User location tracking attacks for lte networks using the 
interworking functionality. (S., P., & I., 2016). 
From this work we take that when taking into account that attackers have incentives and 
strategic preferences, operators need to visualize how to apprehend attackers. Conclusively, it’s 
crucial to invest in security. However, operators shouldn’t compete with each other concerning 
security when it should be a collaborative effort. 
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Chapter 6
Coalitional game theory for increasing the energy
efficiency of cellular networks
6
Neto, Carlos and Abreu, Lu´ıs
Abstract
In recent years there is increasing concern for the environment due to the amount of CO2
emitted. The increased consumption of energy is one of the factors that emits CO2 to the
atmosphere, being the ICT (information and communication technology) one of the main
consumers of energy, having in Europe a percentage of 10%. The research question of this
thesis is: Can coalitional game theory increase the energy efficiency of cellular networks?
The goal of this paper is to answer this question by means of a case study. To answer this
question, we use the methods of Shapley value, the nucleolus and the concept of the core. In
this process, the Shapley value is only used to find the coalition with the clusters that have
the highest average marginal contribution to the energy efficiency of the cellular network,
the application of the nucleolus is not as straightforward as the application of the Shapley
value and for the core, the same holds as with the nucleolus, that the payoff allocation cannot
be divided in an arbitrary way, as was explained in nucleolus. It can only be divided into
parts equal to the contribution of single clusters. Each of these solution concepts has its own
approach and is based on different mathematical concepts. Because of these differences, the
solutions of the three concepts do not always coincide. While the solution concepts used in
this case study have shown to enormously increase the energy efficiency of cellular networks,
due to their computational complexity they are not suited to be implemented in real cellular
networks. There are simpler and quicker methods to find the most energy efficient coalitions
of small base stations
6This paper is based on Elderenbosch, S. (2019). Coalitional game theory for increasing
the energy efficiency of cellular networks (Master’s thesis). Delft University of Technology.
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 1 Introduction 
In recent years there is increasing concern for the environment due to the amount of 
CO2 emitted. The increased consumption of energy is one of the factors that emits CO2 
to the atmosphere, being the ICT (information and communication technology) one of the 
main consumers of energy, having in Europe a percentage of 10%.  
A cellular network is a network of transceivers, serving an area with radio signal 
coverage. These transceivers, called base stations (BSs), can receive and transmit radio 
signals. Each area is divided into multiple hexagonal adjacent cells and each cell is served 
with at least one base station. These BSs serve a wide variety of mobile devices, such as 
mobile phones, tablets, and laptops, and provide them with a connection for data 
exchange. This exchange of data occurs by way of radio signals. Each BS uses a specific 
frequency range to serve the users within its cell. Adjacent BSs use a different range of 
frequencies to prevent radio interference (Xueying Guo, 2017). 
The energy consumed by mobile phone operators has increased in recent years and 
is expected to continue to increase leading consequently to increased energy use. The 
largest part of the operational coasts of mobile network operators is caused by their energy 
consumption, almost 90% of these energy costs are realized by the radio access network 
in which the base stations (BSs) consumes almost all the energy (Elderenbosh, 2018). So 
that companies can increase their profits and reducing CO2 emissions will have to 
intervene in the intakes of the BSs. 
The energy efficiency is measured in the amount of data transmitted divided by the 
amount of energy consumed by the network [Bit/J], (Elderenbosh, 2018).  To achieve 
energy efficiency will be used three concepts of game theory solution of coalition: 
Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the core. 
 The main objective of this paper will be to answer the research question that is 
“can coalitional game theory increase the energy efficiency of the cellular networks”. 
A coalition form game consists of a group of players denoted by N. These players 
seek to form coalitions of individual players in order to increase their personal utility ui. 
Any coalition S⊆N acts as a single entity in the game. Without loss of generality it is 
assumed that N = {1, 2, ...n}. Each S⊆N has a specific value, denoted by v(S), which can 
be divided among the individual players within that specific coalition, (Zhu Han, 2012). 
This work will be divided on the issue of the problem statement in the introduction, 
then the various opinions of authors on the topic in the literature review. In the 
methodology will have exposure of the methods used to obtain the results. The exhibition 
of the results will be according to the methods used, after which the best way to achieve 
the goals. And finally, the conclusion has the answer to the main question of this paper. 
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 1 Literature review 
In this section we will examine several authors who have studied the same topic or 
related themes. The new generation is very focused on the particular me technologies for 
wireless, requiring the creation of new solutions for increasing energy used.   
Information and communications technology (ICT) systems are the core of today’s 
knowledge-based society. Innovations in this area are adapted at tremendous speed and 
worldwide use of ICT has soared in recent years. However, this unprecedented growth 
comes at a price: ICT systems are meanwhile responsible for the same amount of CO2 
emissions as global air travel. If the growth of ICT systems energy consumption continues 
at the present pace, it will endanger ambitious plans to reduce CO2 emissions and tackle 
climate change. Increasing the energy efficiency of ICT systems is thus clearly the major 
R&D challenge in the decades to come (Zimmermann, 2008). 
To cope with this energy turnover, it will be necessary to increase energy efficiency, 
and this can be done in various ways. According to (Ayanoglu, 2015), The energy 
efficiency of the network can be improved by either increasing the total capacity of the 
network while consuming the same power or decreasing the consumed power of the 
network and providing the same capacity. Traditional macro BSs provide better coverage 
and data rate; however they consume significantly higher power than the micro BSs. In 
addition, in densely deployed networks, this gain is substantially reduced due to intercell 
interference. On the other hand, the transmission power of micro BSs is significantly less 
than the macro BSs, thereby they cover less area. However, they consume less power and 
do not interfere with the other transmissions as severe as macro BS transmissions. 
Therefore, they are more energy efficient than the macro BSs especially in densely 
deployed networks. For this reason, in this work, micro BSs are deployed to the network 
as an underlay for macro BSs to maximize the energy efficiency of the network and to 
satisfy the traffic demand. 
According To (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, Hyundong Shin, & Marios 
Kountouris, 2013), With the exponential increase in mobile internet traffic driven by a 
new generation of wireless devices, future cellular networks face a great challenge to 
meet this overwhelming demand of network capacity. At the same time, the demand for 
higher data rates and the ever-increasing number of wireless users led to rapid increases 
in power consumption and operating cost of cellular networks. One potential solution to 
address these issues is to overlay small cell networks with macrocell networks as a means 
to provide higher network capacity and better coverage. However, the dense and random 
deployment of small cells and their uncoordinated operation raise important questions 
about the energy efficiency implications of such multi-tier networks. Another technique 
to improve energy efficiency in cellular networks is to introduce active/sleep (on/off) 
modes in macrocell base stations. In this paper, we investigate the design and the 
associated tradeoffs of energy efficient cellular networks through the deployment of 
sleeping strategies and small cells. Using a stochastic geometry based model, we derive 
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 the success probability and energy efficiency in homogeneous macrocell (single-tier) and 
heterogeneous K-tier wireless networks under different sleeping policies. In addition, we 
formulate the power consumption minimization and energy efficiency maximization 
problems, and determine the optimal operating regimes for macrocell base stations. 
Numerical results confirm the effectiveness of switching off base stations in 
homogeneous macrocell networks. Nevertheless, the gains in terms of energy efficiency 
depend on the type of sleeping strategy used. In addition, the deployment of small cells 
generally leads to higher energy efficiency but this gain saturates as the density of small 
cells increases. In a nutshell, our proposed framework provides an essential understanding 
on the deployment of future green heterogeneous networks. 
One of the way to increase the energy efficiency is given by (Oliver Arnold, 2010), 
In wireless communications micro cells are potentially more energy efficient than 
conventional macro cells due to the high path loss exponent. Also, heterogeneous 
deployments of both cell types can be used to optimize the energy efficiency. Energy 
efficiency of any deployment is impacted by the power consumption of each individual 
network element and the dependency of transmit power and load. In this paper we 
developed such power models for macro and micro base stations relying on data sheets 
of several GSM and UMTS base stations with focus on component level, e.g., power 
amplifier and cooling equipment. In a first application of the model a traditional macro 
cell deployment and a heterogeneous deployment are compared. 
Another way to reduce the energy consumption is specified by (Marco Ajmone 
Marsan, 2009), We have investigated the possibility of reducing the energy consumption 
of the access portion of a cellular network by reducing the number of active cells during 
the periods in which they are under-utilized because traffic is low. 
According to (Iztok Humar, 2011), The continuous increase in energy consumption 
by cellular networks requires rethinking their energy efficiency. Current research 
indicates that one third of operating energy could be saved by reducing the transmission 
power of base stations. However, this approach requires the introduction of a range of 
additional equipment containing more embodied energy — consumed by all processes 
associated with the production of equipment. This problem is addressed first in this 
article. Furthermore, a new cellular network energy efficiency model with embodied 
energy is proposed, and optimization between the number of cells and their coverage is 
investigated. Contrary to previous works, we have found that embodied energy accounts 
for a significant proportion of total energy consumption and cannot be neglected. The 
simulation results confirm an important trade-off between operating and embodied 
energies, which can provide some practical guidelines for designing energy-efficient 
cellular access networks. The new model considering embodied energy is not limited to 
just cellular networks, but to other telecommunications, such as wireless local area 
networks and wired networks. 
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 2 Methodology 
In this chapter we will introduced to the various methods and concepts of game 
theory as, the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the core have been introduced and 
investigated (Elderenbosh, 2018), power consumption model with the homogenous and 
heterogeneous network model (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, Hyundong Shin, & 
Marios Kountouris, 2013). This chapter explains how these concepts are used to 
determine the most energy efficient coalition.  
The structure of the chapter is subdivided by several sections in order to facilitate the 
understanding of the various methods used. At first, it`s necessary to explain how the cell 
phone network is modeled as a coalition form game, what the final coalition will  look 
like, and how the payoff values are assigned to each coalition (Elderenbosh, 2018). In the 
next section, introduces the application of clusters between base stations to decrease the 
computational complexity. The third section, comprises the application of three different 
solution concepts: the Shapley value, the nucleous, the core (Elderenbosh, 2018) but also 
contains power consumption model with the homogenous and heterogeneous network 
model (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, Hyundong Shin, & Marios Kountouris, 2013). 
This chapter ends with some conclusions related to the results obtained through the 
application of the methods mentioned in the previous section. 
2.1 Cellular Network as a coalition form game 
To start the investigation is necessary to build the problem as a coalition form game. 
The players of the coalition form game are the small base stations of the cellular network. 
Then the payoff function transfers the values to all coalitions is explained (Elderenbosh, 
2018). 
2.2 Clustering 
A frequent problem with all the solution concepts is the increasing computational 
complexity when the number of players increases. The number of calculations that need 
to be performed for the nucleolus and the Shapley value increases according to the Bell 
number (Elderenbosh, 2018). The Bell number is the number of ways a set of n elements 
can be partitioned into nonempty subsets (Bell, 1934). The first ten numbers, n = 0, 1... 
10 of the Bells’ series are: 1, 1, 2, 5, 15, 52, 203, 877, 4140, 21147. The model of the 
cellular network consists of 117 small base stations. It can simply be concluded that the 
number of calculations that has to be made to find the Shapley value for all these base 
stations is enormous and way too much for ordinary computers. Consequently, a method 
needs to be found to drastically reduce the number of calculations. (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
One way of reducing the number of calculations is by excluding the small base 
stations that would never contribute to a more energy efficient cellular network. . This 
implies that the total power consumption of the cellular network increases when these 
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 small base stations go into sleeping mode and their users are served by the macro base 
station. Therefore, these base stations can be excluded from the calculation of the three 
solution concepts, since they will never improve the energy efficiency of the cellular 
network (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
When a cluster between small base stations is formed, the power needed for the 
macro base station to take over the small base station is summed up for the cluster. 
Consequently, the same happens with the payoff value of the small base stations. A group 
of small base stations is actually the same as a coalition of small base stations. The only 
difference is that a cluster isn`t formed by using one of the three solution concepts. The 
clusters are formed by relating neighboring small base stations that consume less power 
than the macro base station would need to serve their users. These clusters behave as a 
single player, so all the small base station within the clusters go either into sleeping mode 
together or remain active together (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
While the computational complexity decreases drastically by increasing the cluster 
size among small base station, it is expected that the energy efficiency will also decrease 
when the cluster size is increased. This is outstanding to the fact that with the use of 
clusters it is no longer possible to put single base stations in sleeping or active mode. 
Instead, it is decided for whole clusters of base stations to go into sleeping mode or remain 
active. So, it could happen that some base stations remain active, while it would have 
been more energy efficient if these specific base stations where put into sleeping mode. 
For example, if there are two clusters of small base stations S and T S, T ⊂ N, both clusters 
consist of 5 small base stations , cluster S ={1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and T={6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Assuming 
that for each small base stations except base stations 5 and 10, the macro base station 
consumes 4W to serve their users, for base station 5 and 10 the macro base station 
consumes 8W. So, for each of the clusters, the macro base station needs 24W to serve 
their users. Additionally, it is assumed that the amount of data transmitted by each of the 
individual small base stations is the same. The macro base station in this example only 
has 32W of available power left before it reaches its maximum capacity. In this example 
for the most optimal solution it does not matter whether cluster S or cluster T is set into 
sleeping mode, since they both contribute the same energy saving to the cellular network. 
However, the most energy efficient solution is to set small base stations {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 
8} in sleeping mode, using all the available power of the macro base station and leave 
base stations {5, 10} active. This example shows that due to clustering the energy 
efficiency may decrease (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
2.3 Power Consumption Model 
2.3.1 Homogeneous Network model 
The power consumption at each  macro cell base station (MBS) is given by Ptot = 
PM0 +βΔMPM where PM0 is the static power expenditure of the MBS, βPM is the RF 
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 output power of the MBS, and ΔM is the slope of the load-dependent power consumption 
in MBS (G. Auer, 2011). A fixed power control policy is adopted here in order to avoid 
creating coverage holes or areas where the target SINR is below an acceptable level due 
to switching off MBS. To ensure a similar level of coverage as before sleeping, we assume 
that all awake MBS transmit with power βPM, where β is a ratio that represents power 
control. It is assumed that β is the same for all MBSs (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, 
Hyundong Shin, & Marios Kountouris, 2013). 
2.3.2 K-tier Heterogeneous Network model 
For better understanding of the application of this model we considered the general 
K-tier heterogeneous network model, where the base stations in each tier are modeled as 
independent homogeneous PPP Θi with intensity λi (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, 
Hyundong Shin, & Marios Kountouris, 2013). We will always use Θ1 for the macro tier 
ΘM. In addition, we consider again that all base stations in the K tiers share the same 
bandwidth. Without employing any sleeping mode at each base station in the i-th tier, the 
average power consumption of the i-th tier heterogeneous networks is given by  (A. 
Ghosh, 2012): 
PHet,i = λi(Pi0 + ΔiPi), 
Where Pi0 is the static power expenditure of the base station in the i-th tier, Pi is the 
RF output power of the i-th tier base station, and Δi is the grade of the load-dependent 
power consumption the base station in the i-th tier (Yong Sheng Soh, Tony Q. S. Quek, 
Hyundong Shin, & Marios Kountouris, 2013). 
2.4 Applying the three solution concepts 
The output of the cellular network model is the dynamic power consumption of the 
macro BS and the power the macro BS would consume when taking over any small BSs. 
The three solution concepts use this output to find the most optimal coalitions among the 
BSs. The three solution concepts all start with the same procedure. First, all the small BSs 
that consume more than 10W at time step t are excluded from the calculation, such that 
only the BSs that can contribute to an increased energy efficiency of the whole cellular 
network are included in the solutions. Next, the payoff values of each individual small 
BSs is calculated. The final general step is the forming of the clusters. All the small BSs 
that are left are divided into clusters of 5 small BSs. The clusters are formed among 
adjacent small BSs. The final payoff value of a cluster is the sum of all the individual 
payoffs of the small BSs within that cluster. The same holds for the energy needed by the 
macro BS to take over a cluster, this is the sum of the energy needed to take over all the 
individual small BSs within a cluster (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
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 2.4.1 Shapley value 
Between the clusters of small BSs all the possible coalitions are formed, apart from 
the grand coalition of clusters. Next, the Shapley value is derived for each cluster of small 
BSs according to Formula. After the Shapley value has been derived for all of the clusters, 
the clusters are ordered in descending order of Shapley values. The clusters are then one 
by one added to the final coalition starting with the cluster with the highest Shapley value, 
until the macro BS reaches its peak capacity. In this way the clusters with the highest 
Shapley value form the final coalition, while the clusters with lower Shapley values 
remain active. Finally, the energy efficiency of the cellular network with the sleeping 
coalition is derived. This process is repeated for every time step in t. Without loss of 
generality it is assumed that t = {1, 2, ..., 24}. In this process, the Shapley value is only 
used to find the coalition with the clusters that have the highest average marginal 
contribution to the energy efficiency of the cellular network (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
2.4.2 Nucleolus 
The application of the nucleolus is not as straightforward as the application of the 
Shapley value. However, this can be applied in games where the payoff can be divided in 
any arbitrary way, such as when the payoff is money. In the case of the cellular network 
model, the payoff value of a coalition solely depends on the power saving this coalition 
induces when going into sleeping mode. This power saving cannot be divided in any 
arbitrary way, since each small BSs contributes a fixed amount of energy saving. A small 
BSs is either in sleeping mode or active. When in sleeping mode, it contributes a fixed 
energy saving to the cellular network, when in active mode it consumes 10W of power. 
It is not possible to set half a small BS into sleeping mode such that it contributes half of 
its payoff value to the energy saving coalition. Therefore, the payoff allocation can only 
be adjusted in fixed steps of the contribution of single separate small BSs, a BS is on or 
in sleeping mode. In the case when clustering is applied the payoff function can only be 
adjusted in the steps of the fixed energy saving contribution of a cluster switching from 
active mode into sleeping mode. This significantly decreases the computational 
complexity of finding the final allocation of payoffs that minimizes the dissatisfaction of 
all coalitions, since only a limited number of variations to the payoff allocation is 
possible. So in order to find the final coalition of small BSs with the nucleolus concept, 
first all the possible coalitions among the clusters are formed, with exception of the grand 
coalition. Next, all the coalitions of clusters that need a higher power consumption of the 
macro BS to take over that coalition than the available power of the macro BS, are 
excluded from the calculation. All the remaining coalitions are ordered in ascending order 
of size. Then the dissatisfaction between one specific coalition and all the other coalitions 
is derived. This procedure is repeated for every remaining coalition. The coalition that 
generates the smallest maximum dissatisfaction among all coalitions is the final coalition 
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 according to the nucleolus approach and will be set into sleeping mode. This process is 
repeated for every time step t. (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
2.4.3 Core 
For the core, the same holds as with the nucleolus, that the payoff allocation cannot 
be divided in an arbitrary way, as was explained in nucleolus. It can only be divided into 
parts equal to the contribution of single clusters. To find the core, first all the possible 
coalitions among the clusters are formed. Then the linear inequalities are formed for all 
the coalitions of clusters, following the same procedure as was the case with the 
Musicians’ game. The allocation of payoffs satisfying all these inequalities forms the core 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
Since in the case of this specific game the payoffs cannot be arbitrarily divided, the 
only allocation that can satisfy all the linear inequalities is the allocation of payoffs to the 
grand coalition. However, the capacity of the macro BS is not always enough to take over 
the grand coalition. In these cases, there is no feasible allocation of payoffs that can satisfy 
all the linear inequalities. Therefore, the core would be empty and there would have been 
no comparable result to compare with the Shapley value and the nucleolus. When this 
was the case the best alternative was chosen as solution of the core, in order to have 
comparable results with the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The best alternative is the 
allocation of payoffs to the largest possible coalition in number of clusters that the macro 
BS still can take over. This is the allocation that satisfies most of the linear inequalities 
and thus the best alternative solution for the core (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
 However, there are situations in which there are multiple different coalitions with 
the same largest number of clusters that the macro BS can take over. In these situations, 
the collection of allocations to all these possible largest coalitions form the core. This 
situation shows various analogies with a situation in which the core is not unique. When 
this is the case the average energy efficiency of every possible coalition in the core is 
taken to compare with the Shapley value and the nucleolus (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
3 Application 
In this chapter we will expose the results, observations and results of the methods 
utilized to answer the main question of this paper. First, the results of the application of 
clusters are discussed. Then, the individual results and comparison of the Shapley value, 
nucleolus and the core. To conclude this chapter, a final note on the use of the coalitional 
game theory solution concepts in this case of study is made. 
3.1 Clustering 
The implementation of clustering will have implications in different aspects. First if 
we look for the graphics 1,2 and 3 (annexes), the main conclusion we have drawn is the 
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 decrease of the computation time. The computation time will depend of the different 
clusters size with an increasing number of small BSs.  
The computation time for calculating the Shapley value for a set of 20 small base 
stations is 1600 seconds for single base stations; 0.7 seconds for clusters of 2; and 0.01 
seconds for clusters of 5 base stations. The difference in computation time between single 
BSs and clusters of 5 base stations is a factor of 160000. This factor increases 
exponentially with the number of base stations. If the Shapley value was applied to 117 
base stations this factor would be enormous, (Elderenbosh, 2018).  
The energy efficiency will not decrease with this variable. The increasing of base 
station drives to a constant “difference in energy efficiency for 20 BSs between the 
calculation for single BSs and clusters of 5 BSs is only 1.5%”, (Elderenbosh, 2018).  
So, applying clustering for the Shapley value is a process with exceptional results to 
decrease the, computation time, but diminishing the reduction in energy efficiency. 
Analyzing now the results of clustering with the nucleolus, looking for the graphics 
4,5 and 6 (annexes), we can conclude that nucleolus is more beneficial than the Shapely 
value.  
The computation time for calculating the nucleolus for a set of 20 small base stations 
is 500 seconds for single base stations, 0.01 seconds for clusters of 2 base stations, and 
0.001 seconds for clusters of 5 BSs. The difference in computation time between single 
BSs and clusters of 5 base stations is a factor of 500000, (Elderenbosh, 2018). Therefore, 
the result of this numbers is the better computation time of the nucleolus compared with 
the Shapley value. The increasing of base station drives to a constant, “The energy 
efficiency of the clusters among 5 BSs is only 1% lower compared to the situation with 
single BSs, when 20 BSs are included in the calculation”, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
So, applying clustering for the nucleolus is a process with exceptional results to 
decrease the, computation time, but diminishing the reduction in energy efficiency. 
Examining at list the results the core when clustering is executed, looking for the 
graphics 7,8 and 9 (annexes), we can conclude the computation time is minor compared 
with the results when the Shapley value and nucleolus are used.  
Then, for calculating the core for a set of 20 small base stations the computation time 
is only 3 seconds, for clusters of 2 it is 0.006 seconds, and for clusters of 5 base stations 
it is 0.004 seconds. The computation time of the application of clusters of 5 is larger 
compared to the method of nucleolus, contrary to the expectations since the situation 
without clusters and clusters of 2 of the core have faster computation times, (Elderenbosh, 
2018).  
The energy efficiency of the approach with clusters of 5 BSs is only 1.5% lower 
compared to the approach with single BSs (Elderenbosh, 2018). This difference like in 
the other process becomes constant with the growing number of base stations. 
So, the conclusion of that results is the computation time reduce when have clustering 
in coalitional game theory, and small decrease in energy efficiency with growing of 
number of small base stations. 
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 3.2 Solution concepts applied to whole cellular network 
To make the simulation of results have been chose clusters of five small base stations 
for the computation of the energy efficiency of the entire cellular network.  
The simulation includes all the 117 small BSs and uses clusters of 5 to reduce the 
computation time. The simulation was repeated for every time step t 2 {1, 2, ..., 24}, 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
 
Analyzing the table 1 and the graphics 10,11,12,13,14 and 15 (annexes), the increasing 
in energy efficiency are among 21% and 121% to the Shapley value. This energy 
efficiency increasing (%) is given by the division A/Shapley.  
Table 1- Overview of the results of the three coalitional game theory solution concepts. These 
numbers are the results of simulations with all 117 small BSs. T = time step, A = situation in 
which all small BSs are active. (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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 The computation time of the simulation was 18 hours and 45 minutes. The total 
average energy efficiency increases of the cellular network using the Shapley value 
solution approach with clusters of 5 small BSs is 48.3% compared to the situation in 
which all the small BSs are active, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
Applying the nucleolus solution concept to determine the final coalition, the results 
about the energy efficiency are precisely the same as the results of the Shapley value. The 
energy efficiency increases between 21-121%. The total average energy efficiency 
increases of the cellular network using the nucleolus as solution with clusters of 5 small 
BSs is 48.3% compared to the situation in which all the small BSs are active. The only 
difference is the computation time. The computation time of the nucleolus is 5 hours and 
27 minutes, which is significantly less than the Shapley value, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
It´s normal the final coalition found with the Shapley value is the same as with the 
nucleolus. The final coalition of the Shapley value is the collection of clusters with the 
highest Shapley values. This implies that these clusters contribute the most to every 
possible coalition. Therefore, this collection of clusters also minimizes the maximum 
excess. However, it does not imply that if there would be a transferable utility, the 
partitioning of payoffs among the players would be the same for both solution concepts, 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
Applying the core solution concept to determine the final coalition among the small 
BSs, an energy efficiency increase between 20-121% is achieved. The total average 
energy efficiency increase of the cellular network is 47.5% compared to the situation 
when all small BSs are active. The computation time of the core is 1 hour and 24 minutes. 
One main drawback of the core is that it can be non-unique. The number of possible 
solutions of the core during these simulation ranges per time step t between 1 and 449. 
The results presented in graphics 14 and 15 and Table 1, show the average of all these 
solution for every time step t. An interesting finding is that the most energy-efficient 
solution within the core at every time step t, is the same as the Shapley value and the 
nucleolus. When for each time step t the solution with the lowest energy efficiency within 
the core is applied, the energy efficiency would increase with 47.1%, (Elderenbosh, 
2018). 
Looking for table 1, we can conclude that t ϵ {4, 5, …, 10} is the same. This is because 
the macro base station has enough available capacity to serve the users of all the same 
small base station. So, we can conclude all the solution take to the grand coalition of all 
small base station. 
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Analyzing the table 2, the main conclusions we can take is the same energy efficiency 
and relative energy efficiency increase in the Shapley value and Nucleolus, but the 
Nucleolus have a lower computation time than the Shapley value. The core has the 
smallest energy efficiency but in computation time is the lowest of the three solution 
concepts. 
One note concerning the results of the computation time needs to be made. The 
computation time strongly depends per computer and the active background programs. 
Furthermore, it can occur that one of the solution concepts is programmed in a less 
efficient way than the others. Therefore, the results presented in this thesis only give an 
idea on how the computation times of the solution concepts differ from each other, 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
3.3 Final Note 
While the results of each of the solution concepts is a great improvement on the 
energy efficiency of the cellular network, the solution concepts are not optimal to use for 
real cellular networks. First, the computation time of each of the solution concepts is too 
long. Small BSs start up in seconds from sleeping mode. Therefore, a control algorithm 
that has to efficiently control a network of BSs needs to work with far smaller time steps 
than an hour, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
To conclude, this case of study shows that coalitional game theory can significantly 
increase the energy efficiency of a cellular network, but, as has occurred, the methods 
used are highly inefficient due to computational complexity. 
4 Conclusions 
The main research question of this paper is, “Can coalitional game theory increase 
the energy efficiency of cellular networks?” To answer the question we used a case study 
in order to obtain the best final results. Also, it`s necessary to take into account the energy 
efficiency is measured in the amount of data transmitted divided by the amount of energy 
consumed [Bit/J] (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
An urban cellular network was modelled with two types of base stations with 
different power consumption profiles. This can make possible to increase the energy 
efficiency of the cellular network. This two types of base stations are the small base 
Table 2- Key results of the simulations for determining the final coalition using the three 
different solution concepts (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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 stations (BSs) and the macro base station (BS).The macro BS has a linearly increasing 
power consumption with increasing data demand, while the small BS has an almost 
constant power consumption with increasing data demand (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
Therefore, some of small base stations can be underutilized, for example, they use only a 
little of their maximum transmission capacity while consuming their highest power 
consumption. In these cases, put this bases in sleeping mode and serve the users with the 
macro base station it`s an option for a highest energy efficient. However, due to safety 
regulations the macro base station has a limited transmission capacity, consequently, the 
key is to find the most energy-efficient coalition of small BSs (Elderenbosh, 2018).  
Three solution concepts inside coalitional game theory have been investigated, the 
Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the core. Each of these solution concepts has its own 
approach and is based on different mathematical concepts. Because of these differences, 
the solutions of the three concepts do not always coincide (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
The Shapley value is a solution based on equality. It is the average marginal 
contribution a player has to every possible coalition among the players. The solution 
concept makes use of the super additivity assumption and therefore implies that the grand 
coalition will form (Elderenbosh, 2018). Each player will get his Shapley value as 
partition of the payoff of the grand coalition.  
The nucleolus is based on dissatisfaction, which is measured by the excess of a 
coalition, where the excess of a coalition is the value of a coalition minus the sum of 
individual payoffs to all the players within that coalition. The nucleolus is the imputation 
that minimizes all the excesses of all the possible coalitions except for the grand coalition 
in a non-increasing order (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
The core is based on stability. A stable solution implies that no player or group of 
players wants to deviate from this solution. The solution of the core is the collection of 
imputations in which there are no sub-coalitions that can more profitably deviate from 
these imputations. One of the drawbacks of the core is that it can be non-unique. 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
An urban cellular network is built to test the hypothesis whether coalitional game 
theory can be used to increase the energy efficiency of cellular networks. To do this, an 
urban network was chosen, since it guarantees the two requirements for this test, a large 
changing data demand profile and a big set of base stations, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
 The case study network consists of one macro base station and 117 small base 
stations, providing the simulated area with mobile data. Inside the simulated area there 
are crowded and less crowded areas with mobile users. The output of the model is the 
power consumption of the macro base station and the power consumption the macro base 
station would need to take over any small base stations at any time step t, (Elderenbosh, 
2018). 
The coalitional game theory solution concepts use this output to test whether they 
can increase the energy efficiency of the cellular network. In first place, one drawback all 
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 of the solution concepts have must be overcome. To speechless this problem clusters of 
small base stations can be formed, (Elderenbosh, 2018).  
A cluster of small base stations then acts as one single player in the game, if the 
cluster goes into sleeping mode, all the small base stations within that cluster go into 
sleeping mode. However, in general it could also decrease the energy efficiency, 
compared to the situation when all the small base stations are considered as single players. 
The results showed that there is just a 1% energy efficiency decrease between the situation 
with clusters of 5 small base stations and with single small base stations considered as 
individual players. Therefore, the case study continued with clusters of 5 small base 
stations, (Elderenbosh, 2018). 
These three solution concepts are then used to determine the most energy efficient 
coalition among the 117 small base stations. Each of the three solution concepts induces 
an enormous increase in energy efficiency. The Shapley value and the nucleolus yield the 
same results in terms of energy efficiency. They increase the energy efficiency with 
48.3% compared to the situation when all the small base station are active. The energy 
efficiency increase induced by the solution of the core is 47.5%. The computation time 
of the nucleolus is 5.5 hours, which is around one third of the computation time of the 
Shapley value. Therefore, the nucleolus is considered as the best solution concept, 
(Elderenbosh, 2018). 
While the solution concepts used in this case study have shown to enormously 
increase the energy efficiency of cellular networks, due to their computational complexity 
they are not suited to be implemented in real cellular networks. There are simpler and 
quicker methods to find the most energy efficient coalitions of small base stations, 
(Elderenbosh, 2018).  
In addition to the previous results, with these coalitions, companies will reduce their 
costs as is the case of Vodafone, in 2016, the worldwide energy consumption was 4000 
GWh, (Vodafone, 2017). If it can be assumed that Vodafone pays the average electricity 
price of e 0.20/kWh, the total energy bill of Vodafone is over e 800 million. If the 
company would have been able to save 10% of the total energy use by implementing an 
energy saving algorithm for its cellular network, Vodafone could have increased its 
operating profit with e 80 million, which is a profit increase of almost 8%, (Vodafone, 
2017). In addition to the reduction of energy costs, these reductions would have 
environmental implications because there would be a reduction of CO2 emissions into 
the atmosphere. 
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Annexes 
 
Graphic 1- Shapley value- Energy efficiency of the Shapley value (difference in energy 
efficiency when using different cluster sizes with an increasing number of small BSs) 
(Elderenbosh, 2018) 
 
 
 
Graphic 2- Shapley value- Relative energy efficiency increase of the Shapley value 
compared to when all small BSs are active (Difference in relative energy efficiency 
increase when using different cluster sizes with an increasing number of small BSs, 
compared to the situation when all small BSs are active) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 3- Shapley value- Computation time of the Shapley value 
(Different computation times for different cluster sizes with an increasing 
number of small BSs) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 4- Nucleolus- Energy efficiency of the nucleolus (Difference 
in energy efficiency when using different cluster sizes with an increasing 
number of small BSs) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 5- Nucleolus- Relative energy efficiency increase of the nucleolus compared to 
when all small BSs are active (Difference in relative energy efficiency increase when using 
different cluster sizes with an increasing number of small BSs, compared to the situation when 
all small BSs are active) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 6- Nucleolus- Computation time of the nucleolus 
(Different computation times for different cluster sizes with an 
increasing number of small BSs) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 7- Core- Energy efficiency of the core (Difference in energy 
efficiency when using different cluster sizes with an increasing number of 
small BSs) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 8- Core- Relative energy efficiency increase of the core compared to 
when all small BSs are active (Difference in relative energy efficiency increase 
when using different cluster sizes with an increasing number of small BSs, 
compared to the situation when all small BSs are active) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 9- Core- Computation time of the core (Different 
computation times for different cluster sizes with an increasing number 
of small BSs) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 10- Shapley value- Energy efficiency when the core is applied to all 
small BSs ( Difference in energy efficiency for each time step t when the final 
coalitional among all small BSs is found using the Shapley value) (Elderenbosh, 
2018) 
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Graphic 11- Shapley value- Relative energy efficiency increase of the core applied 
to all small BSs, compared to when all small BSs are active (Relative energy efficiency 
increase for each time step t when the final coalition among all small BSs is found 
using the Shapley value) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 12- Nucleolus- Energy efficiency when the nucleolus is applied to all small 
BSs (Difference in energy efficiency for each time step t when the final coalitional among 
all small BSs is found using the nucleolus) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 13- Nucleolus- Relative energy efficiency increase of the nucleolus applied to 
all small BSs, compared to when all small BSs are active (Relative energy efficiency increase 
for each time step t when the final coalition among all small BSs is found using the 
nucleolus) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
Graphic 14- Core- Energy efficiency when the core is applied to all small BSs 
(Difference in energy efficiency for each time step t when the final coalitional among all 
small BSs is found using the core) (Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Graphic 15- Core- - Relative energy efficiency increase of the core applied to all small 
BSs, compared to when all small BSs are active (Relative energy efficiency increase for 
each time step t when the final coalition among all small BSs is found using the core) 
(Elderenbosh, 2018) 
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Chapter 7
Game Theory and Cancer: Cell-cell interactions
and Host-cell interactions
7
Fernandes, Bernardo and Gonc¸alves, Tobias
Abstract
Cancer can be described by the contamination of healthy cells by the cancerous cells that
spread across the organism. In this paper, firstly, we are going to use game theory to explain
the cell-cell interactions throw models like the angiogenesis, programmed cell death, among
other models explained further in this paper. Secondly, having as basis (Rand, 2013), we
will analyze the host-cells interactions and the strategies adopted. The methodology used
is based on (I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997) and (Rand, 2013), among other authors. The cell-cell
interactions and the host-cell interactions are shown, mostly, in payoff matrices, depending
on the genotype under study. The conclusions of each example are dependent of the values of
the strategies adopted among the players.
7This paper is based on Rand, K. D. (2013). Game Theory and Cancer: Using Game
Theory to Model Host-Tumor Interactions (Master’s thesis). University of Oslo.
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 1 Introduction 
Game theory has many applications in many areas. According to (Colman, 1995) 
most of the games studied have applications in the social sciences and in the biological 
sciences. (Smith, 1978) points out that in biological applications, strategies are assumed 
by genotypes, throughout the area of action. This article goes along with the biological 
field, specifically in the analysis of cancer disease.  
Game theory is thus allied to the problems associated with cancer, where cells and 
organisms produce strategies by the presence of several factors, or, more precisely, of a 
number of genotypes. 
The article aims to highlight some of these factors and to see what the results of cell-
cell and organism-cell interaction. 
Among the various genotypes that cells can acquire, we will address a specific group 
of genotypes, among which: the presence of cytotoxin in cells, angiogenesis and even, 
programmed cell death. We will also highlight the relationship between the organism and 
cells and the strategies they adopt.  
This article is composed of 6 chapters: This Introduction, Literature Review, Problem 
Statement, Methodology, Application and Conclusion 
The results are based on the methodology used by several authors, case of 
(I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997), (Rand, 2013), among others. This methodology allowed us to 
arrive at several results, which are inserted in the application and the conclusion. 
 In the literature review below, we intend to provide other problems not mentioned 
in this article and their response to them. In addition, we intend to offer information about 
the disease, regarding its characteristics and statistics. 
2 Literature Review 
This literature review is based on two objectives. First of all, before an approach 
between game theory and cancer, we intend to give a concrete idea of the disease at its 
features, whether their effects produced in different organisms. For that we will have as 
a reference, different authors who study and analyze the disease in question. 
Subsequently, we aim to correlate cancer with game theory, and analyze the methods in 
the theory of games, that allow a better understanding of this subject. Various cancer-
related problems in the interactions between cells and between organisms and cells will 
be mentioned herein. 
For a more specific definition concerning the disease, can be based on the definition 
of Momna Hejmadi: "Cancer can be defined as a disease in which a group of abnormal 
cells grow uncontrollably by disregarding the normal rules of cell division. Normal cells 
are constantly subject to signals that dictate whether the cell should divide, differentiate 
into another cell or die. Cancer cells develop a degree of autonomy from these signals, 
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 resulting in uncontrolled growth and proliferation. If this proliferation is allowed to 
continue and spread, it can be fatal” (Hejmadi, 2010). Going even to the thesis that we 
have based on Knut D. Rand (Rand, 2013), itself has a very brief approach regarding the 
disease, citing that "cancer is a common and deadly disease". (P. 19) 
Given that Knut Rand states that cancer is a common disease (also a common sense 
idea), we intend here to present brief statistical data to prove this affirmation and idea 
defined in society. With this, we will use the 2008 statistical data, mentioned in the thesis 
bibliography (Rand, 2013), adding to them, the most recent data for 2018. The data refers 
to the United States. 
According to (Jemal, 2008) we can see some interesting aspects. According with 
Illustration 1: Estimated New Cases and Deaths by Sex, USA, 2008 , approximately 
1,437,180 new cases of cancer arose in the United States, where in the same year, the 
disease caused about 565,650 deaths. Ten years later, according to (Siegel, 2018), we see 
that the table, Illustration 2: Estimated New Cases and Deaths by Sex, USA, 2018 shows 
higher values when compared to 2008. In 2018, there were about 1,735,350 new cases of 
cancer, where the disease killed approximately 609,640 patients. 
Cancer has to be seen and treated as the major problem that is, which kills more and 
more individuals, not only in the US but throughout the world. According to the 
(International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2018) , we can take into account the 
following words: "The global cancer burden is estimated to have risen to 18.1 million 
new cases and 9.6 million deaths in 2018." 
But what are the characteristics of cancer? What differentiates cancer cells from 
normal cells? Knut Rand, in (Rand, 2013) , presents the characteristics of cancer-based 
cells (Hanahan & Weinberg, 2011). According to these authors, in (Hanahan & Weinberg, 
2011), we can see that both say the following: "The hallmarks of cancer comprise six 
biological capabilities acquired during the multistep development of human tumors. The 
hallmarks constitute an organizing principle for rationalizing the complexities of 
neoplastic disease. They include sustaining proliferative signaling, evading growth 
suppressors, resisting cell death, enabling replicative immortality, inducing angiogenesis, 
and activating invasion and metastasis." When all these characteristics are found in 
normal cells, they become totally malignant cancer cells, contributing to a better 
performance of the tumors. 
According to (National Cancer Institute, 2018) (Cancer.net), the available treatments 
and the cancer itself may cause some effects in the hosts. Relieving these side effects is 
an important part of cancer care and may be called palliative care or supportive care. It’s 
important to keep in mind that the effects of cancer may differ from person to person, 
even between those who are receiving the same treatment.  
In order with the available information (OHSU Knight Cancer Institute), the physical 
effects caused by cancer and cancer treatment can vary from anemia, bleeding and 
bruising, bone loss, cancer recurrence, constipation, among others. These effects can 
make you more dependent of others because they will affect your autonomy. 
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 Cancer does not only affect you physically, but also affects you socially and 
emotionally. It will affect your body image and self-esteem, it may lead you to a 
depression, you will be afraid of the return of the cancer, you’ll feel lonely, and you might 
have high levels of stress, among other effects. 
Going now to the other work already done in the theory of games and cancer, we can 
take into account several problems, methodological processes and conclusions drawn 
from this subject, studied by several authors. 
(Basanta, Simon, Hatzikirou, & Deutsch, 2008) affirm that some phenotypes1 are 
more essential, crucial than others for the proliferation of the tumors. In the study, they 
used the evolutionary games theory (EGT) to analyze the various interactions between 
tumor cell phenotypes, namely, autonomous growth, anaerobic glycolysis and even 
cancer cell invasion. The objective is to understand the effect of these phenotypes on the 
progression / evolution of glioma2. The paper concludes that the therapy, which causes 
an increase in the costs of anaerobic glycoloysis, can reduce the presence of phenotypes. 
In (Orlando, Gatenby, & Brown, 2012) is said that, usually, chemotherapy for 
metastatic cancer3 fails, because the tumor cells tend to become more resistant to the 
drugs. In this paper cancer treatment is seen as a game between the oncologists and the 
tumor, where the oncologists choose the therapy and the tumor chooses an adaptive 
strategy. The authors use a mathematical model that analyses the resistance of the tumor 
cells against two types of drugs. After the research process, they found that the best 
response to when the tumor cells invest their resources to maximize their response to one 
drug, is a time invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, when the tumor 
cells develop a response to both drugs, the optimal protocol is an alternative use of both 
drugs. The authors conclude that when planning an optimal chemotherapy, having 
knowledge in both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interaction is crucial for a better 
treatment of the patient.   
According to (I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997) a tumor is a group of cells that may consist 
of different types of cells. Tomlinson says that the tumor cells often use other tumor cells 
to boost their replication. Here is where game theory comes to play, because there are 
models that can be used to understand and explain the interactions between the different 
tumor cells. In this paper we can see that some cells produce cytotoxic substance4 that 
enables the reproduction of these cells. The interactions between tumor cells can act in 
favor of the individual cell, because some strategies can retard the growth of the tumor. 
                                                 
1 The phenotype of an organism is the composite of the organism's observable 
characteristics or traits, including its morphology or physical form and structure.  
2 Glioma is a type of tumor that occurs in the brain and spinal cord. Gliomas begin in the gluey 
supportive cells (glial cells) that surround nerve cells and help them function. 
3 Metastatic cancer: is when the tumor spreads to different parts of the body from 
when it started. 
4 Cytotoxic substance: A substance that destroys other cells. 
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 According to (Whiteside, 2005), a healthy immune system is critical for the control 
of cancer and for a decrease in the progression of cancerous cells and consequent tumors. 
The problem here is that tumors develop strategies and mechanisms to escape and disrupt 
the functioning of the immune system. With this, several therapeutic strategies are being 
developed to correct the immune imbalances, caused by cancer cells. The paper concludes 
that immunotherapy5 alone is not sufficient for the disappearance of cancer cells and 
consequent removal of tumors. (Whiteside, 2005) suggest that the challenge will be to 
combine various types of therapies, including cancer vaccinations, thus taking advantage 
of advances in modern immunology. 
3 Problem Statement 
Before we refer to the methodology used in this paper, we want to be aware of the 
answer that this paper intends to offer in relation to game theory and cancer. This paper 
aims to analyze cell-cell relationships and to study the relationships between organisms 
and cells.  
After the literature review, we were interested in addressing the relationships 
between cells, as already mentioned. Among several cell genotypes, we will refer the 
genotypes acquired by cells, in the presence of cytotoxins, addressed in 
(I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997). In addition, we will address other cellular genotypes, 
angiogenesis and programmed cell death. 
Regarding the interactions between the organisms and the cells, we will take into 
account mainly (Rand, 2013) where it tries to know the strategies adopted by each of 
them. 
4 Methodology  
4.1 Evolutionary Games Theory (EGT) 
In this paper we will be on the presence of Evolutionary Games Theory. For a better 
understanding of the EGT models, we could have as a base (McKenzie, 2002) where the 
own indicates that: "Evolutionary game theory originated as an application of the 
mathematical theory of games to biological contexts, a strategic aspect to evolution." 
According to Knut Rand, in (Rand, 2013), the same affirms that: "In evolutionary 
game theory, the interpretation of a game is different from classical game theory. Where 
game theory traditionally models rational agents choosing strategies to maximize their 
                                                 
5Immunotherapy is a type of cancer treatment that helps your immune system fight 
cancer. Immunotherapy is a type of biological therapy. Biological therapy is a type of 
treatment that uses substances made from living organisms to treat cancer. 
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 payoff, evolutionary game theory players who are programmed to play a certain strategy 
in a game where the player's payoff represents his Darwinian fitness6." 
In this paper we will emphasize two classes of games, due to their relevance in the 
best explanation and understanding of EGT models. These two classes are: Symmetric 
Two-Player Games (STG); and Population Games. 
4.2 Symmetric Two-Player Games (STG) 
Symmetric Two-Player Games are games where payoffs depend not only on the 
strategies and actions taken by the player in question, but also on the rest. According to 
(Rand, 2013), STG are "the special class of games that is of special importance to 
Evolutionary Game Theory (...) These are games with two players where the roles of the 
players can be interchanged without changing the dynamics of the game. In an STG, each 
player has only one information set, and the action set on each set is equal." 
 
4.3 Population Games (PG) 
Based on  (Quijano, Ocampo-Martinez, Barreiro-Gomez, Obando, Pantoja, & 
Mojica-Nava, 2016) (Rand, 2013), we see that population games are games that 
symbolize the various strategic interactions between a large group / populations of 
players. Population games are distinct from normal-form games, because in PG players 
are grouped in mass. Each player's payoff depends on the strategy chosen and the strategy 
chosen by the rest of the population. An assumption of these games is that all players 
have the same set of strategies. 
4.4 Cytotoxin 
For a better understanding of cytotoxin and cytotoxic agents, we can take into 
account (Joensuu, Jyrkkiö, Kellokumpu-Lehtinen, & Pirkko-Liisa, 2014) and (NIH - 
National Cancer Institute) where they claim that a cytotoxic agent is an agent that has a 
substance (cytotoxin) that is harmful to cells, even leading to death itself, which also 
includes cancer cells. The death of the cancer cells causes them not to propagate, where 
later, would contaminate normal cells. The presence of a cytotoxic substance may even 
lead to decreased tumor size. Cytotoxic agents may arise in chemotherapy, through 
cytotoxic drugs. 
Relating game theory to cytotoxic agents, we can have as basis a basic model used 
and delineated in (I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997) to understand the interactions among several 
cellular genotypes. As a starting point, and in accordance with the information in the 
previous paragraph, we consider that the cells produce a cytotoxic substance that is 
                                                 
6 Darwinian fitness: capability of the body distributing inhaled oxygen to muscle tissue during 
increased physical effort. 
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 harmful to other cells with which they interact, where they gain a benefit when they 
perform this action.  
As mentioned, there may be several genotypes / strategies. In this case, we are 
considering three genotypes, namely: 
1. Cells produce a cytotoxic substance where they contaminate surrounding cells; 
2. The cells are resistant to the cytotoxic substance; 
3. Cells do not produce cytotoxin, nor are they resistant to the substance. 
After these three genotypes / strategies, we have the following assumptions: 
a. The fitness is given by z; 
b. The cost of producing the cytotoxin is e ˄ 𝑒 >  0; 
c. The harm of being affected by the cytotoxin is f  ˄ 0 < 𝑓 < 0; 
d. The benefit of infecting other cells with cytotoxin is expressed by g ˄  𝑔 >  0; 
e. The cost of resisting the cytotoxin is given by h ˄   ℎ >  0. 
4.5 Angiogenesis 
According to (Tomlinson & Bodmer, 1997) (Rand, 2013) this model considers the 
production of a Growth Factor (GF) by the cells, such as an angiogenesis promoter. “Its 
role is as a genetic alternative to models which assume that production of angiogenesis 
factors is caused by inducible, epigenetic mechanisms”. Here we will only consider 
strategies made by two cells. A+ cells (frequency 𝑣 = 1 − 𝑤) produces an angiogenesis 
factor that as a cost (i) and a benefit (j), while A- (frequency w) doesn’t. The benefits are 
common to the cell itself and to the cells it encounters. 
4.6 Programmed cell death 
It is believed in this paper (Tomlinson & Bodmer, 1997) that prevention of 
Programmed Cell Death (PCD) depends on paracrine growth factor secreted by adjacent 
cells. This model assumes that the tumor has become too large for paracrine growth factor 
to have any effect. Three genotypes are considered:  
1. (1) A cell produces a growth factor to prevent PCD; this acts only in a paracrine 
fashion: frequency k. 
2. (2) A cell produces a growth factor to prevent PCD; this acts only in a autocrine 
fashion: frequency m. 
3. (3) A cell is independent on paracrine growth factor but does not produce it: 
frequency 𝑛 = 1 − 𝑘 − 𝑚. 
In addition: 
a. Baseline fitness is unity; 
b. The cost of producing paracrine growth factor is a (𝑎 >  0); 
c. The benefit of receiving paracrine growth factor is b (𝑏 >  0); 
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 d. The net cost-benefit of producing autocrine growth factor or becoming 
independent of growth factor is c (with 𝑐 >  0 usually, if the autocrine growth 
factor is advantageous). 
4.7 Host-cell interactions 
According to (Rand, 2013) an organism is represented by a multicellular organism 
and a cell is thought to represent a member of the cell population associated with an 
organism. The premises of the model are: 
 Some part of an organism’s fitness is determined both by its trait and by the 
traits of the cell in its cell population. 
 Some part of a cell´s fitness is determined both by its traits and by the trait of 
the organism it is part of. 
For a better understanding of this model is important to know that: 
 The role of an organism is denoted by O and the role of a cell is denoted by 
C; 
 The possible traits of an organism is denoted by ∑ை and the possible traits 
of a cell is denoted by ∑஼ . 
 The size of the organismal trait space is denoted 𝑚ை and the size of the cellular 
trait space 𝑚஼. 
 The contribution to an organism’s fitness is given by the function 
𝑔: ∑ ×ை ∑ → ℝ஼  
 The contribution to a cell’s fitness is given by the function 𝑓: ∑ ×஼ ∑ → ℝை  
The fitness functions g and f above can be considered the payoffs from an interaction 
between a single cell and an organism. 
The strategies of the organism are given by the following summation: 
෍ = ( 𝜎ଵை , 𝜎ଶை , … ,
ை
 𝜎ெ௢ை  ) 
The strategies of the cells are presented in the summation below: 
෍ = ( 𝜎ଵ஼ , 𝜎ଶ஼ , … ,
஼
 𝜎஼௢஼  ) 
 
The organism presents two strategies: 
 A punitive strategy P: this strategy decreases the fitness of tumor cells, 
represented by p; 
 A P´ passive strategy: this strategy does not interfere with the dynamics of cells. 
 
In turn, the cells present the following strategies: 
168
  A tumor strategy T: represents the increase and proliferation of cancer cells, 
giving an advantage to the fitness of cells, represented by a. On the other hand, 
there is a decrease in the fitness of the organism, represented by d; 
 A normal strategy T': there is normal cellular functioning. 
5 Application 
Regarding the cytotoxin issue, we can see the following: 
1. (1) cells type is p; 
2. (2) cells type is q; 
3. (3) cells type is r; 
After this, we can observe the following payoff matrix in relation to the cell-cell 
interaction: 
  p q r 
  1 2 3 
p 1 z-e-f+g z-h z-f 
q 2 z-e z-h z 
r 3 z-e+g z-h z 
 
Table 1 - Cytotoxin Payoff Matrix 
We can see that: 
 𝐸 (1)  =  𝑝 (𝑧 − 𝑒 − 𝑓 + 𝑔) +  𝑞 (𝑧 − 𝑒)  +  𝑟 (𝑧 − 𝑒 + 𝑔)  ⇔ 𝐸 (1)  =  𝑧 −
𝑒 +  𝑝 (𝑔 − 𝑓)  +  𝑟𝑔  
 𝐸 (2) =   𝑝 (𝑧 − ℎ) +  𝑞 (𝑧 − ℎ) +  𝑟 (𝑧 − ℎ )  ⇔ (𝑝 + 𝑞 + 𝑟) × (𝑧 − ℎ )  ⇔
1 × (𝑧 − ℎ) ⇔ 𝑧 − ℎ  
 𝐸 (3)  =  𝑧 − 𝑝𝑓   
The equilibrium between the various strategies is given by: 
 𝐸 (2) =  𝐸 (3)  ⇔   𝑧 − ℎ = 𝑧 − 𝑝𝑓 ⇔ 𝑝 =  ௛
௙
  
 𝐸 (1) =  𝐸 (3)  ⇔ 𝑝𝑓 = 𝑒 − 𝑝(𝑔 − 𝑓) − 𝑟𝑔 ⇔ 𝑟 =  ௘
௚
− ௛
௙
  
 𝑝 + 𝑞 + 𝑟 = 1 ⇔ 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑟 ⇔ 𝑞 = 1 −  ௛
௙
−  ௘
௚
+  ௛
௙
 ⇔ 𝑞 = 1 −  ௘
௚
   
After arriving at the equilibrium frequencies and taking into account the assumptions 
pointed out in the methodology, we can take into account the following inequalities: 
0 < ℎ 𝑓ൗ < 1 
0 <  𝑒 𝑔ൗ −  ℎ 𝑓ൗ < 1 
0 < 𝑒 𝑔ൗ < 1 
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 Examining these last inequalities, we realized that for the verification of their own, 
the cost of being affected by cytotoxin (f) should be greater than the cost of resisting 
cytotoxin (h). That is:𝑓 > ℎ. 
In addition to this, we note that the benefit of infecting the remaining cells with 
cytotoxin (g) should be higher than the cost of producing cytotoxin (e). This is:𝑔 > 𝑒. 
According to Illustration 3: Dependence of equilibrium values of p, q and r on initial 
values and parameters of selection under the basic model, we can observe some 
interesting data, related to the last conclusions that we have just arrived. 
It should be noted that the benefit values associated with cytotoxin proliferation (f) 
are always higher than the costs associated with cytotoxin resistance (h), where we can 
verify the condition𝑓 >  ℎ. However, according to the same table, it is no longer between 
the benefit of infecting the remaining cells (g) and the production cost of the cytotoxin 
(e). This condition is not always true.  
We can also check another important aspect in table. The initial frequencies are not 
identical to the equilibrium frequencies. Initial frequencies influence subsequent 
frequencies. For example, the equilibrium r is influenced in favor when the initial p is 
small. 
Looking now at the angiogenesis case: 
 
  Fitness of genotype 
   A+ A- 
Encounter 
with 
A+ 1-i+j 1+j 
A- 1-i+j 1 
 
Table 2 - Angiogenesis Payoff Matrix 
The new value of v for each succeeding generation (v’) is given by the probability of 
an A+ cell encountering another A+ cell or an A- genotype, multiplied by the appropriate 
fitness in each case and then normalized, resulting in: 
𝑣ᇱ =
(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣
[(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣 + (1 + 𝑣𝑗)(1 − 𝑣)]
 
At equilibrium:  
𝑣ᇱ = 𝑣 
⇔ 𝑣 =
(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣
[(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣 + (1 + 𝑣𝑗)(1 − 𝑣)]
 
⇔
𝑣
(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣
=
1
[(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣 + (1 + 𝑣𝑗)(1 − 𝑣)]
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 ⇔
1
(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)
=
1
[(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣 + (1 + 𝑣𝑗)(1 − 𝑣)]
 
⇔ 1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗 = (1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗)𝑣 + (1 + 𝑣𝑗)(1 − 𝑣) 
⇔ 0 = (𝑣 − 1)(1 − 𝑖 + 𝑗) − (𝑣 − 1)(𝑣𝑗 + 1) 
⇔ 𝑣 = 1 −
𝑖
𝑗
 
Where: 
 𝑗 >  𝑖 → There is equilibrium. 
 𝑣 =  0 → Strategy A+ is lost from the population at equilibrium. 
 𝑣 =  1 → Does not exist equilibrium. 
 Equilibrium frequencies are independent of the initial value of v. 
About applications on programmed cell death, we have: 
  Fitness genotype 
  1 2 3 
Encounter 
with 
1 1-a+b 1+b+c 1+b 
2 1-a 1+c 1 
3 1-a 1+c 1 
Table 3 - Programmed Cell Death Payoff Matrix 
It is easier to analyze this model by using the fact that fitnesses must be equal at 
equilibrium. The assumption of asexual reproduction allows this analysis to be 
performed. If we denote the fitness of strategy (1) by w₁, strategy (2) by w₂ and strategy 
(3) by w₃, we have: 
 𝑤ଵ =  𝑘(1 − 𝑎 + 𝑏) + 𝑚(1 − 𝑎) + 𝑛(1 − 𝑎) 
⇔ 𝑤ଵ = 𝑘𝑏 + (𝑘 + 𝑚 + 𝑛)(1 − 𝑎) 
⇔ 𝑤ଵ = 𝑘𝑏 + ൫𝑘 + 𝑚 + (1 − 𝑘 − 𝑚)൯(1 − 𝑎) 
⇔ 𝑤ଵ = 1 − 𝑎 − 𝑘𝑏 
 
 𝑤ଶ = 𝑘(1 + 𝑏 + 𝑐) + 𝑚(1 + 𝑐) + 𝑛(1 + 𝑐) 
⇔ 𝑤ଶ = 𝑘𝑏 + 𝑘(1 + 𝑐) + 𝑚(1 + 𝑐) + 𝑛(1 + 𝑐) 
⇔ 𝑤ଶ = 𝑘𝑏 + (𝑘 + 𝑚 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝑐) 
⇔ 𝑤ଶ = 𝑘𝑏 + (1 + 𝑐) 
 
 𝑤ଷ = 𝑘(1 + 𝑏) + 𝑚 + 𝑛 
⇔ 𝑤ଷ = 𝑘 + 𝑘𝑏 + 𝑚 + 1 − 𝑘 − 𝑚 
⇔ 𝑤ଷ = 1 + 𝑘𝑏 
Considering w₁ and w₃: 
w₃ > w₁ always, unless a = 0 
Whenever a > 0, strategy (3) will always displace strategy (1) from the population. 
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 Considering strategies 2 and 3 alone:  
If 𝑘 = 0, 
𝑤ଶ = 1 + 𝑐 
𝑤ଷ = 1 
Whenever 𝑐 > 0, strategy (2) will always displace strategy (3) from the population. 
When 𝑐 > 0, strategy (3) will always displace strategy (2) from the population. In the 
special case of 𝑐 = 0, neither of the genotypes change in frequency. “Simulations confirm 
these conclusions and show that the boundary equilibria 𝑚 = 0 (with 𝑐 > 0) and 𝑛 = 0 
(with 𝑐 < 0) are stable”. 
According to this model, there is a strong selection for autocrine growth factor, as 
long as the benefits are bigger than the costs (𝑐 > 0). If this does not happen, no cells 
produce growth factor. No stable polymorphism between strategies can exist. Strategy 
(1), altruistic production of paracrine growth factor never occurs, even is strategy (2) is 
absent, although inspection readily shows that strategy (1) could lead to faster overall 
tumor growth in some cases. 
Finally, about the host-cell interactions, we will have as reference (Rand, 2013) 
where it is used extensive game-form to try to explain these same connections. The game 
is constituted by the organism (O), where the organism is the first to decide. Only then 
do the cells enter (C), where they decide after the strategy taken by the organism. 
We can take into account the following functions: 
𝐺𝑗(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥௜∈∑಴ ig(j,xi) 
Fitness function for organisms: Since an organism has a population of cells, fitness 
should be influenced by each cell in the population state. 
𝐹𝑗(𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑖, 𝑗) 
The cell’s fitness function it’s related with the organismal trait and with the cell´s 
strategy. According to the data of the methodology on the host-cell interaction, we can 
observe the following representation in extensive form: 
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For a better analysis of this game we used the backward induction that leaded us to:  
 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑝 > 𝑎, and 𝑐 < 𝑑 we have: 
 
The Nash equilibrium here is: (P, TT´). After resorting to the use of backward 
induction, we realize that, first, the strategies p and a, as well as the strategies c and d are 
correlated, where they determine the equilibrium of this game. As a demonstration, we 
have the example described above. We see that the body has a great incentive to attack 
the cancer cells when it detects that the cells have the goal of applying the cancer strategy. 
In the opposite case, when 𝑐 >  𝑑, and 𝑝 >  𝑎: 
 
The Nash equilibrium is: (P’, TT´) 
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 When these conditions are verified, especially when the values of 𝑐 are higher than 
those of 𝑑, we see that there are changes in the strategies adopted by the organism, where 
it practices a strategy that does not interfere in cellular functioning. 
6 Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper was to analyze the relationships between cells and the 
interactions between cell and organism. We based our research in a few articles of 
different authors, but, most importantly in the thesis named “Game Theory and Cancer” 
by Knut D. Rand. In order to explain the behavior of cells we used game theory and some 
models previously developed to substantiate their behavior. 
Regarding the problem related to cytotoxin, with reference (I.P.M.Tomlinson, 1997) 
we can firstly mention that the initial frequencies are not equal to the frequencies of 
equilibrium. It is true that the initial values of the variables influence the equilibrium 
values. According to the examples given in the application, we have seen that the cost of 
resistance to cytotoxin (ℎ) is less than the cost of being affected with the cytotoxic 
substance. From this we can conclude that there is a greater propensity for cells to resist 
cytotoxin. It is also possible that the various strategies can become fixed in the population, 
depending on the initial parameters. It should also be noted that regression of tumors may 
occur if one cancer cell acts against another cancer cell. However, the advantage of 
infecting another cell with a cytotoxic substance (𝑔) may increase. 
In (Tomlinson & Bodmer, 1997) is where we based our research to study the 
relationships between tumor cells, and the strategies adopted by the cells. This cell’s 
strategy can spread throughout the tumor cell population from low initial frequencies to 
fixation or some internal equilibrium value. The models used by these authors ser the 
angiogenesis and the programmed cell death. This model represent strategies that bring 
benefits to tumor growth, but doesn’t necessarily makes tumor cell population achieve its 
optimal replication rate. 
In the model of angiogenesis, is shown that polymorphism between producers and 
non-producers can occur, regardless of the initial genotype frequencies. To achieve 
equilibrium in this model, the value of the benefits and the costs of the angiogenesis must 
be equal. It’s important to the cells that make the angiogenesis factor that they benefit 
from it as well, otherwise they will be lost from the population. “Stable, polymorphic 
production of angiogenesis factor is an alternative to epigenetic models of angiogenesis. 
This finding has possible implications for anti-angionesis therapy”. (Tomlinson & 
Bodmer, 1997). 
In the model of Programmed Cell Death is said that paracrine growth factor only has 
an effect on other cells and that no internal equilibrium exists in this model. The cells that 
produce a growth factor with a paracrine effect are always lost from the population, 
because this behavior is essentially altruistic. “Altruistic production of growth factor, 
despite benefits for the tumor as a whole, is not possible under the assumptions of the 
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 Programmed Cell Death model. It may be possible if a model were to incorporate some 
form of kin selection”. 
About host-cell interactions we can take into account that the organism develops 
strategies against the cancer cells and against the negative effects induced in the organism. 
The body thus has a defense mechanism. The conclusion we come to is that regardless of 
the parameter values, the body "looks" at the body as a whole, taking into account the 
behavior of the cancer cells. Cancer cells, on the other hand, only think of a strategy that 
will allow them to be more useful, give them a greater utility.  
This article and its subsequent research have enabled us to understand the various 
applications of game theory in cancer-related health and well-being. Although we present 
some basic models to explain some of these interactions, we think that with these models 
we can get the core ideas between the interactions of the cancer cells and the organism. 
Game theory thus presents a solution for a better interpretation of disease and biological 
phenomena. 
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 7 Annexes 
 
 
Illustration 1: Estimated New Cases and Deaths by Sex, USA, 2008 
 
Illustration 2: Estimated New Cases and Deaths by Sex, USA, 2018 
 
Illustration 3: Dependence of equilibrium values of p, q and r on initial values and 
parameters of selection under the basic model 
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